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Politics, Ethnicity and Jostling for Power 
The Evolution of the Institutions of Muslim Leadership and Kadhiship in Colonial Kenya, 
1895-1963 
Hassan Abdulrahman Mwakimako 
This study demonstrates the flexibility and manipulability of Islamic leadership in a pluralistic 
situation, and argues that colonial policies and practices concerning Islamic legal practitioners 
(qadis), their institutions (qadis courts) reflected British prejudices about ethnicity and race. In a 
broad sense this work first examines how power, politics, ethnicity and colonialism influenced 
the development of political institutions among Muslims. Secondly, it debates the basis of the 
authority of the (ulam~P as they were appointed to occupy the posts of Shaykh aI-Islam, Chief 
Kadhi, lower Kadhis, and pseudo Kadhis. The dissertation articulates the nature of colonial power 
as indicated by British colonial officer's responses to demands by Muslim populations in the 
towns of Mombasa, Nairobi and Mumias. It situates colonial power, especially its policy of 
'indirect rule' and its impact, as the British colonial government embarked on administrative 
innovations that subsequently co-opted indigenous elites into the colonial administrative 
structures. The process began with the co-option of representatives of Arab communities of 
Mombasa into the Legislative Council, while similar demands by non-Arab Muslim communities 
were ignored. The study follows the development of opposing groups of civil society formed by 
different Muslim identity groups and exemplified by groups like Coast Arab Association, (CAA), 
Afro-Asian Association (AAA), Arab Association (AA) and African Muslim Society (AMS). The 
study points to the role and significance of ethnicity in political leadership among Muslim while 
tracing the institutionalization of race as colonial officers discoursed the states intervention on 
communal representations in colonial bureaucratic structures. The dissertation also focuses on 
how a section of Muslim elite, the cuiamiP were co-opted into the colonial bureaucratic structures 
and appointed to serve as Shaykh al-Islam and Chief Kadhi. Through a chronology of 
appointments of prominent 'ulamiP to these posts the study identifies intra- Muslim competitions 
but also shows how preferences by colonial pro-consuls for (ulamiP of Arab descent created an 
impression that non-Arab people were not qualified or eligible for the post turning a religious 
form of authority into prevalent racialized politics. The chronology of appointments questions the 
notion that knowledge espoused by the (ulamlP propelled their influence and power and shows 
that loyalty to colonial policies and racial identity of appointees mattered more. The racialization 
of the authority of the (ulamlP was instituted from the topmost post of Chief Kadhi to the lower 
positions of town Kadhis registrars of Muslim marriage in Nairobi and Mumias where preference 
for Arabs continued to be practiced. 
This study was contemplated to identify, discuss and understand the role played by colonial 
authorities in the emergence of political and religious forms of leadership among Muslims during 
colonial Kenya. Its contribution is the argument that Muslim authority emerged in the colonial 
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1.1 Background to the study 
This study dates back to late 1994, resulting from the proceedings of an 'uiamii) 
symposium, 1 organized by the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM),2 
involving 'ulamii) from all over Kenya who congregated in Nairobi to deliberate on 
problems afflicting Muslims, and thus expected to create a 'mouthpiece' institution of 
religious leadership and opinion. The symposium was the initial step in a process to 
establish a formidable and workable leadership structure involving Muslims with expert 
knowledge on various disciplines of Islamic faith. The need to solicit expert knowledge 
came about because on many occasions unity (umoja) had eluded Muslims due to 
divergent opinions on matters of religious and political leadership. For example, Muslims 
had failed to observe the beginning of Ramadan and festivals like 'id al a41){i and 
'id alfitr due to misunderstandings pertaining to the question of which individual, 
I The symposium was held in Nairobi at Huruma Muslim School, during August 12-14, 1994. It was 
attended by over one hundred culamii) from all over Kenya. 
2 For a discussion of the formation of such organizations in East Africa see A. N. Chande, Islam Ulamaa 
and Community Development in Tanzania: Case Study of Religious Currents in East Africa (San Francisco, 
London & Bethesda: Austin &Winfield, 1998): 133-161; F. Constantin, "Leadership, Muslim Identities and 
East African Politics: Tradition, Burcaucratization and Communication," L. Brenner, ed., Muslim Identity 
and Social Change in Sub-Sahara Africa (London: Hurst & Company, 1993): 36-58, idem "Muslim 
&Politics: Attempts to Create Muslim National Organization in Tanzania, Uganda & Kenya," HoB. Hansen 
& M. Twaddle, cds., Religion and Politics in East Africa: The Period Since Independence (Nairobi: East 
Africa Educational Publishers, 1995); 19-31. A.RK Kasozi ,"The UMSC: An Experiment in Muslim 
Administrative Centralization and Institutionalization, 1972-1982," Journal Institute of Muslim l"finority 











organization, groups or officials had the authority to declare the sighting of the new 
crescent to usher in the beginning of each lunar month (kuandama mwezi), sighting of the 
new crescent. The recollection of some Muslims indicated that problems associated with 
moon sighting began in the early 1980's, after the death ofShaykh Abd Allah Salih Farsy 
(1912-1982). During his tenure as Chief Kadhi of Kenya from 1964-1982, Shaykh Farsy 
rallied Muslims opinions and avoided controversy. Under his leadership Muslims 
avoided the persistent disagreements, conflicts and differences of Muslim opinions on 
important matters of societal concern.3 After Shaykh Farsy no other figure of religious 
authority was recognized and respected by a sizeable part of the Muslim communities in 
Kenya. 4 Shaykh Abd Allah Salih Farsy was succeeded by Shaykh Nasor 
Mu1).ammad Nahdy (b.1935-) who had other district Kadhis under his authority. 
However, these were not as authoritative on matters such as the problem of kuandama 
mwezi as Shaykh Farsy had been. Pronouncements by Shaykh Nahdy on 'moon sighting' 
were hardly observed. This period also coincided with the rise of Wahhabi inspired 
(ulamiP whose obsession with a literalist interpretations of Islamic practice challenged the 
more conservative and traditional inspired Shaykh Nahdy, thus contributing to further 
divisions. Likewise, there existed various religious organizations which considered 
themselves institutions of leadership and public opinion amongst Muslims. The authority 
of these institutional forms of leadership was also challenged. Most organizations did not 
extend their activities to cover the whole of Kenya. The existence of the Chief Kadhi, 
other lower Kadhis and the Muslim organizations created a leadership dilemma for 
3 Shaykh Ali, Mwinzagu. Personal interview. Mombasa, 17th August 1998. 
4 Sentiments expressed by Abdulghafur al-Busaidi, Chainnan, SUPKEM in his opening address to the 











Muslims, as diverse voices and opinions emerged from multiple sources and trends, 
making it difficult for the larger population to identify with one source of religious 
authority. As a result, it was not clear who had the authority over religious leadership of 
the Muslims in Kenya. 
Persistent differences between Muslims resulted from ineffective leadership as Muslims 
sought for an authoritative national body of (ulamii' who would contribute their 
knowledge towards uniting and guiding the opinion of the ummah.5 The SUPKEM 
supported the formation of a Majlis (ulamii> as participants at the symposium echoed 
similar sentiments.6 The SUPKEM might well have been the institution to offer the 
leadership that Muslims required. But it found it necessary to invite the (ulamiP to 
establish the Majlis because Muslims had previously argued that the SUPKEM's 
leadership was not representative of all Muslims in Kenya. Its membership was confined 
to those affiliate Muslim associations who had participated in the election of its leaders.7 
During the SUPKEM's symposIUm I witnessed a umque phenomenon of Muslims 
debating aspects of leadership. Observable phenomena included the microcosmic 
presentation of a diverse, racialized and ethnicized Muslim population, and evidence of 
the diverse geographical expanse from which Muslims had been drawn for the 
5 This is the author's recollection of the sentiment expressed during the symposium organized by the 
SUPKEM. 
6 Shaykh Ali, Darani. Personal interview. Mombasa, 18th August 1998. Shaykh Darani served as Kadhi in 
various districts in Kenya and has remained an outspoken critic of the leadership of SUPKEM. 











symposmm. These racial and geographical diversities were important categories that 
clarified the foundations upon which Muslims debated aspects of leadership, with 
discernible racial dichotomies between Arab, Mrican and Indian Muslims. Racial and 
geographical diversities were further compounded by the existence of over forty African 
ethnic communities in Kenya. The geographical divides on which Muslims displayed 
diversities was broadly identifiable into two categories of Muslims from the coastal 
towns (Waislamu wa Pwani) and Muslims from the interior (Waislamu wa Bara). 
The intentions to establish a Majlis 'ulamii> were genuine but its realization was difficult 
as attempts to include all diversities of Muslims led to spontaneous accusations that some 
participants were more concerned with sectional interests. The process was characterized 
by attempts by various racial groups to dominate the exercise. Identified as Waarabu (the 
Arabs), Wahindt (the Indians), Waswahili (the Swahili), Wakikuyu (the Kikuyu) or 
Wabajuni (the Bajun), these micro categories of Muslims lobbied to claim a stake in 
various anticipated positions in the proposed council. 8 The interplay of regional divides 
between Waislamu wa Pwani (Muslims from the Coast) and Waislamu wa Bara 
(Muslims from the Interior or up country) demanded space in anticipation of the top 
position of a mufti or Shaykh mkuu (Grand Shaykh). 
The opposing activities by the participants provoked my thoughts to reVIew the 
SUPKEM's symposium as the scope of this study. The culamii' were to be viewed as de 
jure and de facto leaders in Islam. This attempt would have been vindicated had the 
8 These Muslim diversities are also mentioned by S. Ayubi and S. Mohyudin, in "Muslims in Kenya: An 











proposal to establish the council of (uiamiP been unanimous. To the contrary, some 
participants considered such attempts arbitrary. Proponents of the idea to establish the 
Majlis were accused of imposing the will of a few individuals over the community. 
Opposition to the establishment of the council was also based on a lack of precedents 
because, during the early centuries of Islam, the 'ulamiP did not evolve their own 
corporate standing nor were they a professional group of rank or status. Opponents of the 
establishment of the Majlis argued that it was an unnecessary innovation. It was noted 
that the 'ulamiP had an identity as imams in worship and exegetes ofIslamic theology and 
were extremely influential. Despite their ability to exercise effective and decisive 
pressure in the realms of public order and government they did not enjoy exclusive power 
and authority. 9 
SUPKEM's efforts were commendable but the likelihood that the proposed Majlis would 
complicate the problem of leadership for the Muslims of Kenya was real. I was 
particularly interested in engaging with what was defined as the 'riddle over leadership' 
by Shaykh Ali Darani 10 In a way I have pursued one aspect of the riddle in my attempt to 
clarify aspects of the social history of leadership amongst Muslims in Kenya. For 
everything else it might be in the service of scholarship, this research seeks to unravel the 
complexities illustrated by that meeting in 1994. 
9 M.G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. Vol. 1 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974): 238. 











1.2 Research Problems 
In the Muslim communities of Kenya there are two important questions concerning 
leadership. First, Muslims may ask what are the names of the leaders. Which institutions 
can be identified as offering leadership? Second, they want to know what constitutes the 
authority of a leader. The precursor to these questions is the persistent denial of the 
existence of formal groups of either individuals or institutions within the realms of power 
and authority in Islamic communities. The authority of individuals or groups who laid a 
claim to any form of leadership is usually challenged, as other Muslims will oppose its 
existence on the basis that the Qur'an or Sunnah is not specific on such forms of 
leadership. Nevertheless, various interlocutors of power and authority have evolved in 
Islamic communities who have based their authority on a variety of sources. This study 
therefore researches the following problems: what are the forms ofleadership available to 
Muslim society in Kenya? What are the circumstances of their existence? What are the 
social historical developments associated with their existence? 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
This dissertation addresses the formation of leadership amongst Muslims in Kenya by 
focusing on five objectives. First, it seeks to clarify the forms of leadership available to 
Muslims prior to the emergence of colonial rule; second, to account for the institutions of 











development of new forms of leadership; fourth, to demonstrate the effects of colonial 
institutionalization of leadership; and fifth to account for the reactions of Muslims to 
colonial policies on leadership. 
1.4 The Argument 
The central argument of this study revolves around the question how forms of political 
leadership and judicial posts of Kadhiship became associated with leadership of Islamic 
communities of Kenya. It contextualizes the history of existing and contemporary forms 
of leadership within a process indicating the evolution of a community through socio-
political history. Using the 'ulamiP and political organizations as examples of 
interlocutors of power in the Muslim community of Kenya, the dissertation makes two 
claims. The existence, sustenance and articulation of power and authority by the' ulamiP 
and the political groups in Kenya have been influenced by the actions of internal social 
structures amongst Muslim societies. At the same time, the forms of leadership were 
mitigated by British colonial power as British officers interpreted and implemented 
administrative decisions. The two arguments are elaborated through a review of the 
appointments of the 'ulamiP to official positions as Kadhi largely emphasizing how 
British officers, representing colonial power, influenced social discourses on leadership 
institutions. In the Muslim community the study points to the enhanced authority of the 
(ulam~P through appointments to post such as Kadhi, Shaykh al-IsHim and Chief Kadhi. 
On the other hand, non-religious based traditional forms of authority expected to be 
included in the hierarchies of colonial power through representations by a nascent 











to British activities, and particularly, the establishment of the Legislative Council. With 
regard to political leadership, the British government's policy of selective participation in 
the Legislative Council enhanced a racialization of political leadership. Thus, British 
colonial activities became the mitigating influences that shaped the continuity and 
development of a racialized Muslim political leadership. British influence 
notwithstanding, the existence of diverse, pre-colonial racial interests contributed to 
communal competition and strife over leadership in the Muslim communities. 
1. 5 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The scope of this study is to cover a specific historical period, subject matter and content. 
Historically, the study covers the period of the institutionalization of British colonial rule 
from 1895 to 1963. The growth of British influences in Kenya dates back much earlier, 
but 1895 is regarded as the starting point of a formal British Protectorate. This year also 
marked the beginning of a new era for Muslim communities in the sense that a new 
colonial political order was ushered into existence, taking over from the Muslim 
Sultanate of Zanzibar. In the year 1963 the British relinquished power and Kenya gained 
independence (Uhuru). These two dates are not sacrosanct and reference will be made to 
earlier and later periods too, when particular events of post-independence or pre-colonial 
era will help to clarify our discussion. 
The study does not claim to account for the entire history of Islam throug~out Kenya. 











approached through case studies of the brief historical expansion of Islam in the towns of 
Mombasa, Nairobi and Mumias. These towns represent the diverse Muslim populations 
and the application of colonial rule in relation to Muslim communities. The Coast region 
is considered the 'home' of Islam in Kenya and is represented Mombasa. Nairobi was 
selected for its central location in the interior of Kenya, while Mumias is significant as it 
enables us to discuss how a single indigenous community of the Interior, the Wanga 
articulated a racially and ethnically based opposition to the Arab Kadhi within their 
community. 
The study concentrates on the sttuctures established by the colonial government which 
institutionalized the authority and power of the' ulamiP, who are included as a category of 
leaders because their authority is normatively based on their mastery of Islamic 
knowledge. The positions of leadership occupied by the' u lam ii' in this study begin from 
the time when colonial authorities created bureaucratic juridical structures which became 
the primary institutions through which the (ulamiP institutionalized religious authority 
over Muslims. As officials in Muslim Courts, Kadhis existed at the Coast of Kenya 
during the reign of the sultanate of Zanzibar, doubling as traditional l~aders, wazee 
(elders) and Muslim clerics. The difference between the Kadhi of the sultan's period and 
those of the British period, post 1898, was based on the procedures that resulted in their 
appointments. For example, the Sultan depended on the considerations and 
recommendations of his agents, the Liwali, to choose Kadhis. On the other hand, the 
British regarded Kadhis as state functionaries appointed on the basis of colonial 











community elders, thus espousing both traditional authority and rational authority based 
on knowledge. However, when the British bureaucratized the post, Kadhis functioned as 
Court officers. In the process of the British establishing their authority, the (ulamiP were 
appointed as Kadhi in bureaucratized Islamic Courts and charged with the authority to 
institute Islamic (read Mohammedan Ordinance) codes of law. 
The discussion of the appointments of the (uiamiP to the posts ofKadhiship undertaken in 
this study has been influenced by two factors. First, a bureaucratized Kadhiship was a 
colonial innovation that Muslims in Kenya came to accept as a tradition. Kadhis were 
thus a manifestation of colonial rule. Second, the principles upon which Kadhis were 
appointed implied that appointees were inclined to serve the interests of the appointing 
authority. Kadhis were rarely deemed to serve the interests of all Muslim communities, 
but were frequently accused of serving racial or ethnic interests. I shall hereunder in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven show how their appointments were influenced by racial 
considerations. 
The factors that I have proposed above provide the scope to discuss racially based 
tensions when (ulamii' were appointed by the colonial state to serve as Kadhis. The posts 
of Shaykh aI-Islam and Chief Kadhi are included in the discussion of'ulama.> leadership 
in Mombasa but not in Nairobi or Mumias, because for a large part of the period 
1898-1963, the post was based at the Coast and attracted CulamiP from Mombasa and the 











diversities of Muslims in the discussions on racially based tensions in the appointments 
ofKadhis, the study also includes such debates in Nairobi and Mumias. 
Leadership debates that emanate from the appointment of the (ulamtP to Kadhiship are 
complemented by debates about other forms of leadership, especially the political forms. 
These are represented through an analysis of the factors responsible for the emergence of 
groups such as the Coast Arab Association (CAA), the Afro-Asian Association (AAA), 
the Arab Association (AA) and the African Muslim Society (AMS). Bent on articulating 
power, British colonial rule unilaterally used their authority to choose and favor one form 
of traditional leadership and ignore others. Thus, the Arab Liwaliship, a sultanic 
institution, was included in the colonial bureaucratic state, while other leadership forms 
like the wazee ( elders) were excluded. The scope of this study thus includes an analysis 
of the challenges to the leadership of the Liwali and the subsequent emergence of 
political forms of leadership in the name of CAA, AA, AM and AMS mentioned above. 
These institutions represented sections of the Muslim community on the basis of two 
factors. Firstly, the colonial authorities exclusively appointed people of Arab ethnicity to 
participate in colonial structures of communal representation such as the Legislative 
CounciL Secondly, the authority of the Liwali was constantly challenged when its 
incumbents were chosen, especially (Ali b. Salim, as representative of Arab communities 
in the Legislative CounciL Because the Muslim representative in the Legislative Council 
was an Arab who deemed his participation in the Council to cover the interests of Arabs 











1.6 Justification of the Study 
Aspects of leadership amongst Muslims in Kenya are discussed in various studies. I too 
need to justify another study of my own. Any reconstruction of the history of Muslim 
politics and leadership under colonialism must draw upon the general history of colonial 
Mombasa and coastal Kenya through A 1. Salim's pioneering study, The Swahili-
Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast, 1895-1965.11 Focusing on the social and political 
changes within the Arab and Swahili communities of the Coast, Salim makes passing, 
albeit valuable remarks about class, the ( ulamiP and other social divisions within the Arab 
community of Mombasa. Another analysis of East African (ulamiP of the nineteenth 
century is RL. Pouwels, Horn and Crescent, Cultural Change and Traditional Islam on 
the East African Coast 800-1900. While encompassing the period 800-1900, Pouwels' 
study of the nineteenth century draws on the knowledge of 
Shaykh (Abd Allah Salih Farsy, as expressed in his writings and interviews. Pouwels 
emphasizes change, especially the emergence of Arabic literacy among East African 
religious scholars. Taking note of the important role played by family networks, lineages 
and tribes in the processes of change, Pouwels notes that "things ... began to change in 
the nineteenth century under the tutelage of Had rami (ulamiP, especially the shurajaJ .,,12 
11 A. I. Salim. The Swahili Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast, 1895-1945. (Nairobi: East African 











While tracing some of the trans-oceanic links maintained by the exponents of the new 
Arabic literacy, Pouwels' account primarily seeks explanation for changing expressions 
of Islam within the parameters of East African history. Rather than seeking to explain 
nineteenth century changes in East African Islam as such, my thesis seeks to explain the 
-.~---~--.-.. ----
increasingly important role of the colonial state as agency for change while tracing 
------_.---_. -~--......-------------.----.--~-
Muslim reactions to these changes. This should not be construed to mean that I see no 
need for including family connections to my study. On the contrary, I am aware of the 
important contributions by previous studies on the relevance of lineage networks in the 
authority of the 'ulamtP along the Coast of East African. Especially so, works by Farsy 
like Tarehe ya Imam Shafti na Baadhi ya Warunyuoni wa Mashariki ya Afrika,13 
translated into English and annotated by R. L. Pouwels. 14 An additional, comprehensive 
and up to date study that touches on the networks of' ulamiP and their genealogies and 
histories with special reference to Sayyid Al;nnad b. Sumayt Jamal al- Layl is that by 
Anne Bang. 15 Such pioneering studies have adequately treated the genealogical and 
networking aspects of religious authority. Including extensive biographical sketches on 
the 'ulamiP discussed in this work would be duplicating what has already been done. 
Instead, I shall complement and draw inspirations from such works through my own 
analysis of how these 'ulamiP were appointed to their positions. In his Mombasa: Ihe 
12 R.L. Pouwels, Horn and Crescent, Cultural Change and Traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 
800-1900 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987): 13 L 
13 A S. Farsy. Tarehe ya Imam Shafi na Wanavyuoni Wakubwa wa Mashariki ya Afrika. (Zanzibar: 
Education Department, 1944). 
14 A S. Farsy. The Shafrl'Ulama of East Africa, ca 1830-1970. A hagiographical Account. Translated, 
edited and annotated by R. L. Pouwels, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1989). 
15 A K. Bang. Sufis and Scholars of the Sea: The Sufi and family networks of Al)mad ibn Sumayf and tPte 












Swahili and the Making of the Mijikenda, Justin Willis16 approaches the issue of ethnicity 
by focusing, for example, on the relevance of Mijikenda collective and "sub-group" 
identities in the politics of labor and leadership in Mombasa. Richard Stem's work on 
urban development and African politics in Mombasa was the first real attempt to explain 
the coastal dimensions of Mrican nationalist politics and colonial policies beyond those 
discussed by A. I. Salim. 17 His data on the political competition between Coast African 
politicians in the Mombasa political scene provides only passing comments on the role of 
Islam as an identity, and ultimately characterizes Mombasa politics almost entirely in 
terms of competing personalities and their followers, with little regard for other aspects of 
social conflict. Karim K. Jan Mohamed's dissertation,18 A History of Mombasa, c 1895-
1939, examines urban development problems in Mombasa from a historical perspective. 
He presents an empirical discussion of ethnic groups, social classes and other aspects of 
colonial society in Mombasa, but his study is limited to the period before 1939. 
Irrespective of the contributions made by these studies, my own study is different in 
approach. It is based on the absence of colonial voices and the role of its agency in 
previous works. Posts like Shaykh aI-Islam and Chief Kadhi have been discussed by way 
of mentioning the facts that people like SharifcAbd al-Ral:nnan b. Al:nnad al-Saggaf 
(1844-1922) and Shaykh Al-'Amin b. CAn al-Mazruci (1891-1947) held the posts. 
16 J. Willis. Mombasa: The Swahili and the Making of the Mijikenda. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993). 
17 Richard Stem. "Factional Politics and Central Control in Mombasa, 1960-1969." Canadian Journal of 
African Studies, 4, 1, (1970): 35-56. 
18 Karim Kassam, Jan Mohamed "A History of Mombasa c. 1895-1939: Some Aspects of Economic and 
Social Life in an East Mrican Port Town during Colonial Rule."( Ph.D dissertation, Northwestern 











Shaykh Al-'Amin is the most widely discussed of those who occupied the post of Chief 
Kadhi during the colonial period. To add to the debate of Chief Kadhis acting as Muslim 
leaders in Kenya, this study has identified other Kadhis who hitherto had not been fully 
studied. Consequently, this study contributes to a complete historiography of Chief 
Kadhis of Kenya during the period 1898-1963. Another important contribution of this 
study is the discussion of the role of colonial policies in the emergence of communal 
strife as Culamii' competed for appointment to serve as Kadhis. The study achieves this by 
reviewing the appointments with reference to the British colonial attempts to take charge 
of the social, political and religious aspects of Muslim communities. The chronology of 
appointments to the posts of Shaykh ai-Islam, Chief Kadhi in Mombasa and the posts of 
Kadhi in Nairobi and Mumias enables this study to claim its contribution towards 
understanding the full potential and challenges that Muslims faced with regard to the 
posts held by 'ulama) in the structures of colonial power, authority and leadership. 
1.7 The Colonial State and Muslim Leadership: 
A Theoretical Perspective ~ 
The theoretical foundations of this study are based on an articulation of colonial power by 
way of defining the salient features of the British colonial state in Kenya. Its premise 
articulates the forms of leadership amongst Muslims in Kenya in relation to the vagaries 
of colonial rule. First of all, it is my argument that, under colonial rule, African societies 
underwent a radical reorganization of political and social spaces. Thus, I use a theoretical 
formulation based on the nature of British colonial power. Policies pursued in the culture 











societies, as the colonial state, created various institutions of power, authority and 
leadership. The effects of colonial rule were myriad, but, in Kenya, three dimensions are 
particularly relevant for investigation. What was the ideology of colonial rule? How did 
colonial power institute domination? What was the impact of the administrative 
framework developed by colonial rule? How it influenced the provision of opportunities 
for social promotion amongst Muslims. To assist and guide my responses to these 
questions, I use a characterization of colonial rule espoused by Georgies Balandier who 
argues that the most striking aspects of colonialism are the following: 
• The domination imposed by foreign minority upon the indigenous population by 
using the excuse of cultural, ethnic and racial superiority. 
• The imposition and maintenance of ideologies justifying the position of the 
dominant groups. 
• The presentation of the values of the rulers as a model to be emulated, and lastly 
keeping the contacts between the rulers and the ruled at a minimum by a policy of 
segregation. 19 
Evidently, colonialism is an event of major historical significance and its effects are a 
distinctive feature of existence in most African societies. Prolonged contemplation and 
comparison of how different societies coped with colonialism have given rise to different 
questions and approaches to the effects of colonial rule. Colonial rule is inextricably 
interwoven with peculiarities of power as the demands of colonialism caused old 
societies to disintegrate. Controlled by Europeans and as a hierarchy extending in time 
19 G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach," Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., Social 











and space, colonial rule initiated a process of change with many implications. In Kenya, 
as elsewhere in Africa, the profound complexity and extraordinary ramifications of 
colonial rule included a constellation of social contributions, innovations and reactions, 
resulting in Balandiers' 'colonial situation', which transformed the social fabric of the 
colonized people. 
Studies on colonial rule in Kenya have emphasized the political economy of colonialism 
as issues of the organization of labor. Class inequalities and underdevelopment were thus 
central themes.2o However, the impact of colonial rule went beyond the political economy 
of labor and affected other social institutions. Such aspects include the question of how 
colonial rule articulated power and what its effects were on indigenous communities. 
How was power practiced by the colonial state? In a contemporary study of colonial 
power in Africa, Mahmoud Mamdani argues that contemporary forms of power in Africa 
are a manifestation of the legacy of colonialism, because colonial rule is inextricably 
interwoven with peculiarities of power in its ramifications and authority.21 Accordingly, 
the problem faced by many colonial rulers was that of stabilizing alien rule, referred to as 
'the native question'. Effectively, the crucial question remains, as phrased by Mamdani, 
"how can a tiny and foreign minority rule over an indigenous majority?,,22 
20 See for example, Frederick Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation labor and agriculture in 
Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890-1925. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 
21 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (London: 
James Currey, 1996). 











In addressing the native question the British designed 'direct' and 'indirect rule' .23 
'Direct rule' responded to the problem of administering colonies by creating a single 
legal order modeled on the "civilized" or laws of Europe. Its chief characteristic was the 
non-recognition of "native" institutions. 'Indirect rule' allowed the domination of 
indigenous communities within the context of a spatial and institutional autonomy. 
Indirect rule gave rise to two generic forms that amount to a distinction between 
'identity' and 'differentiation'. The doctrine of identity conceived future social and 
political institutions of Africans to become the same as those of Europeans, while 
differentiation implied separate institutions appropriate to African conditions?4 
Indirect rule retained some indigenous forms of power and authority in tribal enclaves 
through tribal institutions and leaders, fostering leadership institutions within single 
culturally and linguistically homogeneous 'tribes' .25 Ethnic communities were expected 
to practice power in such indigenous institutions and subject to 'ethnic discipline' 
through local structures of authority. These traditional or ethnic leadership institutions did 
not exercise authority on their own, however, because leaders became grassroots 
foundations of colonial domination. They were the means by which colonial rule derived 
a degree of legitimacy through its association with 'traditional' social forces?6 What 
23Ibid., p. 7. 
24 Ibid. 
25 B. Berman, "Structure and process in the bureaucratic states of colonial Africa," B. Berman and J. 
Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Book One: State and Class. (London, James 
Currey, 1992): 162. 
26 P. Ekeh, "Social anthropology and two contrasting uses of tribalism in Africa," Comparative Studies in 











happened in addition in Africa was that colonial authorities gave credence to a racialized 
reality, which they gradually sought to mould and manipulate through policies such as 
indirect rule?7 Acting on the basis of racial preferences in the community, British 
colonial authorities deployed indirect rule in an already differentiated Muslim 
community. Perceiving Muslims of Arab descent as being more civilized, leadership of 
Muslims became the exclusive domain of Arabs. Consequently, Arab Muslims 
participated in structures of indirect rule as Muslims mediated leadership through such 
racialized and ethnically organized institutions and local powers, amongst them the 
Kadhis Courts and its officials. 
As a system of social control, the colonial state incorporated and expressed a racial mode 
of power and domination through institutions managed by its pro consuls. As models of 
control, agents who managed these institutions sought to achieve and maintain 
compliance through the institutional mediation of power channeled through defInitive 
strategies of control. 28 Anthony Giddens posits the characteristic of the state in its 
attempts at domination as corresponding to structural determination and instrumental 
agency. Domination is institutionally mediated in non-static institutions of social 
structure, usually reproduced and modifIed by more self-conscious collectivities or 
organization. Thus, the universal limit imposed on all forms of domination is the 
'dialectic of control' whereby strategies of control employed by superordinate individuals 
Colonial Africa." T. O. Ranger and O. Vaughan, eds., Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa 
(London, 1993): 14-15. 
27 P. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: The unstable state (London: Lester Cook Academic Publishing, 
1990):5. 











or groups call forth counter- strategies on the part of subordinates. These usually bring to 
bear strategies of their own and apply particular sanctions from the bottom up towards 
their superiors. 29 
In a similar vein to Giddens' identification of the state-operating domination through 
social institutions and instrumental agency, this study identifies the colonial institutions 
used in the process of domination and how they were entrenched in the society. State 
structures illuminate a terrain of struggle for power as communities interacted with such 
modes of production not as abstract structures but as ones that confronted them directly. 
The peculiar characteristic of the colonial state in Kenya was the vast expansion of the 
capacity of state administrators like, District Officers, Provincial Commissioners, 
Attorney Generals, Native Commissioner and Governors to influence intimate aspects of 
daily activity. The foremost reason for the existence of colonial institutions was an 
unrelenting drive to establish and sustain the conditions of production of power. 30 
Relations between Muslims and colonial power are encountered not just in historical 
experiences but in productions of structures of authority and power that took the form of 
particular juridical and political relations, and organizations which were precisely 
articulated as forms of production of power. 31 
In this study the British colonial state was a sphere of political domination that defined 
and regulated social relations within juridical-political forms that legitimized social 
29 Ibid., p. 11 
30 Giddens, The Nation State, 10. 











activity. By means of abstraction the colonial state claimed to be removing social 
relations from the unstable variability of immediate inter-personal and class relations. Its 
claims were that these would be grounded on principles, ostensibly impersonal, founded 
in equity without awarding unfair advantage to one or another party. Colonial principles 
were also claimed to be universal, in the sense of applying equally to all who enter into 
relations. The colonial state took upon itself the responsibility to enforce these ideas at a 
level at which colonized communities were forced to perceive and accept them as natural 
and permanent. These activities of the state deployed relations of domination, 
simultaneously obscuring and presenting them as the natural order of things. Human 
creations thereby became social structural parameters, and power became hegemony in 
which the submission and subordination of the population was part of the natural order of 
the social world.32 
The above characterization of the operation of the colonial state in Kenya and its 
influences in the production of leadership amongst Muslims is applied cautiously, 
because the colonial state's articulation of power could not have lasted unless it had been 
grafted onto hospitable traditional analogues. This suggests that the colonial state related 
to and interacted with colonized communities by painting a picture of complexities that 
forced the colonized to ask questions about themselves, their society and their history 
which they had never asked before. Thus, the colonial state generated an unprecedented 
level of self-consciousness. It was a process whereby colonized communities dug deep 
into their past, reinterpreted their positions and formulated a range of responses. In the 
32 Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, Power of Theory: Capitalism, the State and Bureaucracy 











process, new institutions introduced by colonial rule functioned directly through the 
medium of this self-consciousness. Ultimately, colonized communities played a vital a 
role in structuring and shaping the influence of colonial rule. 
Thus, colonial rule does not represent as drastic a rupture in the history of colonized 
societies as is often made out. No doubt European rule had an unprecedented reach and 
penetration, but its inherent limitations derived partly from the fact that new rulers 
intuitively perceived as radically and culturally different lacked the accessibility and 
relative familiarity oftheir predecessors. The complexities of colonial rule emerged when 
values, institutions and identities relevant to the articulation of power and authority, the 
very aspects forming the 'colonial situation', were components partly of the colonial 
legacy and partly of the indigenous societies. The crux of my argument here is that 
institutions emphasized by colonial power were deeply intertwined with the traditional 
ones of the indigenous people. Thus, colonialism did not impose of something entirely 
new and foreign. Rather, it evolved a new consciousness out of a subtle mixture of the 
old and new. 
This study will approach the 'colonial situation' and its influence in the production of 
forms of leadership by engaging and confronting its particularistic dimensions. My view 
is that British colonial power was practiced to perform the role of an organ of society 
arising out of irreconcilable antagonisms and struggles among Muslim collectivities with 











identities, espousing different traditional forms of power, its organization and futuristic 
aspirations of leadership. The colonial state as another originator of the production and 
maintenance of power and authority created organizational structure to emphasize its own 
control over the rest of society.33 More important though were the assumptions that the 
colonial state occupied a position above group conflicts by keeping such conflicts within 
the bounds of law and order. In Kenya, its actualization was the enacting of the 
Subordinate Native Courts Ordinance and the Legislative Council Ordinance as 
frameworks to coalesce and coerce indigenous communities to recognize and legitimize 
colonial power. Nevertheless, far from being the anticipated smooth and trouble-free 
administration, colonial institutions of power emerged as focal points of contestation and 
disputes on power and authority amongst Muslims in Kenya. 
1.8 Sources 
This dissertation is based on archival, documentary and oral evidence. A large body of 
primary material was consulted at the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi. The data 
collected encompassed hitherto unused materials including administrative decisions made 
by colonial officers like District Officers (DO), Provincial Commissioners (PC), Attorney 
Generals (AG), Native Commissioners (NC) and Colonial Governors (GH). These 
sources indicate that the question of Islamic leadership was a major concern of the 
colonial state. They also point to the directions which officials of the colonial state 
wished Muslims to follow. They display the official position of the state in relation to 
33 C. Mathema, Wealth and Power: An Introduction to Political Economy. (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing 











Muslim leadership. The exchanges of communication between various cadres of colonial 
officials are used to decipher the circumstances under which the Shaykh aI-Islam, Chief 
Kadhi and Kadhis were perceived by colonial officers and members of the Muslim 
community. These sources are equally useful and helpful in drawing inferences about 
how colonial officers directed the emergence and development of the positions of 
juridical leadership and political leadership amongst Muslims. Responses by Muslims 
appear within annual reports by District Officers and Provincial Commissioners, but they 
can also be found in other classes of data in the Archives as reports on native 
organizations. 
Data on Muslims organizations such as the Coast Arab Association (CAA), the Afro-
Asian Association (AAA), the Arab Association (AA) and the African Muslim Society 
(AMS) are available and classified in two ways in the Kenya National Archives. First, as 
files bearing the names of the organizations. Second, in the general correspondence found 
in files created by colonial officers who responded to petitions and administrative matters 
raised at the stations in which they were serving. Apart from these general files, colonial 
officers also created multiple personnel files for officials under discussions. Data on 
officials such as the Shaykh aI-Islam would thus be in his personal file, along with the 
title of the post, such as Shaykh aI-Islam or Chief Kadhi. More data was gathered from 
personal files with titles like Shaykh <Abd al-Ral;1man b. Al}mad, or Shaykh 
Mul;Iammad b. <Vmar. Most Muslim officials had occupied junior positions as Kadhis 
before being promoted to the apex of Kadhiship. Thus, data on such individuals was also 











relevant written documentation I could find. My purpose was to achieve the fullest 
reconstruction of the responses of colonized communities towards the British, as well as 
the British attitudes towards demands raised by their Muslim subjects. The process of 
integrating written and oral sources has been less daunting than might be imagined. Some 
oral informants had a formidable memory of events and sequences but lacked knowledge 
of historical dates. However, when placed alongside archival documentation, the oral 
narratives had proved remarkably consistent from a chronological point of view. 
As stated earlier, participant observation was used as a method of data gathering. In the 
field, I collected data through a mix of observations at gatherings, informal discussion 
and the simple sharing of the rhythms of the day to day activities of the Muslim 
communities ill Nairobi, Mombasa and Mumias. In Nairobi Mzee 
'Vmar Sulayman Mwajambia walked with me from his house to the Pumwani Mosque, 
where I was introduced to other informants. Likewise, Shaykh Sulayman Munyu, the 
Registrar of Muslim Marriage Divorce and Succession in the Majengo areas of Nairobi 
allowed me to observe on several functions as he went about his duties, to register new 
marriages. The data gathered from participant observation was systematically 
reconstructed to delineate the varied contexts of social1ife and the process of production 
of forms of leadership but there will be no denial that the researcher was part of the 
dialogue. 
Finally, I would like to mention that I have made generous use of quotations from various 











apology is necessary for doing so, as quotations often made a point more effectively than 
paraphrasing or summarizing. The quotations moreover help to create the atmosphere of 
earlier times, and nowhere are these more useful than in my discussion of colonial 
responses towards demands by various Muslim communities for representation in official 
leadership institutions, and especially in the Legislative CounciL 
1.9 Analytical Approach 
The presentation of data in this study is influenced by my consideration of the historicity 
of human experience. I am presenting the social history of leadership amongst Muslims 
in Kenya on the basis of Gadamer's ideas that history is about human beings and human 
lives.34 I analyze the data by assuming that human beings are not merely observers or 
spectators of events; rather, they are always part of broader social-historical contexts. 
During times of rapid social change and conflict, human beings are inclined to 'conjure 
up the spirit of the past,' and to disguise the present in order to reassure themselves of 
their continuity with the past.35 This historicity of experiences creates the space for a 
social historical inquiry that concludes that the traditions familiar today were in fact 
recently invented traditions even though they seem to be more ancient. 36 
34 Hans-Gerg Gadamer, Truth and Method ( London: Sheed & Ward, 1975): 235-74. 
35 Karl Mark, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected 
Works in One Volume (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1968): 96-179. 












The historicity of my approach considers positions such as Liwali, Shaykh aI-Islam, 
Chief Kadhi, Kadhi, Wazee, Shaykhs and organization such as the Afro Asian 
Association (AAA), the Coast Arab Association (CAA), the Arab Association (AA) and 
the African Muslim Society (AMS) as being constructs not only situated in definitive 
ways, but also embedded in specific social and historical conditions and processes. To 
take account of the ways in which they are structured, the conditions within which they 
emerged, and how they are articulated, I engaged them through three not so discrete 
stages of a sequential analytical and interpretative process comprising a definition of the 
spatial-temporal settings, the fields of interaction and of the social institutions. By 
'spatial-temporal settings', I refer to specific locales like Mombasa, Nairobi and Mumias, 
where the production of forms of leadership occurred. A reconstruction of such locales 
contextualizes local contests of authority. 'Fields of interaction' refers to posts, positions 
and sets of trajectories, like the Shaykh aI-Islam, Chief Kadhi, Liwali, the Legislative 
Council and colonial ordinances, which determined the relations between individuals and 
the opportunities available to them. Pursuing a course of action within such fields of 
interaction enabled individuals and organizations in the colonial state to draw upon a 
variety of rules, conventions and schemata as explicit and well-formulated precepts and 
guidelines. Analyzing these forms of leadership assists us to grasp their social 












1.10 Organization of the Study 
This dissertation comprises eight chapters. Chapter One introduces the subject under 
discussion, including the research problem, objectives, scope, limitations, justification, 
the theoretical assumptions on which the study is based, the sources and the 
methodology. Chapter Two lays the foundations for discussing aspects of leadership in 
Mombasa. It locates the historical existence of Islam, describes the diversities of Muslim 
communities and analyzes local organizations of leadership. It also examines the 
emergence of foreign influences including Arabs and how Muslim communities related 
with one another. The significance of Chapter Two lies in how it traces disagreements 
about leadership amongst the Muslims of Mombasa prior to the imposition of British 
colonial rule. 
Chapter Three describes the encounters between Muslims and colonialism, tracing the 
impact of the agreement entered into between the British and the Sultanate of Zanzibar, 
which subsequently allowed the British to manage the Sultan's dominions. It argues that 
once authority was passed from the Sultan to the British, the latter embarked on a process 
that changed and re-defined the organization of leaders. Responding to demands from the 
Muslim communities, the British grappled with delicate communal interests based on 
race and ethnic diversities. This shows how, ultimately, negotiations between colonial 











communities. Chapter Three furthermore identifies the basis on which colonial officers 
made official decisions pertaining to leadership demands by Muslims, thereby 
institutionalizing race as a category upon which individuals and communities were 
included in the hierarchy of colonial power. 
Chapters Four through to Seven are case studies of various forms of leadership, 
discussing the consequences of British racial policies and Muslims' reactions and 
responses. Chapter Four traces the origins of political leadership as responses to racial 
definitions of authority by discussing how non-Arab Muslims reacted to exclusion from 
participating directly in the Legislative Council. It argues that Muslims succumbed to 
colonial preferences for a racially defined leadership and perpetuated historical racial and 
group differences over leadership in their locales. The premise of Chapter Four is the 
negotiation of racially based communal interest in political leadership. The consequence 
was the formation of associations such as the Coast Arab Association (CAA), the Afro 
Asian Association (AAA) and its nemesis, the Arab Association (AA) and the African 
Muslim Society (AMS), thereby indicating the prominence of race in the political 
leadership struggles of Muslims in Kenya. 
Chapter Five discusses the creation ofthe post of Shaykh aI-Islam and its later variant of 
Chief Kadhi as the major innovations by colonial authorities concerning leadership of the 
culamif). Identifying the culamii> as an important class of practitioners of power in Islamic 
communities, the Chapter argues that in Kenya, the CulamiP assumed official posts on the 











officials of the colonial state even as this was mitigated by the existence of Muslims from 
different racial backgrounds. This further complicated the process of appointing cuiamiP 
to be Kadhi, ultimately leading to Arab Muslims being favored as opposed to other 
Muslim racial groups. This chapter shows the role of racial differences in the chronology 
of appointments of the cuiamiP to the posts of Shaykh al-Islam and Chief Kadhi. 
Chapter Six discusses the leadership of the culamiP in Nairobi by drawing attention to 
early forms of leadership amongst Muslims and how the colonial authorities influenced 
changes in them. Subsequently the chapter shows how Muslims negotiated amongst 
themselves for the post of Kadhiship in Nairobi, continuing to display the role of colonial 
officers in the process of appointing the Kadhi, as well as the role played by racial and 
ethnic interests. 
Chapter Seven discusses how the Wanga Muslims in Mumias were influenced by racial 
and ethnic identity conflicts to demand that Kadhi appointed in their area should be from 
the Wanga. Reviewing the Wanga demands as directly opposed to the wishes of the 
colonial government, the chapter describes again how Arabs or people deemed to be 
Arabs by the colonial state were favored for the posts of Kadhiship. This chapter 
chronicles the appointment of Sharif (Vmar b. (Abd Allah al-Ma1;ldaly to Kadhi of 
Mumias among the Wanga and later the whole of Nyanza Province despite the opposition 
from the Wanga and other non-Arab populations. Finally, Chapter Eight reviews the 












2.1 Pre-colonial Organizations of Leadership among Muslims in Mombasa 
This chapter discusses pre-colonial forms of leadership and positions of influence 
amongst the Muslim communities of Mombasa. It explains the pre-colonial organization 
of leadership, the authority of leaders, their titles and how individuals ascended to these 
positions of authority. Taking into account pre-colonial forms of leadership, the chapter 
then elaborates on the factors responsible for changes in the forms of leadership. These 
factors include the emergence of Islam and the coming of the British to the Coast of 
Kenya. I argue that the existence of Islam influenced changes in traditional forms of 
leadership and paved the way for further changes as Muslims responded to colonial 
power. I will begin by locating Mombasa's social discourses on identity of belonging to 
the town, wenyeji or umiji. My preferences to use stories about Mombasa to indicate a 
variety of discourses of leadership lie in my conviction that, like all great cities, 
Mombasa too has its share of mythical narratives, many of which are told by its 
indigenous communities and visitors to the town alike. Such are the stories about the 
changing names of Mombasa. In extrapolating the meanings of these stories I argue, as 
did Martin Heidegger in Being and Time, that, "Man's relations to locations, and through 
locations to spaces, inheres in his dwellings. The relationship between man and space is 
none than dwellings, thought essentially.,,37 











2.2 Mombasa, Gongwa, Mvita and Kongowea 
Mombasa is an island on the east coast of the Indian Ocean. It occupies an area of about 
nine square miles with a coastline about three miles long and two and half miles wide. 
Except at the western end its coast consists of cliffs varying in height from about forty to 
sixty feet and a steep shore all around. Mombasa lies very close to the mainland and its 
deep channels provided excellent anchorage facility. It was the chief terminal on the 
eastern seaboard for caravan routes to the interior. The north-eastern anchorage, being the 
more sheltered, was the one mainly used in the 19th century. Early visitors to Mombasa 
were greatly impressed by the geographical position of this coral island. Arabs, the 
Portuguese, and later the British considered Mombasa to be an important strategic and 
commercial center on the coast. The British saw the potential of trade, civilization and 
power in the port ofMombasa. This was emphasized by Owen who noted that 
"perhaps there is not a more perfect harbour in the world than Mombasa ... facility of navigation 
constituted one of the greatest recommendations; as, by a proper attention to the monsoons and 
currents, voyages both to and from Mombasa may be affected with safety and certainty at all 
seasons. Goods sent from England to that part could be conveyed by the Arab dhows along the 
whole line of Coast, where they would meet with a sure market. ... In conclusion our holding 
Mombasa as military station would be one of the most effectual steps towards the entire 
civilization of East em Africa.,,38 
The climate of Mombasa is influenced by periodic monsoon winds. The northeast 
monsoon known as Kaskazi or msimu begins in November and lasts until February. The 
north-easterly monsoon winds begin to drop about March, when the south-westerly 
monsoon winds set in till they have fully developed in June and July. Between the 
38 F.W. Owen. Narrative of Voyage to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar (London: 











North-easterly and the south-easterly winds (called kusi) there is a short calm period 
called maleleji, after which the rains of mwaka fall. The latter part of kusi which blows in 
about August is called demani (calm winds). After the calm winds, t'anga mbili (two 
sails), set in, these being the variable winds that blow alternately from north and south. 
These winds enabled a two-way communication between the mainland and the offshore 
island almost all the year round. It is during these windy seasons that dhows from the 
Persian Gulf, Southern Arabia and India call at Mombasa. 
Early accounts of Mombasa indicate that it was divided into two main parts, Mjl wa Kale 
(old town) and an administrative center built by the Portuguese called Gavana.39 But oral 
traditions indicate that these two quarters constitute two miji amongst many others that 
made up the Mombasa polity. For example, other names of locations are recalled with 
nostalgia because they remind its indigenous residents (wenyeji or wenyetsi) of some 
significant aspects of the social and political history of the town. The old names have 
been the subject of poetic compositions by Mombasans. For example Muyaka, one of 
Mombasa's great poets, composed poetry on the greatness of the town as a warning to 
invading forces.4o 
39 This was probably of Portuguese origin meaning a city of government. Krapf however refers to Gavana 
as Mji wa kale. He speaks of the Swahili of "Gavana or Mji wa Kale". Krapf J.L. Travels, Researches and 
Missionary Labours during an Eighteen Years residence in Eastern Africa, (London, 1961). 
40 For other works by Muyaka, see M. H. Abdulaziz, Muyaka: J9'h century Swahili Popular Poetry 











As an ancient town ruled by Queen Mwana Mkisi, Mombasa's names included Gongwa, 
Kongowea and Nyali Kuu. About these names Muyaka composed the following verses: 
L K'ongoweaja mvumo, maangavu maji male 
Haitowi lililomo Gongwa isingenyemele 
Msiotambua ndumo na utambaaji wa kale 
Mwina wa chiza mbwi chile mtambuzwa hatambuli 
IL K'ongowea aridhimbi ukenda usijikule 
Ina mambo t'umbitumbi, wajuvywa hawajuvile 
Mara huliona wimbi lausha nyuma na mbele 
Mwina wa chiza mbwi chile, matambuzwa hatambuli 
IlL Mteza na Nyali K'uu kugeua mageule 
Humvundanga maguu asende mwendo wa kule 
Akawa p'aka mnyau, mnyau p'aka mwele 
Mwina wa chiza mbwi chile, mtambuzwa hatambuli 
IV. Gongwa nda Mwana MkiSl: Mvita mji wa Kale 
Uitupile viasi ukenda enda kwa p'ole 
Inika chako kikosi maninga vyema sivule 
Mwina wa chiza mbwi chile, mtambuzwa hatambule 
IV. Mvita mji wa ndweo ivumayo kwa kelele 
llikutile t'utio panga za masimba wale 
Haishi vigururumio na kwangusha mwanzi mle 
Mwina wa chiza mbwi chile, mtambuzwa hatambuli 
I will render a translation of the verse of Muyaka, bearing in mind the social significance 
of the events explained in each stanzaY 
L K'ongowea roars like the surf, despite its calm waters 
So placidly quiet is Gongwa not to reveal its great secrets 
Nay strangers, perceive not its war-cries nor its warriors strategies 
Mombasa is an abyss deep in its gloom even those well-informed comprehend not 
IL When going into K'ongowea refrain from being haughty 
41 The translations are largely inspired by those done by M.H. Abdulaziz in his Muyaka, however whenever 











For its innumerable affairs are incomprehensible even to those who are informed 
For suddenly aforward and backward surging wave appears 
Mombasa is an abyss deep in its gloom even those well-informed comprehend not 
III Trifle not with Nyali K'uu wishing to change its status 
Whilst your legs are smashed to be unable to walk 
You can be turned to a cat, a sickly cat 
Mombasa is an abyss deep in its gloom even those well-informed comprehend not 
IV. Gongwa is the royal city of queen Mwana Mkisi, this Mvita our old city 
Tread wily therein not to exceed its bounds 
Lower your gaze; do not look straight in the eye 
Mombasa is an abyss deep in its gloom even those well-informed comprehend not 
V. Mvita is a land of loud death-groans 
Its long blades are already brandished, the swords of mighty lions 
Its war cries are thunderous and loud 
Mombasa is an abyss of deep gloom; even those well-informed comprehend not 
2.3 'Insiders and Outsiders': 
Social Composition in Mombasa 
A mention of Mombasa often evokes memones of romanticism and reverence to a 
nostalgic past amongst indigenous residents and visitors alike. Visitors from within 
Kenya are curious about Mombasa's mysterious stories associated with maraudingjinns 
(demons) tormenting residents who fail to conform to the Islamic dispositions and 
character of its residents. Some visitors depart from Mombasa with awesome narratives 
of invisible cats that cry throughout the night to their displeasure. Others marvel at the 
hospitality of its residents, their laid-back life style, narrow corridors, unique architecture 
and, more importantly the historical significance of Mombasa on the eastern coast of the 
Indian Ocean. Against localized perspectives, the prejudice of unfamiliar visitors, against 
the background of archaeological excavations and historical treaties, against studies on 











from its indigenous residents who engage in contentious social histories over who is 
mwenyeji (indigenous, or an insider) and who is mgeni (an outsider). 
It is said that Bantu-speaking communities first inhabited the ancient settlements of 
Gongwa, Kongowea and Nyali Kuu. Amongst them were the Mijikenda and the Swahili 
who claim to be indigenous not only to Gongwa, Kongowea or Nyali Kuu but also the 
island of Mombasa. It is a characteristic misrepresentation to confine Mombasa to the 
Island, as its indigenous communities mention miji ya upeoni (settlements of the 
horizons) that formed the wider community of Mombasa including locations such as the 
areas of Changamwe, and Jomvu to the West, Nyali and Kongowea to the East, Kilindini 
and Mtongwe to the South, and Maunguja and Mtwapa in the North and North-East of 
the Island.42 With regard to the communities of Mombasa "it was common for 
archaeologists and historians to write that, although seafaring people intermarried with 
Africans, their coastal settlements developed in isolation from nearby African 
communities surrounding them and with which they traded. ,,43 It is a misconception to 
consider Mombasa exclusively in relation to Arab settlements without mention of the 
centrality of other communities. New revisions on the oral histories of Mombasa locate 
the Mijikenda as having settled on the Island earlier. Oral respondents still maintained a 
position that the Mijikenda lived in Mombasa, not so much to be close to Arabs and 
enjoy the benefits of trade relations, but because Mombasa was their home.44 
42 Salim wa Katwa, Personal interview. Mtwapa, Mombasa 15th June 1998. 
43 Chaparukha M. Kusimba, The Rise and Fall of Swahili States (Walnut Creek. London. New Delhi. 
Altamira Press, 1999). 











2.4 The Swahili 
Historically, the people identified as the Swahili have had no particular territory around 
which a boundary could be drawn. They have never had a state centre, or empire, or even 
a single political authority. Yet they have had certain marked features besides their 
language and their acceptance of Islam that have been unique to them and have 
distinguished them. Historically, the people known as the Swahili have had many 
identities from where peoples and groups could select anyone in a given time situation. 
Mark Horton and John Middleton have identified two views of the Swahili identity. The 
first is that which is given to the Swahili by other person, that is, the Swahili are a 
culturally deracinated people, Arabised, and an un-African cluster of community. The 
other view identifies the Swahili as essentially a Creole people formed through 
immigration from Persian and Arabia. This would mean that the Swahili are an Afro-
Arab society which culturally claims to form part of the world of western Asia than 
eastern Africa.45 Neville Chittick puts this dialogue on the Swahili identity this way: 
'the springs of this civilization are to be found on the northern seaboard of the Indian Ocean. But it 
cannot be said to be Arab; immigrants were probably few in number and there would have been 
far fewer women than men among them ... most Arab men must have married Africans or women 
of mixed blood and their stock rapidly became integrated with local people.'46 
45 Mark Horton and John Middleton, The Swahili: The Social Landscape of a Mercantile Society (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001). 
46 Neville H. Chittick, "The East Coast, Madagascar and the Indian Ocean" in R. Oliver, ed., Cambridge 











The Swahili, on the other hand, see their own self-given identity in terms of their claimed 
ethnic origins, which may include those from outside of Africa. Ethnicity refers to actual 
or claimed places of origin and of descent from them to the present, and has little to do 
with race. Both external and internal definitions of identity may change and have changed 
over time, as the criteria alter with developments in local political and cultural conditions 
and aims. The Swahili discussed herein are those who in the early 19th century were 
inhabitants of Mombasa and the surrounding hinterland. Their organization reflected a 
socially and politically differentiated and hierarchical society, where everyone was 
conscious of their place, duties and obligations. In Mombasa the Swahili divided into two 
confederations of the Thelatha Taifa (three tribes) and the Tisa Taifa (nine tribes), who 
collectively called themselves the Thenashara or Twelve Tribes. The Tisa Taifa are 
sometimes referred to as the Mvita tribes or Miji Tisa (nine tribes), consisting of Wa-
Mvita, Wa-Kilifi, Wa-Mtwapa, Wa-Pate, Wa-Shaka, Wa-Gunya, Wa-Katwa, Wa-Faza 
and Wa-Jomvu. These names suggest that at least seven ofthese groups, not including the 
Wa-Mvita and Wa-Jomvu, came from the old spatial settlement to the north of Mombasa. 
The Wa-Jomvu is a well-known pottery community of the coast which today has mainly 
settled further up the Mombasa channel at Maunguja and Jomvu Kuu. On the other hand, 












2.5 The Mijikenda 
The important group of the polity of Mombasa is the Mijikenda who comprised nine 
tribes: Giryama, Digo, Chonyi, Kauma, Kambe, Ribe, Rabai, Duruma and Jibana.47 
Except for the Digo who also inhabited areas inside the Island of Mombasa, other 
Mijikenda groups inhabit the immediate outskirts of Mombasa in clearly identifiable 
areas. For example, the Chonyi live in western parts known as Chonyi, the Jibana, Rabai 
and Ribe inhabit the north eastern in areas identified with similar names. Mean while the 
Digo have extended their habitat to cover Tanga in Tanzania. 48 In Mombasa the Digo 
claim to be amongst the first community to settle in the Island in areas like Kongowea, 
Nyali, Kizingo and Makupa. 49 Because of the historically socio-economic and political 
significance of Mombasa communities including the Mijikenda and specifically the Digo 
have a tendency to disagree on the history of the town including matters of leadership. 
These disputes have significantly influenced how the Mijikenda and the Swahili perceive 
leadership in the town. 
47 An extensive discussion of the Mijikenda can be gleaned from T.T. Spear, The Kaya Complex: A History 
of the Mijikenda Peoples of Kenya Coast to 1900 (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1918); Justin Willis, 
Mombasa, the Swahili and the making of the Mijikenda (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
48 For a discussion ofIslamic functionalism involving the Digo of Tanga in Tanzania see Abdin N. Chande, 
Islam. Ulamaa and Community Development in Tanzania: A Case study of Religious Currents in East 
Africa. (San Francisco, London & Bethesda: Austin & Winfield, 1998). 











2.6 The Arabs 
The other group of residents of Mombasa are Arabs, especially Omani Arabs comprising 
Mazrii(j, Mandhry and BiiSaidy clans. Though immigrant communities, Arabs carried 
into Mombasa inter-clan rivalries from Oman. In Oman, the Mazrii<j are known as the 
Mazaria, a section of the Bani Jabir tribes who are residents of the valley of Jabir and the 
hilly districts east of Oman. They also inhabit the regions of Rastaq and Sumayil. 50 The 
Mazrti'l appeared in Mombasa as soldiers of the Yarubi Imam of Muscat during the 
nineteenth century when Arabs and the Portuguese fought over Mombasa. After the wars 
the Mazrii<j did not return to Oman but stayed in Mombasa, gradually intermarried with 
local inhabitants and became assimilated. At the turn of the nineteenth century most 
Mazrii<j in Mombasa were second or third generation Swahili of both Arab and African 
descent. An indigenous Swahili family in Mombasa would hardly fail to trace their 
African ancestry amongst the Mijikenda. For example, because of blood relations 
between Mazrii(j families and the Mijikenda, the Mijikenda often made reference to the 
Swahili and Ma7xiiCj kinsfolk as 'Adzomba' meaning uncles and nephews. The 
relationship between the Mijikenda, the Swahili and the MazriiCj has always been of great 
significance to the social and political survival of Mombasa. It was a relationship that 
varied with circumstances, and sometimes communities acted together which were at 
other times found on opposite sides. 
50 S. B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes o/the Persian Gulf. Vo1.2 (London 1919):432, idem "Notes on the 
Tribes of Oman," Report on the Administration 0/ the Persian Gulf Political Residency and Muscat 











2.7 Social Organization and Leadership 
The various groups that inhabit the Coast each see their history largely in tenns of 
genealogy, of presumed or claimed descent from a founding ancestor and especially from 
an original homeland. Some of these claims are historically justified, others are not. 
Among these are the Shungwaya myths and claims of Shirazi origins based on ancient 
genealogies. Genealogies however are not always statements of actual ancestry but, 
rather validations of present authority and position. Descent and kinship are socially 
defined and measured for validation of status and may in fact not be biologically or 
historically true. The communities of Mombasa comprised ethnically and racially defined 
elements that together fonned an Islamic demography, including groups that may loosely 
be referred to as indigenous and others whose fairly recent ancestors were immigrants 
from Arabia. 
The elements named above have different and complementary political roles, and hold 
varying places in the overall system of social stratification. In Mombasa the Swahili and 
the Mijikenda organized their affairs through the institution of umiji or midzi (belonging 
to a settlement). The Miji (sing. Mji) of the Swahili and Mijikenda communities was the 
widest quasi-kinship grouping recognized in the polity. Members of Mji often traced the 
same patrilineal descent from a putative common ancestor. The areas occupied were 
known as miji and comprised the mji burial ground in most cases. Thus, miji were the 











Ascertaining the identity of the earliest inhabitants of Mombasa is problematic as Swahili 
and Mijikenda espouse similar myths of origin tracing their movements from a location 
called Shungwaya.52 Their arrival and settlement on locations of Mombasa is a point of 
conflicting and contradicting claims and accounts of the history of Mombasa. In most 
cases each claim is made with the intention of according an advantage to a specific 
community in important aspects of the social and political matters of the town. I will 
elaborate on the implications of such claims to the social relationships between the Digo 
and the Swahili. 
Narratives of the early histories of the Mijikenda and Swahili communities provoke 
controversy over wenyeji (indigenousness). Both the Swahili and the Digo reckon and 
identify the real Mombasa as Mvita, Gongwa or Kongowea which are the homes of their 
ancestors, but seldom concur on who arrived first. Historically, ruins have been used to 
identify the earliest inhabitants. The Swahili, claiming Arab origins, usually cite ruins 
such as the Jumba la Mtwana, Gedi, and other ancient buildings at Vanga and Gasi as 
being proof of earlier arrival and habitat thereby refuting Mijikenda claims and migration 
histories that also locate their arrival earlier than everybody else. 53 
52 For a discussion of this see T.T. Spear, The Kaya Complex: A History of the Mijikenda Peoples of Kenya 
Coast to 1900 (Nairobi, Kenya Literature Bureau 1978), T.R.H. Cashmore, "A Note on the Chronology of 
the Wanyika of the Kenya Coast," Tanganyika Notes and Record 57 (1963); R.F. Burton, "The Shungwaya 
Myth of the Mijikenda Origins: A Problem of late Nineteenth century Coastal History," International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 5, 3 (1972); J. Willis, Mombasa, the Swahili and the making of the 
Mijikenda (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 











The Swahili reference to ruins does not persuade the Digo who acknowledge they did not 
build stone houses. But they make counter claims against the Swahili using a paternity 
argument. The Digo, or more generally the Mijikenda, argue with the Swahili for the 
advantage that accrue to being considered the most indigenous community. Such 
advantages include occupying positions of prominence in town affairs. Thus, their 
argument that early Arab immigrants married local women and thus gave rise to the 
Swahili should conclude the dispute. But the debate continues. If the Swahili are not 
African in origins as most would claim, they also do not like to acknowledge that the 
Mijikenda were already in Mombasa when they arrived. 
Other claims include the argument based on the name 'Swahili,' which is a Bantu word 
rooted in the Arabic word Sahil which has the meaning of margin or coast but often in 
Arab geographies meaning also 'port of trade,.54 Swahili as an ethnic term was used by 
Omani conquerors who established the sultanate of Zanzibar in the nineteenth century so 
as to create preliminary order in their new colony. They used the word sawahil as the 
geographical designation for the East African coast and the word Swahili to refer to the 
indigenous population that lived there and the language that they spoke. Irrespective of 
whether the people of Mombasa were Swahili of Arab origins or Mijikenda who 
inhabited Mombasa, Gongwa, NyaJi Kuu or Mvita, the identities of these communities 
are of relevance to our discussion for the organization of leadership (uongozi) in early 
Mombasa. 
54 J. Wansbrough, "Africa and the Arab geographers" in D. Dalby ed., Language and History in Africa 
(London: Cass, 1970): 89-101; M. Tolmacheva, The Origin of the name "Swahili" in Tanganyika Notes 











Forms of social organization and practice of authority conformed to miji backgrounds as 
each mji was under the leadership of elders termed wazee. Each Swahili sub-group was 
under an mzee wa mji, while the Mijikenda identified their leaders as dzumbe or angambi, 
although titles like kubo were more pronounced in late nineteenth century. Any of them, 
ngambi, kubo or dzumbe, were representatives who formed a council of elders, wazee wa 
mji. Individuals assumed these positions on the basis of their knowledge of communal 
histories, wisdom and ability to respond positively to communal problems. Power 
depended on one's prowess to manipulate the community and to offer solutions to its 
troubles. According to some oral informants, knowledge of communal rituals and sacred 
rites contributed tremendously towards recognition and inclusion in councils that 
deliberated upon communal affairs. These epitomized power and authority amongst the 
people ofMombasa.55 
At the beginning of the early nineteenth century internal aspects of the social 
organization of the communities of Mombasa changed, as they came under the influence 
of Islam and its subsequent spread, its domination of the inhabitants of Mombasa by 
foreign Arab rulers, and the emergence of European colonial powers. These forces 
influenced the organization of leadership in Mombasa and were effectively responsible 
for communal strife and social cleavages. 
--~~-------











2.8 Influences of early Islam in Mombasa 
The proximity between Arabia and the East African Coast points to possible early contact 
between the two regions. It is uncertain whether early trade contacts necessitated the 
spread of Islam because such contacts could have predated Islam. However, the advent of 
Islam in Arabia during the seventh century marks the turning point in the contacts 
between the communities of Arabian Peninsula and those of the east coast of the Indian 
Ocean, as initial trade contacts increasingly become relations involving a religious and 
cultural exchange. 
The earliest contacts between the inhabitants of the East African Coast and Arabs are 
mentioned in the Peri plus of the Erythrean Sea although it is silent on the religious 
characteristics of the communities.56 Later chronicles such as that of Kilwa mentions the 
settlement of seven Muslim brothers from Persia who were escaping religious 
persecution in their country. It brings to our attention the conquest of Oman by al- I.iajjaj, 
the Syrian Governor of Caliph Abdul Malik (65-86 A.H.; 655-706 A.D.) and the 
subsequent expulsion of its Muslim rulers Sulayman and Sa<id.57 These latter are said to 
56 A translation of the document is found in R.O. Collins, Eastern Africa History (New York: Markus 
Wiener Publishing, 1990): 48-49. G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, The East African Coast: Selected Documents 
From The First Century to the Earlier Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962): 1-2. 
57 An Arabic version of the Kilwa chronicle fell into the hands of the Portuguese in 1505 when Kilwa was 
captured. This story relates how seven brothers from al-Hasa on the Persian Gulf founded Mogadishu and 
Barawa. For an English translation of the chronicle see Freeman-Grenville, The Mediaeval History of the 











have fled with their families and headed for the East African Coast. Their settlement 
aronnd 685 AD. (65 AH.) is recognized as the first settlement of Muslims along this 
coast. Records by Arab traveler and geographer Ibn Batluta who visited Mogadishu, 
Mombasa and Kilwa, observed the Muslim characteristics of its residents whom he 
defmed observing ShajiC7 codes of Islamic law.58 The chronicles have recently been 
complemented by archeological excavations, most significantly the works of Mark 
Horton who excavated coins with the names of Muslim rulers dated 1050-1080 AD. 
Such finds effectively placing the earliest presence of Islam along the East Coast of 
Africa aronnd the ninth century.59 
The settlement of Arabs along the Coast of East Africa and the subsequently emergence 
of Islam influenced indigenous commnnities. Aspects of their social organization 
changed specifically as previous engagements and disputes took on an Islamic dimension. 
The terminology of leadership changed and titles such as Mzee were substituted with 
Shaykh, the latter being more fashionable and prestigious. Local rulers, the wazee of 
various Miji, collaborated with immigrant Arabs families, changing the units of power to 
incorporate quasi Africa and Arab dynasties. This arrangement favored the Arabs who 
occupied the highest positions in ruleship, although some wazee exercised levels of 
autonomy in the affairs of the Miji. From thence, the overall rule of Mombasa was 
identified more with Arabs than with indigenous inhabitants. The Mijikenda complained 
58 Accounts by Ibn BaHilta are in "Ibn BaHilta: The East African Coast in 1331," R.O. Collins, Eastern 
Africa, 61-66. 
59 Mark C. Horton, Shanga. The Archaeology of a Muslim Trading Community on the Coast of East Africa 











that they had lost most of their influence over Mombasa during such times when other 
communities began referring to them as the Nyika (the grassland people). Some 
Mijikenda elders argue that Mombasa was once a Nyika (grassland) inhabited by the 
Mijikenda groupS.60 However, it is important to note that when the Mijikenda were 
defmed as Nyika, some Swahili groups further excluded them through claims of Swahili-
Mijikenda patron-client relations. The Digo, for example, became incensed by these 
Swahili claims. On the other hand, the Digo' s stubbornness in their demands for 
autonomy in the affairs of Mombasa led the Swahili to characterize them with an adage 
"Mdigo ni mzigo" (the Digo is such a burden). 
The discussion above points to the fact that, social relations in Mombasa during the 
period of the Sultanate of Zanzibar and that of the British colonialism came under the 
influence of Islam. Communities came face to face with the difficult reality of belonging 
to one community based on a common religious identity. Among the difficulties are those 
that emerged as a result of attempts to forge common leadership institutions. 
Between Swahili, Mijikenda and Arab Muslims, the latter assumed higher positions of 
leadership in the ummah though Arab clans disagreed amongst themselves. For instance 
the Mazrfi'I competed against the Busaidi, Nabhany or al-Mandhry clans for prominence, 
power, authority and leadership.61 While the Arabs argued amongst themselves, the 
Swahili attempted to exclude the Mijikenda in the running of the affairs of the town by 
means of patronage, as Swahili ethnic groups claimed to have been allied to one 
60Jumaa Keke, Personal interview. Mwabungo, Kwale, 2nd August 2001. 
61 See, Ie Guennec-Coppens, F "Social and Cultural Integration: A case study of East African Hadramis" 











Mijikenda group or the other. To assert their autonomy and claim a stake, the Mijikenda 
objected to the claims of patron-client relations with the Swahili and recalled that they 
held an independent stake in the affairs of Mombasa. Amongst the Mijikenda the Digo 
challenged the Swahili dominance of Mombasa. Although they formed a significant part 
of the Muslim population, the Digo were pushed out of their town settlements due to 
constant fights that emerged between the Gmani, the Mazrtl'i, or the Portuguese invaders. 
In fact, oral traditions indicate that one major clan of the Digo people, achinga ngome 
(literally meaning the people of the fort) had settled in close proximity to the present 
location of Fort Jesus in Mombasa, suggesting that the Digo belonged to both the Nyika 
as well as to the mji (town) settlements.62 
Contested religious identity, based on various claims ofindigeneity, was part of the social 
discourse of difference. To have been exposed to Islam earlier enhanced claims of 
wenyeji and its prestige. Thus, the Mijikenda and the Swahili constantly disagreed on this 
aspect and argued about it. They still do so today. The Swahili claimed not to have 
identified with any form of religion other than Islam, but disagreed with the Digo over 
claims that the Swahili had been responsible for the Islamization of the Digo. The Digo 
abhorred and were offended by claims that they embraced Islam due to their interaction 
with the Swahili. In a conversation with some respected Digo wazee, I heard a total 
denial of corning to Islam through the Swahili. They felt slighted when reference to 
conversion of their ancestors to Islam was attributed or linked to their interactions with 
62 This information was gathered in the process of collecting data for my MA project on conflict and 
tensions between the Sharia Law and Digo customs on inheritance, through discussions with informants 
like Said Suleiman Mwagumbo (interviewed 12/10/1991 and Bwana Kali on 1 1/0 III 992. Recently this 











the Swahili.63 They opposed such claims that "hawakusilimishwa bali walifuata dini" 
(they we were not converted but rather observed religion). To emphasize that the Digo's 
adherence to Islam was independent of any attempts at proselytisation by the Swahili, 
they would ask rhetorically "who was the fIrst Digo to pigishwa shahada (made to 
pronounce the shahada) by the Swahili"? Since there are no known occasions when 
conscious efforts were made to win over the Digo people to Islam, a response to such a 
rhetorical question can be baffling. As the answer to who were the fIrst Digo to take the 
shahada as an indication of embracing Islam is difficult to disentangle, studies on 
Islamization amongst the Digo will remain unclear. 
The Digo are an important segment of the Muslim population, but Islamization amongst 
the Digo remains an enigma. The earliest historical study of the Islamization of the Digo 
is by David Sperling who dates the beginnings of Islam around the 1870's. Sperling uses 
inscriptions of dates found amongst the earliest Mosques by the Digo.64 However, the 
Digo would disagree by arguing that this was not an adequate assessment of when they 
started to practice Islam. In fact, I tend to concur that inscriptions on when a mosque was 
built hardly indicate the earliest beginnings of Islam. They may however indicate the time 
a mad and wattle mosque was turned into a stone structure. Furthermore, such 
inscriptions tend to express the enthusiasm of the Digo to built permanent mosques. It is 
63Juma Bakari, Oral interview. Mkomani, Mombasa 08tb September 2001, Saidi Mwabanha, Pungu, Kwale 
02nd September 2001, Rashid Salim Mwaneke, Kisauni, Mombasa 15th September 2001. 
64 David. C. Sperling "The Growth ofIslam among the Mijikenda of Kenya Coast 1826-1933" (ph. D diss., 
University of London, 1988); W.F. McKay, "A Pre-colonial History of Southern Kenya Coast." (Ph. D 











easier to assume that the Digo built these new places of worship as strong adherents of 
the faith, and not as novices to Islam. 
The difficulties encountered in discerning the chronology of the spread of Islam amongst 
the Digo, or even other Mijikenda groups for that matter, is as a result of the fact that 
there were no conscious proselytizing activities. It is difficult to find a Digo who accepts 
that their earliest ancestors pronounced the shahada under the tutelage of an Arab or a 
Swahili as an indication of kusilimishwa (having being guided to embracing Islam).65 
Some Digo do acknowledge learning some aspects of Islam from the Swahili but this 
constituted kusoma kwao (learning from them) and not kusilimishwa. The assumption of 
kusilimishwa takes an expression of cultural superiority between communities who claim 
to have assisted others in their practice of Islam. Along the coast of East Africa being a 
Muslim meant you were mstaarabu or culturally superior. Thus, the disputes between the 
Swahili and the Digo are to be understood against this background of claims to cultural 
superiority. The Digo would not accept to be referred to by the Swahili as the washenzi 
(uncultured) because they also practiced Islam. On the other hand, the Swahili would 
abhor being brought closer to the Digo because it seemed to lower their dignity as being 
one amongst the cultured communities of the town. It is with regard to these forms of 
relationships occasioned by Islam that we situate disputes over positions of influence and 
leadership in Mombasa. 
65 It is a common practice in the East African Coast when one embraces Islam they are made to pronounce 
the Creed attesting to have accepted that There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger. 












2.9 Power in Foreign Rule: 
Zanzibar and leadership in the Coast of Kenya 
Apart from the emergence of Islam, the existence of foreign rulership in Mombasa 
influenced the organization of leadership and the accession to positions of influence. 
Since earliest times different communities fought over the control of Mombasa. These 
included the Arabs, the Portuguese and the British. These communities have played 
equally vital roles in the evolution and organization of leadership in the region. During 
1498-1730, life on the East African Coast was characterized by struggles between the 
Portuguese, the Muslim inhabitants and the Imams of Oman. In 1478 vigorous campaigns 
ensued when the Portuguese sailor Vasco-da-Gama arrived. By 1540 another Portuguese 
Admiral, Francisco D' Almeida, sacked and subdued Mombasa.66 The Muslim residents 
of Mombasa abhorred Portuguese behavior and their brutal rule. The existence of the Fort 
Jesus in Mombasa reminded them of the yoke of the Portuguese rule. Muyaka 
reminiscenced in his verses that 
Ngome ni ngome ya mawe na fusi ta kuJusiza 
Ngome ni ya matumbwe, na boriti kuikiza 
Ngome wetwapo sikawe, enda hima na kuJuza 
Ngome imetuumiza, naswi tu mumo ngomeni 
The fort is built on stone and reinforced with coral 
The fort has ceilings well-laid with poles and beams of Boriti 
The fort! When you are summoned do not tarry but hurry and go quickly 
The fort has certainly done us so much harm, are we still to revere the fort 
66 For a history of Portuguese rule in Mombasa see C.R. Boxer & C. Azevedo, Fort Jesus and the 
Portuguese in Mombasa 1593-1729 (London, 1960); Justus Strandes, The Portuguese in East A,frica 











This poem was composed in the early nineteenth century to display the communities' 
ill-feelings about the Portuguese. A mention of the Portuguese still evokes emotions in 
the town. In 1998, the then Mayor of Mombasa organized the Mombasa Cultural 
Carnival and invited its residents to celebrate its history. Participants were enthusiastic 
about the histories of bravery of the Muslims of Mombasa but a mention of the 
Portuguese period evoked strong opposition. Like Muyaka in the nineteenth century, a 
representative of the Council of Imams and Preachers of Islam in Kenya (CIPK), Shaykb 
Ali Shee, argued that ngome imetuumiza naswi tu mumo ngomeni (the fort has certainly 
done us harm, yet we revere the fort).lt was a religious and political message warning 
that the Muslims of Mombasa had nothing to celebrate about the Portuguese reign and 
accused the Portuguese of the murder of thousands of Muslims, the plunder of the town 
and the burning down of "hundreds" ofmosques.67 Negative sentiments aside, the history 
of Mombasa is incomplete without a mention of the Portuguese, since from 1540 they 
controlled the city of Mombasa until 1698 when they were expelled with the assistance of 
the Omani Arabs. The Omani Arabs assisted the residents of Mombasa with ulterior 
motives. When they helped to defeat the Portuguese, their expansionist zeal revealed 
itself. Immediately after the Portuguese left, the rulers of Oman imposed their own 
governor over the indigenous communities. 
67 Shaykh Ali Shee was addressing Muslims and other participants during the Mombasa Cultural Carnival 
in April 1998, though these were his expressions the number of mosques aUegedly burned down sounds 











The first Liwali of Mombasa was the Mazru<i Nasir b. Abd AlHili.68 In 1724, the 
indigenous coastal communities became disenchanted with their Omani overlords. For 
example, when Nasir b. Abd Allah was Liwali, the Imam's indigenous soldiers mutinied 
and set up their leader Sese Rumbe, as Commandant at Fort Jesus. In 1744 changes in 
Oman influenced changes in Mombasa. Al)mad b. Sa<id of the Al-BiiSaidy family seized 
power and became the Imam of Muscat and Oman. Mul;lammad b. <Ut1)man, a Mazru<i 
kinsman, was then the Liwali of Mombasa. In an act of defiance he proclaimed in 
Mombasa that "The Imam is an ordinary citizen who has usurped Oman; I have usurped 
Mombasa." The stage was set for a struggle between the Al-BiiSaidy and the Mazri1<i. 69 
To counter the Mazri1<i challenge, AQmad b. Sa'id decided to strengthen his hold on 
Zanzibar first by sending a garrison to the Island around 1746. In the same year he 
successfully contrived the murder of Mul;lammad b. <Uthman. Despite Al;lmad b. Sa<id's 
success he did not take control of Mombasa, because he had to consolidate his power in 
Oman first. As a consequence, the Mazru'i family regrouped and regained control and 
installed another Mazri1'i, <Ali b. <UtQman, as Liwali. 
68 There are variations on who was the first Mazrui Liwali. M.A. Hinawy gives the date of the first Mazrui 
governor as 1711, see M.A. Hinawy, AI-Akida and Fort Jesus, Mombasa (Nairobi: East African Literature 
Bureau, 1970):6 however, John Gray mentions that Nasir Ibn Abdullah was holding office when the real 
governor Ahmed bin Nasir set out for the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1727; see J. M. Gray, The British in 
Mombasa 1824-1827 (London: Macmillan 1956): 5. 
69 The struggle for power between the Mazrui and the Sultans of Zanzibar is documented in N. R Bennett, 











Meanwhile in Oman A1;lmad b. Sacid died in 1784, and there followed another period of 
unrest until 1804 when Sa(jd b. SUltan usually known as Sayyid Sacid became ruler. The 
murder of his brother in 1806 gave him absolute control over Oman. Rival claimants to 
the throne attempted to establish themselves along the East African Coast, but Zanzibar 
held out, and soon became the center of Oman activity on the Coast of East Africa. 
Sayyid Sacid had much to do in Oman in the early part of his reign and could not take any 
serious offensive against the MazriN until 1828. He set sail with a large fleet from 
Muscat and engaged the MazrUci at Mombasa. A fierce encounter ended in victory for 
Sayyid Sa'id. A treaty was negotiated in which his authority was acknowledged. 
Sayyid Sa'Id withdrew to Zanzibar, which had continued to be loyal to him, and stayed 
there for three months. Trouble in Oman necessitated his return and the Mazriici 
immediately revolted in Mombasa. In the following years, Sayyid Sa'Id had to send 
several expeditions to Mombasa, and it was not unti11837 that the power of the Mazriici 
was finally crushed. Sayyid Sacid, relying more on diplomacy than martial strength, 
persuaded the new Sultan of Mombasa, Rashid b. Salim to accept a treaty whereby 
Rashid continued to rule the Island but the Fort was to be garrisoned by Oman troops. A 
few months later Rashid was seized along with many of his leading supporters and 
banished to Bandar Abbas. The power of the Mazaria was thus broken. 
After the power of the MazriiCi was finally crushed, Sayyid Sa'Id controlled the whole 
coast from Mogadishu to the Ruvuma river. In 1832, he made Zanzibar his capital and 











officials under the Liwali included Kadhis and the Mudirs. Kadhis assisted and advised 
Liwalis on matters of the Sharf'ah and other matters of local interest. Mudirs were 
administrative assistants in the communities. In this new organization of the Sultanate, 
Sayyid SaCld appointed his BiiSaidy kinsmen to the positions of Liwali and Mudirs in 
Mombasa. Thus, CAll b. Nassir was appointed Liwali of Mombasa immediately after the 
last MazriiCi ruler, Liwali Rashid b. Salim b. Al}.mad al-MazriiCi had been deposed and he 
ruled up to 1845.70 
From 1870 when Europeans developed a keen interest in Mombasa, the Busaidi Liwali 
was Ali b. Nassir who was serving a second term. He seemed not to have liked the 
European presence because when Ludwig Krapf of the Church Missionary Society 
(CMS) landed in Mombasa in 1844, he carried with him a letter of introduction from 
Sayyid Said. But that CAll b. Nassir was un-cooperative and refused to assist Krapf to find 
proper lodgings and in fact he issued an order that people should not call on Krapf. 
CAll b. Salim was succeeded in 1872 by Salim b. <All al-Mandhry who was succeeded by 
Salim b. Khalfan in 1874 who was Liwali intermittently up to 1920. In 1874, 
Seif b. Sulayman Deremky acted, while Salim b. Khalfan was in Zanzibar. Ali b. Nassir 
took over for another term from 1881-84. 
When the Sultan appointed Liwalis, Mudirs and Kadhi in Mombasa, he hardly considered 
the Mijikenda or the Swahili Muslims, although these communities were allowed some 
70 For a history of the Zanzibar Sultanate see N. R. Bennett, A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar. 











levels of autonomy in orgamzmg for traditional authority and leadership. Various 
agreements were entered into between the Sultan's chief ministers (wazir) with the 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa Swahili communities, resulting in the Swahili recognizing 
the sovereignty of the Sultan but skeptical on the authority of his representatives. Swahili 
elders have viewed the Mazri1Ci and al-BiiSaidy Liwali as imposters in respect of the 
affairs of their town.71 For example the Swahili declined to recognize the authority of 
Shaykh Jabir who was appointed Kadhi by the Liwali. They complained to the effect that 
the Liwali was overstepping his bounds by appointing officials against their wishes. 
Opposed to the Kadhiship of Shaykh Jabir the Swahili of Thelatha Taifa favored their 
own kinsman, Shaykh Mshirazi. For illustrative purposes I will reproduce two 
agreements entered into between the Swahili and representatives of the Sultan at 
Zanzibar. These indicate how the Swahili related or interacted with the Sultan and his 
appointed officials in Mombasa. 
The fIrst agreement concerned the authority of the Swahili leader Shaykh Mshirazi who 
challenged the appointment of a Kadhi by the Liwali of Mombasa to serve amongst the 
Thelatha Taifa branch of the Swahili. This agreement was entered between Sultan 
Khalifa b. Sacld and the Swahili in the presence of the Sultan's Chief Minister, 
Sulayman b. Mubammad. It stated the following: 72 
From Said bin Sultan 
To whom it may be presented, 
71 Bashir Mchangamwe, Personal interview. Nairobi, 16th August 1998. 
72 I am indebted to the family of Haider Matano who drew my attention to these documents and most of the 
narrations on the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities in Mombasa. Copies of these are also found in 











We have agreed between Sheikh Mshirazi and ourselves that 
He is the recognized leader amongst his community 
No one is to surpass him. 
I swear to God and His Prophet that during our reign and their lifetime, 
during his (Shaykh Mshirazi's lifetime, all that is due as their right to 
them is theirs. 
If there is any dispute in his community, such dispute must be 
submitted to him. 
Shaykh Mshirazi and his predecessors are to settle disputes of their 
community and the Liwali has no right to interfere. 
It is upon us to guard the safety of Shaykh Mshirazi and his followers, 
their lives and belongings. 
Anyone who will stand against them is deemed to be our enemy and the 
enemy of our representative. 
If the Shaykh wishes that an offender be retrieved he shall be retrieved. 
The Liwali shall follow their advice in connection with town affairs. 
The Liwali shall be a person whom they like and if the Liwali will go 
against them we swear by the name of God that we shall dismiss him 
forthwith. 
There will be no conscription imposed on them by our representative. 
Knoweth whoever will see that all. 
Written by his servant by his order 
Signed. Sulayman b. Mubammad (Minister) 
26th Ramadan 1252 A.H 
Confrrmed by: 
The text is very interesting in a number of respects. Firstly, Mshirazi is appointed as a 
leader but his responsibilities clearly included judicial matters. Kadhiship seems to entail 
broad leadership in the local affairs of the community. Secondly, the agreement also 
implies a parallel authority with the Sultan's representative, the Liwali. The Sultan seems 
eager to appease the beneficiaries that the Liwali will not work against their interest. 
In this case the Sultan's appointees had continually attempted to interfere with the 
authority of indigenous leaders. The Swahili interpreted this agreement to give them 
autonomy and authority parallel to the Liwali. Yet a similar agreement was entered into 











agreement was entered into in the presence of Sulayman b. AJ:.nnad, another Minister of 
the Sultan, and signed by Sultan Said. It states 
From Pauper Sulayman b. A1;unad 
To whom it may be presented amongst the residents of Mombasa. 
That Shaykh, Shaykh bin Mshirazi is the leader of all the leaders 
(Tamim) for the THREE TRIBES and there is no one to interfere in his 
previous privileges. Whoever will disobey him or his orders and wishes 
him to be imprisoned he shall be imprisoned: and whomever he wants 
him to be fettered he shall be fettered and shall not be asked the reason 
why. 
The Kadhi will be the one whom they like for that is their right. Ye 
people fear God to fulfill these conditions. 
Full honor and respect is due to him for whatever is desirable. 
The Kadhi will be the one whom they themselves wish to be for the 
purpose of leading them in prayers, officiate marriages and to settle 
disputes amongst them. 
Knoweth this document is presented to him. 
Pauper by his own handwriting. 
Shaykh Jabir (Shaykh of the immigrant Arabs) shall not interfere with 
them in their matters except by their consent. 
Whoever presents a document other than this but similar to it, is invalid. 
29th Safar 1257 A.H 
Written by Pauper, Signed Said (Sultan). 
We can glean from these agreements signed between Sayyid Said and the representatives 
of the Thelatha Taifa and other Swahili communities that Sayyid Said was ready to 
accede to the demands made by local communities for as long as they accepted his 
ultimate sovereignty. Although future rulers of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, especially 
during the reign of Sayyid Barghash appeared to have been more assertive in their 
appointments, a precedent had already been set that future rulers and his representatives 
were expected to observe. Such agreements determined future relations between the 











Thus, when the British took over the authority to appoint officials including the Liwali 
and Kadhi, the Swahili continued to cling to their autonomy and at times declined to 
acknowledge the authority of non-Swahili officials appointed by the British. More 
importantly, the Swahili demanded to be enjoined and included in the hierarchy of 
positions of leadership in Mombasa. Whenever the Swahili were excluded from positions 
of leadership, they asserted to such historical antecedents to demand alternative leaders. 
Most of the demands by the Swahili emerged when the British appointed Muslim leaders 
as a result of agreements entered between the British and the Sultan of Zanzibar. I will 
discuss hereunder how the British instituted their authorities in Mombasa. 
2.10 Early British Interests in Mombasa 
The first time that the British were mentioned in Mombasa was during the Mazrui period 
in 1824-26. Mombasa became a British Protectorate then at the request of the Mazrui 
who wished to fly the British flag at Fort Jesus to discourage Omani attacks. This request 
was made to Captain Vidal when he docked his HMS Barracouta into Mombasa in 1823. 
Vidal initially declined to hoist the Union Flag despite ''the many arguments and earnest 
solicitations" of the MazrU{i. But Captain Owen, Vidal's commanding officer, sailing 
south from Muscat saw the British Flag flying from the Fort when they sighted Mombasa 
in 1824.73 The MazrU{i did not wish to be ruled, but only to be able to fly the "Union 
Jack" at Fort Jesus should the Omani fleet be sighted. 











The British emerged more strongly during the reign of the Busaidy Sultans of Zanzibar 
who had defeated the Mazrfici. As part of Britain's attempts to stamp out the slave trade, 
Sir Bartle Frere was sent to Zanzibar in 1873 to negotiate with Sultan Sayyid Barghash. 
On his return to England Frere asked the Church Missionary Society (CMS) to open a 
settlement at Mombasa for freed slaves. Within a year, more than six hundred rescued 
slaves were accommodated at Frere Town in the north mainland of Mombasa.74 There 
was a feeling of resentment by many Arab slave owners who stated that most of the 
dwellers at Frere Town were run-away slaves from Mombasa. To counter this, the British 
Government paid compensation for all such runaways to their previous owners. Pressure 
from the British led to further agreements with the Sultans of Zanzibar, culminating in 
the abolishing of the slave trade, and the Zanzibar slave market was formally closed in 
1873. In 1875, an internal dispute provided an opportunity for a greater British 
involvement in Mombasa. Mu1;lammad b. Abd Allah, the Akida or Commandant of Fort 
Jesus, refused to leave the town he was recalled by the Sultan.75 He attacked the Liwali of 
Mombasa and some loyal residents. Sayyid Barghash turned to the British and requested 
help in ousting the Akida. Two British naval ships bombarded the Fort until finally 
Mul}.ammad surrendered and was banished to Madagascar. 
Apart from the desire to eradicate the slave trade, British involvement in East Africa in 
the last three decades of the nineteenth century stemmed largely from the fear that 
Germany might take over the whole territory. Karl Peters, had traveled into the interior of 
74 The history of freed slaves in Free Town is narrated in J.J. Mbotela, The Freeing o/Slaves in East Africa. 
(London: Evans, 1956). 











East Africa and persuaded several tribal Chiefs to sign trading documents, gIvmg 
Germany rigbts in their lands. When Sayyid Bargbash came to hear of these maneuvers 
he was not worried, and turned to the British for assistance. Britain was not anxious to 
antagonize the Germans and failed to give the Sultan the assurances he wanted. The 
Sultan was forced to agree to Germany taking parts of the inland East Africa south of 
Tanga along with Witu in the north. During the latter part of his reign Sayyid Bargbash 
had persuaded Sir William Mackinnon to accept a trading concession on the Coast. The 
British government itself was approached but was still not eager to get involved. 
However, they encouraged Sir William Mackinnon to go ahead and open a trade front. It 
was thus that Sir William formed the British East Africa Association, which latter 
became the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA) in 1888. Under agreements 
with the Sultan the British administered the Sultan's dominions, all the while 
acknowledging his authority. For example, in 1887, the first concession allowed the 
Company to exercise its powers over all his dominions with powers and authority to pass 
laws for the government. It also allowed the Company to establish courts of justice. 
However, a caveat was included where judges appointed by the company required the 
approval of the Sultan. The Sultan reserved for himself the authority to appoint 
individuals to positions of religious authority and influence. Thus, the Kadhi were 
initially nominated by the Sultan althougb the British appointed other officials such as 
collectors, District Officer and Mudirs. 
As the Sultan allowed the administration of his dominions to fall under the authority of 











affairs of his dominions to the new rulers. More emphatically, was that when a charter 
was granted to the IBEA it provided inter-alia that: 
The company as such or its officers will not in any way interfere with the religion of any 
class or tribe of the peoples of its territories or any of the inhabitants there from. All 
forms of religious worship or religious ordinances may be exercised within the said 
territories and no hindrance shall be offered thereto.76 
2.11 Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined what constitutes the Islamic demography in Mombasa. It dealt 
with how Muslim communities related with one another, and outline the extent and the 
limits of locals in the context of Arab rulers and British traders. I have drawn attention to 
an Islamic community characterized by overlapping, contentious and multiple identities 
that came under the influence of major social forces such as the authority of Zanzibar and 
British colonialism. A form of Muslim power was instituted by the Sultanate of Zanzibar 
although centrally authorized Liwali and local Kadhis. But the sultan was relatively weak 
but this was weakened until he eventually acquiesced to foreign British rule which 
ushered in the era of European colonization of Muslim communities. Although the 
control over the political affairs in the Sultan's dominions was passed on to the British, 
religious autonomy and protection was granted to the Muslim communities. It was a 
significant undertaking that formed the foundations for continuous Muslim objections to 
attempts by British officers to favor leaders who were not popular. Muslims deployed 
such guarantees to demand non- interference of the British in all matters of a religious 
76 See "Agreement between Great Britain and Zanzibar, respecting the possessions of the Sultan of 











nature, including the choice of officials such as Kadhi and other positions of leadership 
and authority. The administrative arrangement entered into between the Sultan and the 
representatives of the British traders signaled the decline of the Sultan's authority over the 
Muslim communities and the propelsion of British power through the establishment of a 
protectorate over the Sultan's dominions in Mombasa and other coastal towns. I want to 












3.1 The Colonial State, Race, and Muslim Officials 
Participants at the C:uiamiP symposium organized by the SUPKEM in fact had agreed to 
establish a council of (ulama' or the Majlis but there were sentiments opposed to such an 
institution because of the fears that it could be used to propel ethnic based leadership. 
Neither the proponents of the accusation of ethnic biases nor its protagonists were far 
from reality. To discern Muslim attitudes towards posts of leadership such as Kadhi or 
Liwali, I will in this chapter uncover the basis upon which these posts were created and 
developed. Then I will follow this with an examination of the considerations on 
appointees and the factors that influenced their institutionalization in the colonial state. 
To confirm the role of ethnic predilections, this discussion will be placed in the broader 
context of colonialism because the Muslim communities of Kenya have had an 
interesting and unique history of colonialism, as the colonial desire for hegemony 
influenced almost every sector of the lives of the Muslims. 
3.2 Colonial Power 
In most instances the colonial state in Africa lasted less than a century, and leading 
theorists of colonial power have characterized colonialism as a "mere moment in 
historical time.,,77 In Kenya British colonization took the form of conquest, giving rise to 
colonial states characterized as having, "'displaced indigenous institutions and replacing 
77 Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven and London: Yale 











them with institutions of authority and government imposed by ... imperial power".78 But 
the process of colonization also involved reactions from colonized societies, who 
embraced, refused, rejected and were obsessed by it. Periodizing the colonial enterprise 
identifies tripartite stages broadly defined firstly in the moments of conquest until the 
First World War, when the dominant objective was to construct an apparatus of 
domination and societal subordination into permanent rule. The second interwar period 
was concerned with consolidation of the empire through institutionalization, 
rationalization and routinization of the superstructure of colonial domination. The final 
stage entailed the gradual realization by colonial managers that its privilege and rule 
could not indefinitely persist as alien rule. The third stage falls around the 1940's when 
growing indigenous dissatisfaction forced reluctant metropolitan acceptance of transfer of 
sovereignty and ushered in processes of decolonization.79 This chapter broadly engages 
the history of British colonial rule, perceived as an ambiguous adventure of control and 
response. Superimposing the discourse of colonial power and its effects on Muslims 
entails appreciating the historical explications of the legalities of colonialism. Such 
mapped produced seriously contested outlines of authority in the Muslim community. 
During the time of British colonial power, legal identity was integral to the state's social 
mission of carefully dividing a society that was inherently fragmented, atomized and 
78Donald Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern 
Hemisphere (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 











centre-less. so One's identity was a momentous definition of rights and obligations. 
Colonial encounters included moments of individual and communal negation of one's 
identity because belonging to the 'wrong identity' carried with it the irresolvable 
consequences of loss of privileges. In the Muslim community of Kenya, the colonial state 
also defined local populations as "Natives" making them suffer an intractable social 
humiliation. As elsewhere, a native was defined as an utterly antithetical being who could 
not be brought into the realm of civilization, much less integrated into its emphatic 
instruments like those of the state. The native, in short, was denied a legal personality 
which was the domain of civil and civilized order within the ambit of civilization. SI 
Colonial officers' views of the native were that he could not become the same as the 
civilized, leading to a British policy that ensured the existence of an unalterable 
difference between natives and other communities. Consequently, an unsettled 
ambivalence permeated colonial power as a whole. Any native who demanded civility 
was checked by tentacular native regulations. The torpid incapacity of the native was one 
which prevented the assumption of civilized behavior and denied natives the ability to act 
transformatively. The native was nothing else than the opposite of the dynamism of the 
European identity. Nevertheless, the poverty of colonial powers' ability to define 
communities unexpectedly and unpretendedly allowed natives some effective action. 
Systems of 'indirect rule' proliferated, recognizing native modes of behavior although 
80 C. Poggi, The Development 0/ the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (London: Hutchinson, 
1978): 121. 











such effective action was always severely circumscribed. In respect of the application of 
'indirect rule' in Kenya, existing native institutions could not operate outside the 
supervisory system of European administrators. Native institutions were recognized 
solely as being subordinate to the law of the colonist, and were denied such recognition if 
the colonist felt they would be 'repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience' 
or if they judged them to going contrary to the 'general principles of humanity. 
The British colonist policy imbued itself with a claim to stand objectively and 
transcendently apart from the squabbling diversity of the native, a vantage point that was 
the basis of British claims to resolve native differences and to encompass and determine 
their very destiny. The progressive and evolutionary assumptions of imperial rule placed 
the colonist in a position to decide and act with an appropriate force. So, even when a 
local demand by the colonized was allowed some operative effect, its aberrations and 
inadequacies could be put right by the 'superior colonial' prescription. 
I will analyze colonial hegemony through an overview of the statements attributed to 
colonial governors and other administrative officials as they went about their duties to 
legislate for Muslim people in Kenya. To begin with, I will by way of introduction 
review the policies that entrenched the colonial power, as a scheme through which the 
BritiSh colonial state met its raison de'tre, the desire to accumulate power and ensure its 
own production over time. 82 
I will begin in 1895 when the British took over control of the Coast from the Sultan of 
Zanzibar and embarked on establishing a colonial administration, deploying principles 
82 This concept is well discussed in Friederich Meinecke, Machiavellism, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven: 











and policies that affected how Muslim posts were established and officials appointed. 
Pursuing a policy of instituting colonial rule, they rendered null and void the powers and 
validity of all historically fonned cultures of eastern Africa. They filled this void with an 
artful structure of other elements, some intrusively European but others carefully selected 
on the basis of expediency which I will illustrate. The process of selective inclusion of 
Native fonns of power and authority in the colonial hierarchies of power and 
bureaucracy, albeit undertaken on the basis of expediency and pragmatism, is a classic 
example of the ambiguity that was produced by colonial power. While on the one hand 
colonial officers wished to exclude natives from self regulated fonns of power, on the 
other hand colonial policy allowed the inclusion and co-option of a selected class of 
Native communities and leaders. It will be seen how Muslim authorities were constructed 
in this gap between colonial power and latitude. 
To successfully implement its rule the British needed a smoothly functional state 
apparatus to resolve the problem of authority in what Mahmood Mamdani has coined 
"how a tiny minority could rule over an indigenous majority".83 In Kenya the British 
embarked on implementing a 'colonial situation' by devising certain mechanisms of 
control, and adopted a 'mode of incorporation as opposed to marginalization' whereby 
Muslims were appointed as officials and functionaries of the state.84 A myriad of 
problems had to be overcome in the process. 
• How to institute British authority and its Muslim functionaries? 
-----~~------
83 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996): 15. 











• How to coerce subjected people to accept the colonial version of law and order? 
• How to control dominant social institutions of the colonized community? 
• How to create an organizational capacity capable of transmitting and enforcing 
order from the center to the periphery? 
In Kenya the colonial state's resolve entailed establishing the colonial service as an 
administrative system charged with maintaining law and order. The British colonial states 
that operated amongst Muslims had an administrative backbone stretching from the 
Secretary of State in London through the local Governors and thence down to the village 
headmen or Chief via the Secretariat, the Provincial and District administration. 
Secondly, the machinery necessary to deal with demands and conflicts arising out of the 
needs of a non-homogenous community in a new colonial situation was established. 
Thus, local Legislative Councils and Executive Councils were set up to represent 
communal interests to the government. Finally, local forms of officialdom and 
institutions were developed and charged with settling internal disputes and maintaining 
social order. Now, I will tum to the evidence to illustrate this colonial project. 
In Kenya the institutionalization of Balandier's 'colonial situation' began with the 
establishment of differentiated institutions of rule with separate legal classification for 
subject populations.85 The promulgation of the East African Order-in-Council 1897, 
officially entrenched colonialism, as it established differentiated institutions of the 
colonial state. The Order-in-Council established the Native Court Regulation 1897 to 
85 An East African discussion of the Court structures can be found in H. F. Morris and James S. Read, 












empower the Native Courts Commissioner of Kenya to make rules and orders for the 
administration of native courts. The Native Court Regulation created two classes of 
Native Courts, i.e. the Protectorate Court as the highest Court and Subordinate Courts 
known as Provincial Courts. This organization of Courts recognized the East African 
Protectorate as a district of the Bombay presidency. Thus, the Indian Civil and Criminal 
Procedure Codes were to apply in Kenya. The East African Order in Council 1897 also 
established other native Courts constituted by the Native Courts Authority oj 1897. Three 
classes of Native Courts were established. These included those presided over by 
European officers, those presided over by Arabs in the Coast region and those presided 
over by Native Tribal Chiefs or Elders. 
To serve Muslims along the Coast the Native Courts Authority oj 1897 established two 
Subordinate Courts, viz. the Kadhi Courts and the Liwali Courts. Kadhi Courts were 
presided over by Muslim religious elite (the culamiP) with jurisdiction on Muslim 
religious matters of a personal nature such as marriage, divorce and succession. Its 
operative statutes were the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession Ordinance 
oj 1897, which inter alia identified the realm of its applicability within the former 
dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, its interlocutors, officials and figures of authority.86 
Demands to incorporate the marriage and divorce ordinance in areas outside the 
dominions of the Sultan were incorporated in this although amendments were effected 
around the 1900's and the new ordinance that recognized Muslim officials with lesser 
authority was enacted in 1906 as the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession 











Ordinance 1906. Its effects allowed the colonial government to detennine how Muslims 
instituting marriage rituals would be recognized by the state. Its enactment stipulated the 
colonial perspective on Muslims in the interior of Kenya. The ordinance became the basis 
upon which the government denied Muslim demands for recognition of Kadhi in regions 
beyond the Coast. The Liwali Courts dealt with civil matters presided over by the 
representative of the Sultan, in the person appointed to be Liwali. In the Court hierarchy, 
the Liwali was a civil official who was assisted by junior officials like the Mudir and 
Akida. The establishment of the courts and field officers achieved two goals. In the first 
instance they fulfilled the undertaking given to the Sultan that the British will maintain 
fonns of power and authority previously observed by the Muslim subjects of the Sultan 
of Zanzibar. At the same time, the courts established the primary mechanism for British 
hegemony. Apart from the Court structures, colonial rule manifested itself through the 
power, authority and influence of its 'proconsuls on the ground,' a constellation of field 
officers comprising Governors, District Officers and Provincial Commissioners in the 
service of Her Majesty's government. 
3.3 Sir Arthur Hardinge(1859-1933) 
From Structure to Practice 
In 1895 when the IBEA Company relinquished its management of the Sultan's inland 
dominions, Sayyid I.Iamed b. Thuwain entered into an agreement with Arthur Hardinge 
(later Sir Arthur Hardinge), the British agent and Consular General for management of 
the same.87 By way of these agreements British officers were bestowed with the authority 











to appoint Liwali, Kadhi and other positions of influence. Initially, Muslim communities 
were pleased with the apparent shift of power away from the IBEA Co. back to the rule 
of the Sultan. But they were disappointed when realizing that the Sultan had actually 
replaced one European master with another. As the British aimed to establish their 
authority as quickly as possible, the changes caused considerable agitation amongst 
Muslims.88 During Arthur Hardinge' s appointment as Consul General during 1895-1900 
he initiated changes with far-reaching implications and his successors continued with his 
policies with minor variations. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, each community of Arabs, Swahili and the Mijikenda in 
Mombasa recognized the authority of individuals who emanated from their mji or ethnic 
group. Nevertheless, in the face of European rule, Muslims were unanimously concerned 
with whether the British would recognize their religious institutions, way of life, and 
generally, their leaders, whether Tamims, Wazee or Liwali. Of course, each community 
in Mombasa was concerned with the survival of communal or mji-based officials and 
leaders. The Swahili were less concerned about the position of Liwali because they were 
never appointed to serve in it. But, they were concerned about the validity of agreements 
they entered into with the Sultan concerning the authority of their Tamims and Kadhis. 
To a large extent though, the people of Mombasa were concerned if the Shari'ah would 
eventually be applicable though this did not stop them from disagreeing on who should 
be appointed Kadhi or Liwali. The simmering agitation was equally critical to the British, 
and Arthur H. Hardinge recognized it. To counter any possible deterioration of the 











situation he assured Muslims of positive British intentions concerning their religion, 
leadership and religious institutions. Hardinge tried to alleviate Muslim fears and publicly 
proclaimed that the Muslim religion would remain the public and established creed in the 
Sultan's territories; and further pronounced that cases were to be adjudicated on the basis 
of the Sharicah while Muslim administration of Liwali, Kadhi and Mudirs established by 
the Sultan would be maintained.89 
The assurance Hardinge gave did not deter him or future colonial administrators from 
instituting structures that strengthened colonial power. The application of the SharIah 
was not necessarily inimical to colonial authorities. Muslim officials continued to hold 
positions in the administration but new structures that strengthened were incorporated in 
what was described as streamlining the organization of official positions. Principally, a 
division of roles and titles was suggested for Muslim appointees. 
The first change drastically affected the Swahili communities. Instituted under the excuse 
of removing anomalies and haphazard methods of recognizing Muslim officials deployed 
by the IBEA Company, Hardinge abrogated the payment of jidiya, or tribute that was 
accorded to Swahili elders. The Swahili argued that they had entered into agreements 
with representatives of the IBEA Company to be paid tribute as the company used its 
territories like Kilindini harbor. In his changes Sir Arthur Hardinge abolished the jidiya. 
Extensive exchanges of communication ensued between leaders and representatives of 
89 T. Carmichael, The British Practice Towards Islam in East Africa Protectorate: Muslim Officials, Wakf 
Administration and Secular Education in Mombasa and Environs 1895-1920", Journal Institute of Muslim 











the Swahili on the payment of fidiya. In fact as late as 1934, the Swahili were still 
demanding payment from the government. Then, S. H. Jezan, Acting Provincial 
Commissioner, Coast had written in response that 
When the Imperial British East African Company took its lease of the Coast it continued to make 
these payments, and the Protectorate government afterwards made provisions by a special annual 
vote of some $61 under the heading "wazee of Mombasa". I do not know why the petitioners 
refers to it as Custom duty compensation, unless it may be because the rent payable by 
government for the Coastal Strip was originally assessed on the basis of the customs dues which 
the Sultan was receiving at that time, and perhaps represented the sources from which this 
annual grant was paid.9o 
However, colonial officers in Mombasa constantly objected to such demands. The British 
denied having inherited the practice of paying tribute to the Swahili, but the Swahili 
accused the BuSaidy Liwali of Mombasa of having instigated this move. This accusation 
could again be glean from Jezan's memo to the colonial secretary when he informed him 
that, 
In 1921, on the advice of Liwali Shaykh Ali bin Salim, the grant was discontinued on the 
grounds that the recipients were not the original people who had rendered the services.91 
But Jezan himself was aware that the grand was actually discontinued by Hardinge 
because in the same memo he advices that 
It was decided in Sir Arthur Hardinge's time, that as the recipients died, their individual grants 
should lapse.92 
Denying the fidiya due to the Swahili was part of Hardinge's grand plan to establish an 
efficient administration structure composed of loyal Muslim officials. Muslim officials 














were to be paid salaries, and not a tribute that the fidiya represented. What was even more 
interesting, however, was the fact that dispute invariably led to a conflict between the 
Liwali and the Swahili elders. Such contests continued with the consolidation of colonial 
rule. In the first Hardinge acted arbitrarily when he demoted Arab officials to junior 
positions compared to European officers.93 Hardinge's precedents were perfected in a 
process to insubordinate Muslim officials. Sir Arthur Hardinge left the East African 
Protectorate in 1900 but subsequent administrators were even less sympathetic towards 
Muslim officials. Sir Charles Morton Eliot (1862-1931), who succeeded Hardinge and 
was Governor between 1900-04, was impatient with Muslim officials and minimized 
their importance in the administration. He is said to have visited the "va/i" (sic, Liwali) 
of Mombasa but thought the Liwali did not discharge any important administrative 
functions. Eliot also criticized Hardinge for the apparent lack of progress during his 
stewardship.94 In fact in 1901, Eliot made an attempt to end the Sultan's sovereignty by 
paying minimum attention to the agreements between the Sultan and the British. By 
1904, Eliot's unilateral decisions concerning the affairs of Muslim communities 
prompted Sultan Ali bin Hammoud to intervene Eliot accused the Sultan of arbitrary 
interference. Eliot's stay was brief and in 1904 he resigned from the government citing 
insubordination. He wrote to his superiors in the principle of official etiquette: "I have the 
honor to submit, as His Majesty's Commissioner, I am the proper person to advise your 
---~~~~-------
93 A. I. Salim, The Swahili-Speaking Peoples, 71. 
94 L. 1. lzuakor, "Colonial challenges and Administrative Response: Sir Charles Eliot and 'Native' 
Trusteeship in Kenya 1901-1904," Trans-African Journal of History 17 (1988): 34. Although Eliot was 
critical of Hardinge's demeanor he himself was described as "cold and reserved, he abhorred exercise and 
stayed indoors as much as possible claiming to preserve perfect health ... a curious choice for rough-and-
ready government ... ," C. Trench, Men who ruled Kenya: The Kenya Administration, 1892-1963 (London: 











Lordship on the internal affairs of the Protectorate. Should your Lordship prefer to be 
guided by the advice of my subordinates. I have the honor to tender my resignation.,,95 
Eliot was succeeded by Sir Donald William Stewart (1860-1905) who also displayed 
little sympathy for the role of Muslim administrators.96 He admitted, though, that the 
colonial government was privileged to have an intelligent body of "Muslim officials who 
carried their duty with great tact".97 Nevertheless, Stewart was particularly anxious, lest 
Muslim officials became prominent, superceded the powers of Europeans, and were 
given an exaggerated idea of their authority. To curtail this, he instructed European 
officers to assert their authority by visiting their districts more frequently. Donald Stewart 
was instructing his juniors to be assertive in their duties as part of the official orders in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy of the colonial state. However, other keen observers of 
character especially C.W. Hobley, described Donald Stewart's disposition and attitude 
towards his work as follows 
a man of considerable force of character and shrewd common sense, but without business 
experience or training, except perhaps in the racing world. His powers of application were 
lUlderdeveloped; he barely read files and as he went to bed late and rose late the affairs of the 
COlUltry had scant attention.98 
95 For a full picture of the acrimony leading to Eliot's resignation see M.P. K. Sorrenson, Origins of 
European Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968): 75-82. 
96 Eliot's temperament made it difficult for him to work with others in the colonial administration thus in 
May, 1904 he resigned citing insubordination from the Secretary of State who seemed to have 
acknowledged the advice of Eliot's subordinates. See C. Trench, Men Who Ruled Kenya, 23. 
97 A. I. Salim, The Swahili- Speaking Peoples, 93. 
98 C.W. Hobley, Kenya from chartered Company to Crown Colony: Thirty years of exploration and 











Steward's stewardship and actions lowered Muslim influence. Using the surveillance of 
European officer's he sought to overshadow and minimize the influence of Muslim 
administrators who had been appointed to serve in the colonial administration. 
To facilitate the appointment of Muslim officials, British officers also took cognizance of 
the social and ethnic diversities prevalent in the Muslim community. Communities were 
organized in a hierarchy. Non-European communities such as the Arab, Swahili and 
Mijikenda were categorized as Natives. African were particularly marked in this regularly 
and Arabs were included as an after thought. The underlying rule that categorized these 
communities was the definition of natives outlined in the Native Courts Regulation 1897 
VIZ. 
... a native is defmed as meaning any native of Africa, not of European or American origin. It 
includes any person not of European or American origin, who, within the dominions of the Sultan 
of Zanzibar, would be subject to 'His Highness' jurisdiction even though such a person should 
have been in Africa.99 
Although the Muslim community was previously shown to be diverse and in constant 
competition, once the British colonial authorities legally defmed the rights and privileges 
that separate communities could enjoy, it institutionalized the differences and influenced 
the perceptions of leadership. As a result, communal competitions over post of leadership 
become an endless process which was simultaneously old and new, grounded in the past 
and perpetually being re-enacted afresh. roo 
99 A C. Hollis to Governor on 22nd December 1908 in KNNAP/l/S04. 
100 B. Berman, "Moral Ethnicity, Political Tribalism and State-Society Relations in Africa." African Affairs, 











It cannot be argued that teh differences that occurred among the Muslim were inherently 
of colonial origins. This will be overstating the role played by the British. Rather, we may 
indicate that pre-colonial Muslim societies were anything but unchanging. Pre-colonial 
Muslim societies were anything but unchanging. Its political and socio-cultural 
boundaries were marked by fuzziness and flexibility as Muslims existed within a reality 
of multiple, overlapping alternative collective identities. Relations of domination and 
dependence based on ethnicity pervaded Muslim communities and constantly presented 
an ambiguous, conflict ridden process through which people struggled to create islands of 
order and meaning. 
What the colonial state did was that it institutionalized the differences and gave them a 
semblance of permanence. In a historical construction, interpretation and use of race, 
colonial authorities accorded the scarce resources of leadership in Muslim communities 
as communal racial identities. Under colonial power etthnicity was a powerful ideology 
for social action and access, invoked by Muslim officials and faithfuls alike to maintain 
positions of privilege. 10I Previously relevant during pre-colonial time, the authority of 
race was made effective by the state as colonial officials who appropriated it to resolve 
the contradictions of colonial rule in mediating social relations. In tum powerful ethnic 
sentiments were evoked by Muslims who participated in the process of identifYing 
individuals for posts of Muslim leadership such as those of Shaykh al-Islam, Kadhi and 
Liwali. 











3.5 The Politics of Racial Representation 
The political cultures and state ideologies of the colonizing polities in Africa were varied. 
Long before 'indirect rule' was elaborated into a theoretical doctrine of efficient 
domination by Lord Lugard in 1919, accommodation with local power structures was 
almost everywhere a practical fact. The underlying idea was to seek colonial allies in the 
existing local political cultures of indigenous communities of Africa. In early 1900, 
Hardinge instituted changes in Muslim leadership, he thought that Muslim officials who 
would serve in state bureaucratic institutions would emanate from within the 
communities. But Muslim communities comprised non-homogenous racial populations 
who demanded separate racially-based representation in the bureaucracy. Those holding 
pre-colonial authority, or having some locally recognized claim to it, could rely on a 
reservoir of legitimacy and the familiarity of prescriptive usage. Often there was 
competition among claimants to authority, on whose rivalries the colonial state played, 
and among whom it selected contenders willing to accept the diminished but still real 
power that colonial allies secured. The initial bases upon which allies were made was 
racial and the 'intermediaries of hegemony' popularized by Crawford Young were either 
an array of African chiefs or favored racial categories. 102 Because of the diversities in 
racial composition in the Muslim community, the choice of which community to consider 
in the appointments of local pro consuls was a difficult one. Eventually, preference was 
accorded to Arab and Swahili communities at the expense of the Mijikenda. The 











Mijikenda were not included in the leadership of Muslims, as Hardinge initially espoused 
a policy of partiality towards Arabs and Swahili. He thought these two communities 
possessed valuable comprehension of politics, justice and government. Their exclusive 
participation in leadership positions was deemed relevant to influence other Muslim 
communities because: 
This Arab and semi-Arab element is valuable, as it is on it alone that the administration 
depends for its native and judicial staff .103 
The Swahili would have been appeased had Hardinge thought of including them in the 
realm of officialdom. Was this opinion influenced by the fact that the Sultan had 
recognized their leaders prior to passing his authority to the British? Certainly they were 
waiting for better things to come but disappointed when Hardinge changed his position 
and excluded them. 
Arab and upper class Swahili are the only natives who can read or who have any 
comprehension of politics, justice and government, [they are] a community of religion, 
language [and] this gives them influence over the Negro popUlation. 104 
Considering the diversities if not the fluidity of "Swahiliness", Hardinge, in utter 
disregard of the aspirations of other communities, argued in racial terms in favor of the 
Arab and Swahili, but then stratified the Swahili into upper and lower classes. Intending 
to categorize that Swahili further, Hardinge argued that only the upper class Swahili and 
not all Swahili had the comprehension of religion, government and language to grant 
them the necessary authority over other communities at the Coast. 













The policy of appointing and favoring Arabs in positions of leadership and authority was 
initiated by the Sultans of Zanzibar, institutionalized by Arthur Hardinge and refined and 
perfected by other colonial officers. Previously, I discussed the role of officials such as 
Charles Eliot and Donald Stewart who formulated and implemented colonial policies up 
to around 1918. Thereafter, other officers took over and continued to discuss and 
appropriate the usefulness of race in colonial rule. 
The central actors during the 1920's were Charles William Hobley (1867-1947) who was 
Provincial Commissioner of the Coast; AC. Hollis, the Colonial Secretary for Native 
Affairs and later Chief Native Commissioner; and R. W. Hamilton, the Principal Judge. 
Collectively, these three officials responded to community demands for inclusion in the 
hierarchy of leadership. Their attempts to stop a deluge of communities from demanding 
declassification from the derogatory 'Native' identity led to a further entrenchment of 
race and ethnicity as factors in the choice of leaders amongst Muslims. These officers 
responded to negotiations on the identity of Arab which, as a result of its privileges 
gained ambiguity as communities previously identified as Swahili claimed Arab identity. 
The government felt constrained to take action to confine the identity to a small group. It 
had already been known among government officers that 
Descent with Arabs was traced through the father and consequently the offspring's of an Arab 
and an African is by them considered an Arab. For the case of the communities concerned most 
of the Swahili and other Mijikenda people would claim' Arabness'. 105 
Consequently, changes were initiated to exclude the Swahili through classifYing Arabs 
into pure Arabs (waarabu halisi) and African Arabs. Although officials of the state 
---~-------











thought they had overcome the problem of diversities in the Muslim populations and their 
demands to participate in the structures of the colonial state, the fluidity of the Arab 
identity in Mombasa remained a cause for concern. As a result of historical and extensive 
intermarriages between Arabs and the Bantu communities during earlier centuries, the 
identity of the Arab was highly ambiguous. Amongst the Muslim communities most of 
the Bantu people could also demand to be identified as Arabs on the basis of having half 
Arab parentage. To avoid such an undesirable situation of half Bantu and half Arabs 
being eligible for leadership, the government wanted to control the definition of Arabness 
to meet the exclusion of populations of mixed race. The idea of an 'Arab' identity had to 
be handled with caution, so as to exclude the mixed races in positions of leadership 
reserved for Arabs. R. W. Hamilton continued to argue that, 
Some definition of Arab could be found that would restrict its meaning to the better class pure-
bred Arab, and yet be workable in ~ractice. Otherwise a great body of half-bred Swahili would 
be included which is not desirable. 1 6 
Attempts to redefme the Arab identity were meant to escape the ambiguity created by the 
existence of Arabs of mixed race. In terms of the leadership demands of the people, 
restricting the definition of an Arab would also assist colonial authorities to limit the 
participation of Muslims in posts of leadership to a few. R.W. Hamilton emphasized that 
some definition of Arab should be found that would restrict its meaning to purebred 
Arabs. He wanted an agreeable and workable definition so that large number of half-
breed Swahili would be excluded from demanding classification of Arabness on the basis 












Descent with the Arabs was traced through the father and consequently the offspring of an Arab 
and African is by them considered to be an Arab. 107 
In his contribution to the debate on the classification of the Swahili for the purpose of 
excluding them from the Arab identity, Hamilton wanted a 'cunning' definition of 
Arabness to be constructed: this was because the attempt to exclude the Swahili from 
Arabness was a complex undertaking as the gradations and boundaries that separated 
pure Arabs from those with African blood were small. 108 
Other colonial officers contributed to further entrenchment of racial preferences in their 
choice of leaders amongst Muslims. A. C. Hollis, the Colonial Secretary for Native 
Affairs, whose portfolio included representing the interests of natives, emphasized 
favoritism of one racial category of the Muslim community against another. He wanted 
Arabs to be included in leadership but suggested the appointment of loyal Arabs. 
According to Hollis it was desirable to pick Arabs who were the most loyal and whose 
support to the policies of the colonial state could be relied on. Hollis was clear on his 
preferences when he said that 
It was possible to pick one to present the Arabs especially that one who has always been most 
loyal to the government and whose support could be relied on. 109 
Roughly a decade after a racialized policy was put in place in 1918, C.W. Hobley, the 
Provincial Commissioner for the Coast, recalled that they should implement the traditions 
observed by the Sultan who appointed Arabs to posts like Liwali and Kadhi because the 
107 RW. Hamilton, Principal Judge to Governor on Bib December 1908 in KNA/APIJ/504 
108 Ibid. 











duty of leadership at the coast had always been the responsibility of Arabs. Hobley 
insisted on Arab prudence in racial tenns, arguing that Arabs had several characteristics 
that made them of value to the Muslims. He opined, Arabs possessed greater intelligence 
than ordinary natives: 
The Arab has several characteristics that made him of value particularly to the coastal areas. He 
possesses greater intelligence than the ordinary native of the country does. He possesses a 
hereditary gift of managing natives; the coast language is his tongue and is acclimatized to the 
coast climate. liD 
Colonial officers showered favors on Arabs but were concerned about the loyalty of 
officials whom they would appoint. A.C. Hollis, emphasized the importance of the 
Muslim Arab but also acknowledged that racial bias and loyalty should prevail. Hollis 
argued that the best way to govern Muslims was through the use of Arabs who would be 
appointed as Liwali and Kadhi. He thought it beneficial for colonial policy if Arab 
officials appointed as Liwali and Kadhi would regard themselves as an integral part of the 
general administrative machinery of the state as opposed to the notion that they were 
representing the Sultanate and hence a separate participation in administration. 111 
It is an axiom that the best way to govern is through the use ofLiwali, Kadhi and 
Mudirs. It is not to the benefit of colonial policy if the present situation whereby 
these officials ... have been permitted to regard themselves as a class apart of the 
administration. Rather they should form an integral portion of the general 
administrative machinery of the Protectorate .... When they are a part of the 
service their duty was to ... conform to regulations, obey orders and carry out 
whatever is required of them. 112 
110 C. W. Hobley, Provincial Commissioner, Coast to Acting Chief Secretary on 16th September 1918 in 
KNAJPC/CoastJl/22122. 














To conclude this chapter I contend that the opinions of colonial officers such as R. W. 
Hamilton, A.C Hollis and C.W. Hobley created the contentious racial considerations in 
their choice of leaders amongst Muslims. British colonial authorities deployed racial 
preference and loyalty to determine how Muslims would be appointed to official tasks. 
But, given the racial diversity of the Muslim communities, Muslims took this matter into 
consideration and competed against one another for appointment into positions of 
leadership. When Muslims debated with colonial authorities over who to include in 
leadership posts, they displayed a fragmented approach. Most Muslims favored racial 
exclusivity as a significant role in the determination of leadership. 
Thus, emotional sentiments to create a solid identity, the umma ideal, occasioned by 
belonging to the same religion, were hardly ever asserted by Muslim groups. Muslims did 
not seem to rely on a common religious identity in leadership. As we will see some 
Muslim ethnic groups Arabs debated with the colonial authorities to be included in the 
realm of colonial power on the basis of being Arabs and not Muslims. Muslims had no 
qualms about declaring another group 'native' in order to exclude them from leadership. 
Being non-homogenous, Muslims were easily induced to accept racial preferences in the 
choice of officials. In turn colonial officers took full advantage of the situation as they 
exclusively and cunningly reserved the appointment of official positions for Arabs. 
One ironic outcome of the 'native' question was the complete reversal of local meanings 
about place and belonging. Earlier the Mijikenda and the Swahili Muslims had argued 











nativity was something to be proud of. The wenyeji during pre-colonial era excluded the 
wageni (outsiders). But with colonial hegemony, native became the mark of exclusion, its 
holder a worthless imbecile whose vocation was to be under the control of others. In its 
English context, and colonial usage, the identity of nativity debunked the Swahili and 
Mijikenda as their pride and fortunes were turned upside down as they became social 












4.1 The 'Arab Franchise': Muslim Political Leadership in Mombasa 
Chapter Three discussed how colonial officers laid the foundations for racially based 
leadership by showing how the colonial state, faced with the needs of diverse Muslim 
demography, resorted to racial favoritism to accord leadership positions. In this chapter, I 
examine Muslim responses to these racial categories and find out what forms of political 
leadership evolved to account for the changes induced by the colonial policy of racially 
defined origins of leadership? The chapter shows how the state, faced by the leadership 
demands of a diverse, non homogenous Muslim community eventually deployed ethnic 
and racial favoritism towards Arab people to the chagrin of other communities. This 
chapter in partiCUlar discusses the emergence of an oppositional civil society formed by 
disenfranchised communities that also displayed visible features of the racial politics of 
colonial Kenya. The material in this chapter highlights the non-religious political 
structures of colonial Kenya. The following chapters follow then the religious positions 
in a similar vein. 
I will clarify Muslim positions and reactions to changes in political leadership instituted 
by the colonial state and analyze petitions to the colonial government as Muslims 











Council, as opposed to the government's method of appointing one for them. I emphasize 
the argument that, historically, how colonial power perceived communal representation 
on the Legislative Council greatly influenced and affected demands for access to 
leadership and power. Subsequently, it led to the emergence of racially based institutions 
of political authority in the form of the Coast Arab Association (CAA), the Afro-Asian 
Association (AAA), the Arab Association (AA) and the African Muslim Society (AMS). 
I discuss how each of these groups indicate attempts by Muslims to grapple with a 
contradictory race-based leadership as they negotiated what was termed the 'Arab 
franchise', viz. the permission to participate in the voting process for an Arab 
representative in the Legislative Council. Tbe franchise was based on race from its 
inception and thus communities disagreed with the colonial government because it 
institutionalized tribalism and racial preferences. 
4.2 The Idea and Ideals of the Colonial Legislative Council 
How Africa was perceived in later colonial discourse can be gleaned from a 1946 
statement by F.J. Pedler of the Colonial Office who described Africa as "the core of 
Britain's colonial position, meaning that Africa was the only continental space from 
which Britain still hoped to draw reserves of political and economic strength".ll3 
Consequently, British thinking about Africa fell into general contexts of ideas of tutelage, 
development and trusteeship. British officials spoke a familiar language. The phrases that 
113 Ronald Hyman, ed., British Documents 0/ the End 0/ Empire, series A, vol. 2: Labour Government and 











rang down the ages and were embedded III government documents included the 
establishment of 'Legislative Councils', 'a chain of representation', 'devolution of 
responsibility', the general refreshing of the old idea of 'indirect rule'. All were aimed at 
presumably managing the growth of nationalism and demands for self-determination of 
communities wishing to free themselves from the yoke of colonial ruley4 A summer 
conference on African administration was told that institutions of indirect rule were "in 
the first place the field of activity to which Africans can look for political training". 115 In 
other words the development of responsible government was the "ultimate goal" in all 
African territories. However, different regional and local characteristics complicated the 
march to independence. 1 16 From the perspective of such World War Two deliberations on 
indirect rule and independence, the experiences of Muslim in colonial Kenya appear 
relevant. Since the coastal region was a protectorate, colonial policies had to at least 
pretend that local government was desirable and required. The Muslim institutions of 
power, particularly in this particular area, provide an early example of how colonial 
designs coincided or clash with local responses. 
4.3 Muslims and the Colonial Legislative Council 
In Kenya petitions for communal representation on the Legislative Council are traced 
from 1905 through the activities of a small group of European settlers who demanded a 
form of representation with the British government. Numbering only a few hundred, the 
114 Ibid., pp. 111-18, 121, 143-5,149,182-3 
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European settlers pressed the British government to accede to their demands for an 
institution through which they could participate in the legislation of laws to govern their 
interests separately from those made in England. To meet these demands, the British 
government passed the East African Order-in-Council of 1905 that created two 
institutions of governance, i.e. an Executive Council and Legislative Council. The 
Legislative Council was a representative body for the articulation of communal interests 
to the British government. Community representatives were expected to articulate the 
needs and expectations of their communities. Prior to 1945, the Legislative Council did 
not entirely serve the interests of all communities but rather of a selected few. 
Initially, the Legislative Council in Kenya comprised official and non-official members. 
Official members were appointed to the Executive Council and formed the government. 
Non-official members represented the interests of various communities. The irony was 
that the represented communities did not initially exercise any role in deciding who was 
going to represent their interests because membership to the Legislative Council was the 
prerogative of the British Monarchy. The Legislative Council started to function in 1907 
and was mandated to constitute, make and ordain constitutions and ordinances for the 
governance of the people. Irrespective of the fact that its powers extended to all 
communities, the British government appointed only white settlers to the Executive and 
the Legislative Council, excluding Africans, Arabs and Asians. Numerous objections 
were raised to challenge this exclusion. The British addressed the demands for non-white 
participation in the Legislative Council by applying the principle of trusteeship, viewing 











The interests of the natives were to be taken care of by Europeans. During later colonial 
practice, the Legislative Council was changed gradually to include non-white 
representatives. The process started with nominated members, followed by the addition 
of elected representatives. However, as expected, early colonial members of the 
Legislative Council participated not on the basis of their effective representation of 
communities, but their conservative attitudes and their likelihood to support colonial 
policies. 
The participation of communities in the Legislative Council immediately created a 
difficulty because colonial Kenya was largely comprised of plural societies and 
communalism became a central problem of representation. The history of communities' 
participation in the Legislative Council best describes a display of striking racial 
prejudice. Inclusion of elected members to the Legislative Council presumed an accepted 
system of organizing representation on the basis of territorial residence. However, 
demands by African, Arab and Asian communities made the principle difficult to attain. 
As in the other communities of Kenya, 'common will' was difficult to cultivate among 
Muslims. The society was characterized by plural ethnic entities which complicated 
attempts at communal representation. The colonial discourse of race required the 
cultivation of racial and ethnic identity as the basic units of representation. This not only 
ensured for future constitutional retardation but further exerted pressure upon government 
to eventually implement unjustifiable policies. Being a plural, mixed society, Muslims in 











being cultured or backward (ushenzi, ustaarabu and unyika). Invariably Arabs went along 
and participated in a skewed process of racially based communal representation. This 
enabled Arabs to develop an easy and disproportionate influence in the organization and 
recognition of leadership in the colonial state. Faced by such challenges other aggrieved 
Muslims organized themselves in groups such as the Coast Arab Association (CAA), the 
Afro Asian Association the (AAA), Arab Association (AA) and the African Muslim 
Society (AMS) to challenge the colonial states' preferences for leadership. 
4.4 The African Muslim Society (AMS) 
In July 1958, Abd al-Ral).man Umar Cheka petitioned Sir Evelyn Baring, the Governor of 
Kenya on issues related to political representation, leadership and communal affairs of 
the African Muslims in Mombasa. A.U. Cheka's petition can only be understood in the 
context that, in the previous year, F.J. Khamis was appointed to the Legislative Council 
to represent African populations. African Muslims were not in favor of his nomination, 
arguing that he was not a Muslim and was not expected to articulate the special needs of 
the Muslim communities. Through the African Muslim Society (AMS), Muslims of 
African descent petitioned the governor demanding the nomination of an African Muslim 
to the Legislative Council to represent their interests. The AMS reminded the governor 
that other Muslim groups like the Arabs and the Indians were allowed to elect a 
representative from their racial-ethnic groups and demanded that they too wanted to be 
presented by an African Muslim. Arab Muslims had successfully elected 











Rana separate from the other non Muslims Indians. African Muslims did not expect 
Sharif Abd Allah and M.A. Rana to articulate the needs of their African co-religionists. 
They complained that these co-religionists were not prepared to assist them in the 
Legislative Council when the matter at hand clashed with the immediate interests of their 
racial communities. Before sending the petition the AMS had identified candidates from 
amongst African Muslims which the government could nominate to Legislative Council, 
but the government declined to consider any of them. In mid 1958, the AMS wrote to the 
Governor of Kenya complaining that 
It may be well be said that the Arabs and Asian Muslims can well serve the religious interests of 
our community in all vital problems affecting our faith, but experience has shown that neither of 
these two communities are prepared to assist us particularly when it involves a clash with their 
immediate interests. !l7 
The scenario that African Muslims presented to the governor unfolded from previous 
racial, social and religious arguments about leadership amongst Muslims in Mombasa. 
Prior to the petition by the AMS, African Muslims had articulated similar demands 
through a variety of political groups and organizations. When A. U. Cheka petitioned the 
governor his action came at the tail end of petitions traced from the early 1920's. During 
this period the Mijikenda, the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities were concerned 
about their exclusion from leadership positions in favor of Arabs. Founded in the early 
1950's by Muslims from the Mijikenda, Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa, the AMS was a 
reinvention of previous interest groups formed to champion the interest of African 
Muslims. Its modus operandi was to continue the challenge against the colonial 
hegemony previously championed by organizations such as the Coast Arab Association 











(CAA) and the Afro Asian Association (AAA).118 I will tum to a chronological 
discussion of these institutions by reviewing the factors responsible for their emergence. 
The concerns raised by AMS were based on a historical foundation dating back to the 
reign of the Sultanate of Zanzibar. The AMS petitioned that since the British took over 
the rule of the Sultan's dominions they ought to have taken over other obligations that the 
Sultan had entered into with other communities. I 19 For example, the Sultan had entered 
into agreements acknowledging the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa's communal rights to 
exercise their freedom in the choice of leaders. These communities wanted to compel the 
British colonial state to acknowledge and continue this practice in the Legislative Council 
but the British rejected the proposal. 
A review of appointments to the Legislative Council displayed communal strife and 
disagreements. But the significant factor in the petition by the AMS was its claim to 
articulate and defend the rights of African Muslims (kutetea maslahi ya waislamu wa 
Kiafrika).120 Upon close scrutiny, the AMS took the mantle of challenging the notions of 
racial favoritisms from previous organizations. Its emergence in the 1950's was a 
118 Apart from A.D. Cheka another prominent Digo Muslims who was a member of AMS included Salim 
Abdullah Mwaruwa who later was elected to a political post as the Member of Parliament for Mombasa 
North when Kenya became independent. 
119 Mzee Ali wa Shafi, Personal interview. Kisauni, Mombasa, 18th September 1998. 
120 Rajab Sumba, Personal interview. Mombasa, 3rd September 1998. R~ab Sumba later rose to become the 
Mayor of Mombasa after Kenya gained independence. He acknowledges that he owes his victory and that 
of other African Mayors in Mombasa to the African Muslim population of Mombasa who always 
reminisces over their treatment during the colonial period. Whenever these sentiments are drummed to 
them they easily reinvent their colonial experience and rally behind a fellow African and Muslim for the 











reinvention of its forerunners, the Coast Arab Association (CAA) and the Afro Asian 
Association (AAA) which I will now discuss. 
4.5 The Roots of Petitions, Race, and Representative Leadership 
The earliest known demand by a Muslim community for representation in the Legislative 
Council was made in 1908, not in contradiction of demands made by the European 
settlers but as a response to the government's intent to include Indians in the Council. In 
1907, the Indian community in the Protectorate took its cue from Europeans and 
demanded to be represented by an Indian in the Legislative Council. Sir James Hayes 
Sadler (1851-1922), the Governor of the East African Protectorate, was in favor of the 
request and asked the British government for permission to add two more seats to 
accommodate the Indian's demands. Europeans vigorously opposed this attempt but 
continuous pressures put on Sadler by the Indians eventually forced him to agree to 
appoint an Indian. Soon thereafter, however, Sadler was replaced by Sir Edourd Piercy 
Girouard (1867-1923) in early 1909 and the new Governor was not enthusiastic to 
support Indians. Girouard delayed the appointment as he requested for more time to study 
the situation. He seemed more concerned by the attempt to open representation on the 
Legislative Council to non-European communities. His worries were that the Indian case 
would be a precedent upon which other communities would base their demands, 











Indians". 121 In articulating these precautions Girouard was in fact correct, but an 
undertaking had already been given and an Indian was duly appointed to the Council 
despite the Governor's reservations. In late 1909, Indians were granted their first 
appointment to the Legislative Council, as Allibhai Mulla Jeevanjee, an Indian Muslim 
merchant, took his seat. 122 
Word had gone around in Mombasa that an Indian was to be appointed to the Legislative 
Council. To claim their rightful political influence and status Liwali <Ali b. Salim (later 
Sir <Ali b. Salim)123 organized other Arabs and responded with a demand for their 
inclusion too: 
We understand that the government has decided to have Indians represented at Legislative Council 
by appointment of one member from their community, and we fail to see why Arabs should not be 
similarly represented though they are the subjects of the Sultan, since the same Legislative 
Council passes laws framed both for British as well as Sultan's subjects. 124 
The wording of the petitions suggests that Arabs were concerned and demanded to be 
represented in the Legislative Council. However, other communities thought otherwise. It 
is said that the wording of the petition should have reflected the demand by communities 
who were subjects of the Sultan including Arabs and non-Arabs. Muslim representation 
in the Legislative Council started with protracted differences and acrimony as the 
121 A.I. Salim, The Swahili Speaking Peoples, 95-97. 
122 A.M. Jeevanjee's appointment was gazetted in the Official gazette of September 21 st 1909. 
123 For a brief biography of Sir Ali bin Salim see, A. 1. Salim, "Sir Ali bin Salim," Kenya Historical 
Biographies (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971). 
124 A petition of residents of Mombasa under the leadership of Liwali Ali bin Salim to government of 











Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa felt most aggrieved by the wording. 125 They complained 
and accused Liwali 'Ali b. Salim to have categorically constructed the wording in such a 
way as to create the impression that Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities did not 
require representation. On the contrary, prominent personalities amongst the Thelatha 
Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities such as Muses Mohamed had already initiated the 
demands for their representation, only for a group of some Arabs to connive and exclude 
them. 126 
Popular sentiments indicate that Liwali Ali bin Salim instigated other Arabs who agreed 
with his idea to exclude the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities. These 
communities argued that the BiiSaidy Arabs and I;Iadramy families were wageni 
(outsiders) while Liwali 'Ali b. Salim viewed the communities as natives (in the colonial 
sense) who were not entitled to direct representation in the Legislative CounciL Thus, 
'Ali b. Salim did not see any justification for the inclusion of these communities in the 
petition. Similarly 'Ali b. Salim was accused of avoiding mentioning that the petition was 
raised on behalf of Muslim communities as a whole. With Arabs viewed as wamanga 
(from Manga) and thus foreigners, and the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa being viewed as 
natives or wenyeji, Muslims in Mombasa engaged in another dispute over who was 
indigenous. This dispute was more pronounced, as the colonial state responded to the 
petition. 
125 Mohamed Jambeni, Personal interview. Mtwapa, Mombasa lOth October 1998. 











Petitions by Muslims were received with indifference by colonial officers but the 
responses were instructional, and indeed gave directions to events that ensued later. The 
responses were a catalyst of continuous disagreements on leadership that pitted the Arabs 
(waarabu) and non-Arabs (wasiokuwa waarabu), blacks (weusi) and whites (weupe) 
against each other. Political organizations were formed and petitions made, as 
government officers' sentiments in response to the petitions articulated colonial policy 
which displayed the role of the state in directing the choice of leaders. For example, Sir 
Piercy Girouard was convinced by the argument for representation of the Arab 
community. Nevertheless, he expressed some doubts and reservations on the suitability of 
including Arabs because government policy on communal representation in the 
Legislative Council was based on racial origins. Owing to the intermixture of races, it 
was difficult to draw a dividing line between the races in Mombasa. 127 Girouard's 
immediate concern was not only the varied origins of the communities of Mombasa but 
the fact that some people who were identified as Arabs were actually of mixed descent. If 
the demand for direct representation to the Legislative Council was granted without 
restrictions to the identity of an Arab, there would be an undesirable deluge of members. 
R.W. Hamilton, the Principal Judge, was initially positive, holding the view in his own 
words that: 
It has actually struck me that it was an anomaly that an educated Arab Shaykb should as far as 
representation in the Protectorate is placed on a lower level than an illiterate Indian. 128 
127 See Secretarial minute no. 2497/1908 of 4th December 1908 in KNAJAP/l/S04. 











But, unlike the Indian, the Arab was already identified as a native. According to the 
Ordinance this was the presumed obstacle to their inclusion in the Legislative Council. 
Generally, R.W. Hamilton and Piercy Girouard concurred on the desire to have Arabs 
represented by an Arab, but the predicament that they faced was how to implement the 
government's desire to limit the number of Arabs eligible for representation to the bare 
minimum. Hamilton had already cautioned that were the demand to be granted, a 
majority of the diversified ethnic communities would be eligible to seek leadership and 
demand direct representation. In fact this could have been a justifiable action since 
descent among the communities at Mombasa was traced through the fathers and 
consequently many of the offspring of Arab men and African women were eligible 
Arabs. But the dilemma facing the government was the likelihood of the native Swahili 
and some Mijikenda people claiming Arabness in order to be included in the franchise. 129 
Of course many people amongst the Swahili were aware of this predicament. They too 
were ready to take advantage of the loosely defined, sometimes precarious and 
ambiguous Arab identity. Prominent members of the Mijikenda such as Muses Mohamed 
were ready to debunk their African ancestry and claim Arabness in order to participate in 
the town's elective politics. l3O 
Both government and communities kept vigil on the possibilities to manipulate the 
identity of the Arab to favor the government's policies or the aspirations of people who 
129 Ibid. 











wanted to participate in the Legislative CounciL Of course the ambiguity of the Arab 
identity complicated matters greatly. To escape this ambiguity, the identity of Arabness 
was deliberately restricted as government officers favored to create categories of Arabs 
comprising of pure-bred Arabs (waarabu halisi) and African Arabs. Pure-bred Arabs 
comprised people whose both parents were Arabs, while Mrican Arabs had one non-
Arabs parent. The latter category included most members of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa 
Taifa communities, while the former was comprised of recent Arab immigrants from 
Oman and the Hadhramaut, amongst them the BU$aidy, Nabhani and Shatiri families. 
Colonial officers categorized the Arab identity, and accordingly a policy of racial 
discrimination in the Legislative Council was implemented. Being targeted for exclusion, 
the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda protested. Generally, they wanted 
representation to be based on residence, religious identity or literacy. To their dismay, 
racial categorization became more pronounced. Government officials thought Arabs were 
better placed to lead than were people of African descent, i.e. the natives, as previously 
shown when C. W. Hobley argued that Arabs possessed greater intelligence and that it 
was their hereditary gift to manage natives. 131 
As the appropriateness of Arab leadership was discussed, government's expectations on 
the conduct of Arabs in government also became clearer. A. C. Hollis argued that if an 
Arab was a desirable participant in the Legislative Council it should be the prerogative of 
131 C. W. Hobley, the Provincial Commissioner, Coast, made these racial biases to Acting Chief Secretary 











the government to decide which individual would participate. The people to be 
represented could not decide who would represent them. More importantly, the 
government wanted to choose a loyal Arab whose support could be relied on. 
It was possible to pick one to represent the Arabs, especially that one who has always been most 
loyal to the government and whose support could be relied on. 132 
Ultimately, there emerged pillars of racial favoritism and loyalty to authorities which 
determined appointments to positions of leadership but also created foundations on which 
other institutions of leadership that challenged those favored by the state were founded. 
Gradually and steadily racial preference and loyalty to the colonial state were deployed, 
and leadership became the exclusive prerogative of a particular community, i.e. the 
Arabs. The communities of the Tisa Taifa, Thelatha Taifa and the Mijikenda persistently 
rejected Arab leaders elected on the basis of racial preferences. 
Eventually, the government acceded to demands in the "Arab" petition of 1908, but there 
was no celebration in the community because the leader was to be appointed instead of 
being elected. In early 1912, the first Arab representative to the Legislative Council was 
set to take his seat and Liwali (All b. Salim was nominated. As expected, most Muslims 
who perceived their identity as waarabu halisi (pure Arabs) went along and accepted the 
appointment of Liwali 'All b. Salim. However, the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa were 
not impressed. I will show later, in this chapter, that the Tisa Taifa and Thelatha Taifa 
communities did not support his appointment because it did not represent the true wishes 











of all Arab communities or those of other Muslims in Mombasa. Though the government 
had delineated African Arabs from pure-Arabs, Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa argued that 
they were the descendants of original Arab dwellers; hence they deserved representation 
more than did Liwali <Ali b. Salim whose progeny were recent immigrants. 
Social confrontations over wenyetsi that had earlier bedeviled the Swahili and the 
Mijikenda were reenacted between descendants of early Arab immigrants to the Coast of 
East Africa and recent immigrants, with the former attempting to deny legitimacy to the 
latter. Liwali <Ali b. Salim did not enjoy the support of the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa or 
the Mijikenda because he was not mwenyetsi. If anything, being mwenyetsi implied being 
a native who did not enjoy the right to participate in the Legislative CounciL What 
mattered to government officials and influenced their choice was that Liwali <Ali b. Salim 
conformed to the two pillars of being a pure Arab and displaying unequivocal support 
and loyalty to the colonial state. Amongst British officers these considerations were 
paramount and non-negotiable. It can be gleaned that Liwali <Ali b. Salim was 
representing Muslim political leadership in the Legislative Council, because he was a 
Muslim and representative of the Sultan. The Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa had not yet 
been identified Arabs and Liwali 'Ali b. Salim was an 'Arab representative'. It seems to 
have been wishful thinking by leaders of Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa that they could 
claim Arabness because they had blood relations with Arabs. But they confused Arab 
representation with 'Muslim representation'. While the former was racial and favored by 
colonial officers, the latter was religious and outside the realm of civil representation. 











as a Muslim leader, a representative who did not and was not ready to adequately 
represent the interest of all racial diversities that comprised the Muslim communities 
under the Sultan. 
The most ardent opponents ofeAlI b. ~alim were leaders of the Tisa Taifa, Thelatha Taifa 
and the Mijikenda Muslims who criticized the racial and ethnic basis of his position. 
There was no doubt that (All b. ~alim's position symbolized the rule of the Sultan, and 
that other Muslim communities thus expected him to be impartial. At the same time, the 
Liwali was not an absolute leader. Even during the reign of the Sultan some communities 
did not necessarily have to recognize his authority. Ideally the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa 
and possibly the Mijikenda expected the Liwali to exercise his authority in consultation 
with them. On the contrary, however, the Liwali assumed overall authority and paid little 
attention to the authority of the wazee (elders) of the Mijikenda or those of the Thelatha 
Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities. To challenge this principle the Muslim communities 
demanded that the Liwaliship be maintained as a representative of the leadership of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar, but were opposed to the appointment of <Ali b. ~alim as Liwali and 
representative of the communities of Mombasa in the Legislative Council. 
The Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda were willing and ready to champion the 
cause of electing a leader, but they first had to overcome an obstacle. The statutes had 
categorized them as natives hence they were not eligible for direct representation in the 
Legislative CounciL To overcome this they should be de-categorized as natives. There 











no objection to being classified natives if it meant they were wenyetsi for that is indeed. 
But, they objected to the categorization of nativity which denied them the right to have 
their leaders appointed to institutions of leadership within the colonial state. 
Although Liwali (Ali b. Salim and most British officers were not in favor of the demands 
by the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda Muslims, O.F. Watkins, the Chief Native 
Commissioner from the late 1920's was surprisingly sympathetic to their cause. He 
realized that the categorization of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa as natives was a 
potential cause for animosities between them and those considered as pure Arabs on the 
one side, and the government on the other. Watkin's advice to the government was to 
minimize the potential for agitation, and he wanted the government to recognize the 
The1atha Taifa and Tisa Taifa as Arabs on the basis of their extensive alliances and 
intermarriages with earlier immigrant Arabs on the East African Coast. At least Watkins 
supported the idea that amongst the The1atha Taifa and Tisa Taifa some had an 
identifiable Arab pedigree, as he criticized the officially inspired divisions between pure 
Arabs and half bred Arabs to be unjustifiable and arbitrary. The Thelatha Taifa and Tisa 
Taifa thus found sympathy in Watkins but his interventions did not meet their demands. 
Even as Watkins was assisting the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities to extricate 
themselves from the predicament of the native identity, he probably could not undo the 
influences of Liwali (All b. Salim on the government. It is argued that Liwali 
(Ali b. Salim was aware that he stood no chance of participating in the Legislative 











concerned that if the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa were accorded Arab status, they 
would use their numerical advantage to lobby the government against his appointment. 
Either way, <All b. Salim did not wish to put his Liwaliship or his seat in the Legislative 
Council in jeopardy, and therefore used his position to frustrate efforts by other Muslims 
who had the potential to challenge his leadership.133 Inevitably, this hostility drove the 
Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and some Mijikenda into uniting with other Arabs to challenge 
<All b. Salim's leadership. 
4.6 The Coast Arab Association (CM) 1921-24 
Politicking for social space in Africa (African Nationalism), as skeptics liked to point out, 
was more a theory than reality. Certainly 'African Nationalism' in the broader sense was 
hard to locate. There was a series of movements, whose character and progress depended 
on variables: the emergence of political elites, the growth of political groups, and the 
beginning of political unrest. Usually these factors were specific to a region. The state in 
which Muslims found themselves as colonial subjects represented the "focus of all 
contradictions of colonial power". 134 That is, on closer examination of colonial power we 
are dissuaded from the 'natural' responses of colonized people to European rule and 
argue that colonial power itself contained the seeds of its decline. The growth of 
'national' political groups was preceded by important and necessary political 
manifestations, arising from intellectual as well as social discontent. 
133Rajab Sumba, Personal interview. Mombasa, 3rd September 1998. 
134 Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle Against World Imperialism 











The fact supporting this analysis is that British colonial power always needed to create 
political structures to enable them to broaden the base of their rule. It was also the case 
that the emergence of political elites following this process of politicization as did British 
demands for more opportunities to manage social political affairs in the colony. Thus~ 
challenges to colonial rule whenever they appeared were a complex phenomenon. The 
idea that it was simply a modem invention must be qualified. People are not blank sheets 
on which elites inscribed their ideologies; rather their activities always involve a dialogue 
between past and present. Primarily resistance to colonial conquest and domination~ 
while not always nationalist~ at least provides nationalism with the beginnings of a 
tradition to which it can appeal. 135 Similar to the general African groups that opposed 
colonial rule, Muslims in Kenya found themselves having to deal with the British who 
were colonial rulers; appointers of local advisors; makers of elected councils; makers of a 
legislature with limited powers; the augmenters of those powers; the grantors of a greater 
degree of responsible government and then independence.136 This multifaceted reality 
shaped the way local participators engaged with the colonial power. In tum certain 
indispensable local interests acted to balance more securely their space in the colonial 
power. 
The conflicts over political authority and leadership that occurred during the moments of 
colonial power amongst Muslims in Kenya were laid bare as the empire sought to find 
135 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London: Muller, 1959): 179. 











some broader basis of political authority through identifYing local elites with whom 
colonial officers could or must work with. In the process the chosen elites were accorded 
a significant role in the governing of affairs of the state. Amongst Muslims colonial favor 
fell on Liwali 'All b. Salim who was accordingly appointed to serve in the Legislative 
Council. However, it was normal that such elites would not be 'nationally inclined' but 
locally minded; moreover, in their localities, minority groups which were not regarded as 
significant by the colonial power were ignored. Among these were the Mijikenda, 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa who opposed the nomination of Liwali Ali bin Salim to the 
Legislative Council. In order to express the opposition, they formed the Coast Arab 
Association (CAA), in July 1921. Rashid bin Soud, a member of the Thelatha Taifa, was 
appointed its first president. 137 
The CAA, were aware that they would engage in direct confrontation with colonial 
authorities and even more so with Liwali <All b. Salim, so they went to solicit the support 
of the Sultan. This action was meant to prove to the Liwali and the colonial government 
alike that the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities were independent of the 
leadership of other communities. They also wished to acknowledge the relevance of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar in contradistinction to British colonial authority. In his response 
Sayyid Khalifa b. Harub, the Sultan of Zanzibar, did not hesitate to acknowledge the 
CAA as representatives of the interests of the wamiji of Mombasa. He wrote back to them 
with words of support and encouragement to the effect that: 
137 See Mombasa Times of 12th July 1921 where a letter to the Acting Colonial Secretary was published 











I have received your kind letter and also a copy of the constitution of your Association with the 
aims of which I am fully in accord and which I am very much pleased with. I pray to God for the 
betterment of all of you. At all times when it is possible I shall not fail to keep a watch on you 
every side. 138 
Once Sultan's support was assured the CAA intensified a campaign to sensitize and 
recruit members from the community. The government's initial reaction was worry and 
concern. Colonial officers in Lamu and Mombasa wanted to gather information and share 
it among themselves "in respect to the new Arab Association"Y9 This reaction led to 
attempts to undermine the credibility and relevance of the CAA. Colonial officers were 
largely dismissive, claiming that the CAA could not be viewed as representing the 
majority. G. H. Osborne was not so sure, as the CAA seemed to have registered the 
support of about sixty residents of Mombasa,140 while the support given to the CAA by 
the Sultan was alleged to be out of ignorance. 141 With a sense of diffidence G.H. Osborne 
suggested that the Sultan should be asked to repudiate the sentiments of his letter until he 
was sure that his officers, especially the Liwali, were in accord with the Association. 142 
Denying the representative capacity of the CAA and asking the Sultan to repudiate his 
support indicated the state's desperate attempts to defeat the objectives of the CAA. First 
to be coerced against supporting the CAA was Sultan Sayyid Khalifa b. Hamb. He did 
138 Sultan Sayyid Khalifa b. Harub to Shaykh Haidar bin Mohammed, Secretary, Coast Arab Association on 
11 th July 1921 in KNAlPCICoastlll1l377. 
139 District Commissioner Lamu to senior Commissioner Mombasa on 24th August 1921. The reliable 
source mentioned here was the Superintendent of Police in Lamu District. 
140 G. S Osborne, Resident Commissioner Mombasa to Acting Colonial Secretary on 13th July 1921 in 
KNAlDCIMSAllIS15. 












not explicitly withdraw support for the CAA but at least was willing to comply with a 
suggestion that his future communication with the CAA would have to be sent through 
Liwali CAlI b. Salim.143 The CAA categorically declined to channel their communication 
through the Liwali. l44 Rashid b. Soud wrote to the Resident Commissioner, furiously 
protesting the suggestion. He argued that CAli b. Salim had nothing to do with the CAA, 
as he was neither a member nor an officer of the Association. 
The Liwali does not hold any office in the Association nor has he anything to do with it 
whatsoever in a representative capacity. If you insist that our communication should be forwarded 
through Ali bin Salim, we should have no option but to protest about it as of course we cannot 
possible recognize the Liwali as our representative in any sense whatsoever. 145 
It did not matter to the CAA that the government had strongly supported CAlI b. Salim as 
a leader. Whereas the government argued that he was competent and had proven his 
knowledge and useful wisdom, the CAA regarded these qualities as being useful to the 
government but not to the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda Muslim residents of 
Mombasa. 146 
Though the CAA was adamant in its resolve not to recognize <Ali b. Salim as leader in 
any capacity, the government attempted to weaken the CAA's support. Convinced that 
the association was the brainchild of principally younger Muslims, its membership was to 
143 J.A. Sinclair, Acting High Commissioner to Governor of Kenya on 23fd August 1921 in 
KNAlPC/Coast/1I113 77. 
144 W.K. Notley, Acting Governor of Kenya to British Resident Zanzibar, ref. no. 5.22632/13 of 3fd August 
1921 in KNAlPC/Coast/11l/377. 
145 Rashid bin Soud to Resident Commissioner Mombasa on 20th December 1921. 
146 See the governments positive remarks about Liwali Ali bin Salim's qualities of leadership in G.A.S 
Northcote, for Colonial Secretary to Resident Commissioner for onward transmission to Coast Arab 











be scuttled with the founding of the Protectorate Debating Society (PDS) around August 
1921. Guided by senior government officers the PDS was meant to dissuade potential 
members from joining and supporting the CAA. In 1923, the District Commissioner in 
Mombasa had reported in the annual political records that the PDS was supposed to be an 
alternative avenue for younger people to engage in frank and open discussions on 
subjects affecting the society. 147 
These attempts to dissuade potential members from joining the CAA also targeted 
individuals from prominent and influential families which sometimes led to violence. For 
example Mul;1ammad al-Maawy was a staunch opponent of the CAA and his opposition 
infuriated Abd Allah Boky, the CAA's spokesman in Lamu, leading the two to became 
embroiled in an intense conflict. 148 The opposing activities bore some results as people 
such as Abd Allah b. <Vmar, <Ali b. Juma, Al)mad b. Yusm Madi and FadhIl b. <Vmar 
from Lamu withdrew their support for the CAA. But the CAA also made sure that it 
reached the communities and asserted its position and influence. In late January 1922, a 
mass meeting, doubling as a recruitment drive, was held at Majengo in Mombasa. The 
CAA claimed that the magnitude of Muslims who attended this meeting was proof of its 
popularity, and in fact authorized the CAA to make further demands. These included 
additional seats for Muslims in the Legislative Council but also for some to be appointed 
to the Executive Council. Taking credit for and reporting this development, Rashid b. 
147 Mombasa District Annual Report 1923 in KNAlDCIMSAl1I3/182. 
148 The District Commissioner, Lamu, gave Mohammed al Maawy when he went to inquire about the needs 
for an Arab representative in legislative Council. See District Commissioner Lamu to Senior Coast 











Soud telegraphed the Colonial Secretary in London with the infonnation that a mass 
meeting held between Arabs and natives under the auspices of the CAA had unanimously 
resolved to allow the CAA to demand additional seats in the Legislative Council and the 
Executive Council on behalf of the communities ofMombasa. 149 
The resolution passed at the CAA's meeting of January 1921, was meant to indicate that 
the opposition to Liwali (Ali b. Salim was widespread in the community. However, 
(Ali b. Salim enjoyed the support of the .state and was not worried. He was confident that 
the government would not recognize the CAA as official spokesmen of any community 
in Mombasa for as long as they were opposed to his leadership. 150 He further infuriated 
the CAA by exploiting the racial tensions that existed in the communities of Mombasa by 
his insistence that most members of the CAA were of mixed Arab-Bantu origins that 
could not pass for waarabu halisi (pure Arabs). Based on this, they had no legal grounds 
to demand inclusion in the Legislative Council. (Ali b. Salim emphasized the ethnic 
divisions to his advantage as the notions of 'pure Arab' (waarabu halisi) and non-Arabs 
or African Arabs (wasiokuwa waarabu, or waarabu waafrika) eventually weakened the 
effectiveness of the CAA. While an impression can be created that the membership off 
CAA was entirely opposed to Ali b. Salim, in reality some groups within the organization 
thought they could exploit their Arab background and gain some privileges. The waarabu 
halisi (pure Arabs) who had joined CAA accepted Ali b. Salim's overtures, and as a 
result weakened the organization. 
149 Telegraph from Rashid bin Soud, President, CAA to Colonial Secretary on 20th 
January, 1922 see KNAlDCIMSAl1I3/182. 











For a short while in 1924, the District Commissioner reported that he was elated that the 
CAA, was closing down. isi Government officials were happy on the report of the 
possible demise of the CAA but this feeling was not shared amongst its supporters. 
Individuals such as Rashid b. Soud and Ali Haidar Matano, representing respectively the 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa, accused the government of having interfered with the 
running of their organization, weakened it and fInally leading to its collapse. They were 
bitter when the government favored the Indians and those it deemed pure Arabs. These 
sentiments were further enhanced with direct accusations of CAlI b. Salim working in 
collusion with the government to disenfranchise other communities of Mombasa. 1S2 
When the CAA disbanded in 1924, it was a major setback for the political aspirations of 
the Muslim community among the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda of 
Mombasa. But they continued to explore other ways, including forming other 
organizations. The moods and feelings of the people in Mombasa seemed to have 
supported the demands for an elected representative. Thus it was only a matter of time 
before these demands were re-enacted with vigor through new associations. Deploying a 
political slogan to express their continued resolve to make demands for an elected 
representative, the people of Mombasa committed themselves 'a luta continua', or 
mapambano bado yaendelea (the struggle continues).lS3 
151 Mombasa District Annual Report 1924. 
152Ahmed Matano, Personal interview. Mombasa, 10th August 1998. 
153 Abdulrahman Cheka, Personal interview. Mombasa, 8th August, 1998. Aluta continua as a political 











4.7 The Afro Asian Association (AAA) and the Arab Association (AA) 
The next phase of the vow that African Muslim made to themselves probably begins 
somewhere between 1924 to 1927, when <Ali b. Salim was both Liwali and Arab 
representative in the Legislative Council while the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and 
Mijikenda continued pressing for an elected member to the Legislative Council. Had the 
CAA survived the next three years, the organization would have been directly credited 
with having achieved its objectives, because in 1927 the government added another seat 
for Mombasa and the Coast and allowed the communities to elect the representatives. It 
would have been expected that the communities were elated by this decision considering 
that they had been demanding representation for more than two decades. This was 
however not the case. To the dismay of the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda 
communities the government termed the seat "the Arab Franchise", meaning that only 
people identified as Arabs were eligible to vote for and be voted into the Legislative 
CounciL 
In fact once a decision to add another seat had been made preparations for election began 
in earnest. Not all Arab males were invited to register as voters, but only pure Arab 
males.154 The Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda were apprehensive once more as 
this requirement excluded them. As they had done previously, they again organized 
African Muslim Society but was also elected Member of Parliament for Mombasa North after 
independence. 











themselves for another longer period of agitation, characterized by political intrigue and 
frustrations. ISS 
In 1927 members of the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda communities formed 
the Afro-Asian Association (AAA), with Shaykh Mubammad Abdul Karim as President. 
The new association seemed to recognize the dual African and Arab heritage of some 
Muslim communities. In contrast, the "pure-Arabs" also founded a similar association the 
Arab Association (AA) in the following year with Shaykh Rashi b. Salim as President. 
The formation of the AAA and the AA is indicative of the significant role that racial 
identity played in the political leadership in the Muslim communities of Mombasa. The 
membership of the AAA and the AA comprised Muslims divided along racial and ethnic 
lines. When they argued about the political leadership of Mombasa, they were constantly 
antagonistic. 156 
A manifestation of racial and ethnic antagonism was the preparation of the voter's roll as 
the ideas expressed by colonial officers such as A. C. Hollis. R W. Hamilton and C. W. 
Hobley with regard to the ambiguity of the Arab identity were put into practice. The 
preparation of the voters' roll and the stipulation that only Arab males be included in the 
voters' register meant that Arab identity had to be unpacked in view of its previously 
mentioned cumbersome composition. To overcome this, two even more cumbersome 
criteria were adopted. First an individual had to prove actual Arab origin through an 
155 Abdulrahman Cheka, Personal interview. Mombasa, 8th August, 1998. 











unbroken male pedigree. Second, communities had to prove that the Sultan of Zanzibar 
had previously accorded them Arab status or basically recognized them to be Arabs. 157 
This might have given some leeway for the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa to produce 
their famed agreements with the Sultan that recognized them as part of the independent 
hierarchy of leadership in Mombasa. 
But the measure was certainly not favorable to the Acting Attorney General, T.D.H. 
Bruce who thought that the attempt was flirtation with the law that clearly declared that 
only male Arabs were eligible voters. 158 He thought that the distinction between pure 
Arabs and impure Arabs should be left to the ingenuity of registration officers who were 
given the discretion "to examine each application and determine, whether adequate proof 
of qualification as 'male Arab' has been submitted".159 This blank authority was 
criticized for creating a possible manipulation of the exercise. Members of the Thelatha 
Taifa and Tisa Taifa accused Liwali CAli: b. Salim of influencing their further 
disenfranchisement. Most of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa could only claim an 
assumed, probably fabricated, descent from early centuries of Arab immigrants. An 
"unbroken pedigree of descent through known male Arab", was almost impossible to 
establish. 160 
157 W.M. Logan to Acting Attorney General on 2nd May 1928 in Secretarial files no. LEG. CO.3fL/l in 
KNAIAG/24/3S. 
158 These were the sentiment of T.D.H. Bruce, the Acting attorney General when responding to the 
suggestions made by W.M. Logan. See Secretarial minute no. LEG. SfLll of 10111 May 1928 in KNAl24/3S. 
TIlis enabled Logan to inform the Resident Commissioner Mombasa of the same, see Logan to Resident 












The requirement for communities and individuals to authenticate their claims to Arab 
identity through an unbroken male pedigree excluded the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa 
communities, creating a considerable apprehension and agitation. It was time for the 
AAA to seize the opportunity and petition the government. The AAA argued that the 
government should reconsider the requirements, suggesting that an Arab was a person 
whose father was an Arab. In proposing this criteria the AAA was relying on the 
extensive evidence of the intermarriages between Arab males and Bantu women in 
Mombasa that produced half-Arab half-African people as a basis for their claims to be 
Arabs. Bearing in mind that Arabs from Arabia had intermarried with local communities 
of the coast for centuries, the AAA further argued that it was unacceptable for the 
government to recognize recent immigrants from Arabia for exclusive participation in the 
franchise. But more important was that the AAA impressed upon government to take into 
consideration similarities of culture and rel~gion, or even literacy as another criterion. 
Explicitly the AAA came out strongly to argue that: 
The Mohammedan community of the Coast was in fact one in blood, religion, custom and law ... 
and respectfully request that this unity should be recognized by law and that every Arab and 
African Mohammedan who is able to pass the prescribed literacy test should be admitted to the 
voters-roll. 161 
Initially, the question of who should be identified as Arab and who could not attain that 
identity pitted the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities under the AAA on one side 
against Liwali (Ali b. Salim and other officials of the colonial state on the other. The 
160Shekue Ali, Personal interview. Majengo, Mombasa 11 th September 1998. 
161 Afro Asian Association petition to the Governor of Kenya through the Resident Commissioner 












pure-Arabs concurred with the legalistic requirements because it favored their interests. 
But as long as the legal interpretations disadvantaged other communities, especially those 
who were deemed 'not so pure Arabs" the pure Arabs could care less. This was the 
position taken by Liwali <All b. Salim. The Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda 
accused <AU b. Salim of being a representative of waarabu halisi (pure-Arabs) but not 
waislamu wote (entire Muslim communities). The government did not help either when it 
categorically rejected suggestions by the AAA to substitute a religion for birth 
qualification for participation in the Arab franchise. 
Despite apprehensions in the community, there was hope that an amicable solution would 
be achieved on the method of communal representation in the Legislative Council. The 
government promised to hold an inquiry into the franchise with the aim of reviewing the 
composition of its participants. 162 Thus, from 1930-34, the government attempted to 
work out an appropriate definition of the term "native", This was necessitated not only by 
constant petitions and acrimony in the communities but also by the government's wishes 
to minimize inter-communal antagonism whenever voting for the Arab representative 
was due in Mombasa. 
162 J.E.S Merrick, Acting Chief Secretary to Governor on 15th February 1929 in KNAJ24/38, the Attorney 
General W.C Hamilton also advised that the law did not contain a definition of the term Arab. Therefore 
the decision to include individual in the voters roll should be left to the judgment of the registering officer. 











4.8 Defining the Native 
Throughout the early 1920's when the CAA began the process of challenging the 
modalities upon which 'Ali b . .salim had been appointed to represent Mombasa and the 
Coast in the Legislative Council, and in the 1930's when the AAA did the same, 
members of these organizations (most of whom were of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa 
Taifa) had considered themselves to be Arabs, although they were not pure-Arabs. The 
obstacle that these communities faced in their aspirations to be included in the Arab 
franchise was that the pure-Arabs did not favor their inclusion in the voters' register and 
in fact went further to influence the government to have them declared non-Arabs. 
Nevertheless, despite these differences the two communities actually faced a common 
problem, because legislative statutes had categorized them both as natives irrespective of 
whether one was a pure-Arab or an African Arab. In the hierarchy of privileges they were 
classified as natives and thus could only demand and be accorded the rights and 
privileges available to this category. 
When the Arab representatives assumed their seats in the Legislative Council, one of the 
issues they brought up for debate was their demand to be defined as non-natives. They 
had two obvious reasons. First, they found the term 'native' to be offensive, as it carried 
with it connotations of being backward, uncouth and primitive.163 Second, Arabs wanted 
to express the view that they were masters of the African people and they did not wish to 











be put in the same racial category with people of African descent. This second motive 
made sure that communities like the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa did not stand a chance 
to challenge Arab people who were appointed to positions of leadership. This meant that 
once Arabs managed to convince the government that they did not deserve to be 
categorized as native, they would demand separate considerations and favors. These 
opinions were strongly defended by Sir Mbarak Ali Hinawy an Arab gentleman who 
recommended that the government should give a precise legal definition of an Arab. He 
suggested to the government to enact a short ordinance so that, any other law or 
ordinance notwithstanding, the term native shall never be so interpreted as to include an 
Arab. Alternatively, the government should "agree in principle that in any sectional 
Legislation Arabs should never be grouped with natives". Despite his suggestions 
Mbarak Ali Hinawy also argued he had faith in the courts' ability to ascertain who was an 
Arab in any particular case although he favored the position of the pure-Arabs. l64 On the 
other hand, the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa were not worried about being declared 
"native" because natives were merely of a lower social status. In fact, were the 
interpretation of the term native was to carry with it the notions of being mwenyeji 
(indigenous), the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda communities would have been 
comfortable. It was the government's emphasis on the opprobrious connotations of being 
native that they opposed. More so, they rejected the rule that natives could not participate 
in direct representation of their interests in the Legislative Council. 












In 1930, the government responded positively to Mbarak: Ali Hinawy's suggestions. A 
couple of Bills were brought up for debate in the Legislative Council. The most 
significant of these was the Ordinance to Amend and Define in more precise terms the 
Definition of the Expression 'native' 1930 and attempts to review the Interpretation and 
General Clause Ordinance 1908. 165 But the state bureaucracy was slow and, before a 
conclusive decision had been reached it was election time again. Could the government 
accept postponing the elections until a decision on who was native or what entailed 
Arabness had been reached? If this was meant to appease the demands by the Thelatha 
Taifa and Tisa Taifa for inclusion in the voters' roll, the Arabs and the government 
seemed to be the least concerned. Furthermore, elections had previously been held 
despite petitions by the AAA. Although going ahead with the elections meant continuing 
to exclude a section of the community in Mombasa, the government still went ahead to 
call for the registration of voters. Obviously the AAA were infuriated and warned that if 
the elections were held without their participation, then the representative elected would 
not be recognized by the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda communities in 
Mombasa. 166 
This stern resolve by the AAA met mixed reactions from the government. Some officials 
were sympathetic while others were outrightly dismissive, and even hostile. For example, 
N.R. Montgomery favored the inclusion of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa in order to 
appease the AAA, arguing that these communities had considerable admixture of Arab 
165 This Ordinance contained all the statutes that defined the privileges accorded to natives but more 
important it contained the initial definition that categorized Arabs as natives. 
166 Resolution of the Afro Asian Association adopted in their meeting of 28th February 1931 and end to the 











blood due to the obvious historical reason of intermarriages. Further, Montgomery argued 
that the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities had strong Islamic influences and 
wondered why questioning the Arabness of these communities was necessary when they 
desired to register as voters. Montgomery was a sympathetic officer who wished to have 
the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa accorded Arab identity to avoid the intermittent 
disputes in Mombasa over the representative to the Legislative Council. 167 
N. R. Montgomery was in favor of expanding the franchise to incorporate the wishes of 
the AAA in order to avoid extending the prevailing antagonism between Arabs and other 
members of the Muslim communities. He understood that if changes were not effected 
the disputes would re-emerge annually and contribute to a hardened position. He 
suggested that the Legislative Council Ordinance and the additional Royal Instruction of 
March 1927 be amended to include two nominated members (one official and another 
unofficial). These would represent the interests of the Arabs and other communities.168 If 
the government added another seat and appointed someone from the membership of the 
AAA it would minimize the insoluble differences between the communities. However, 
other officers were not in favor of Montgomery's ideas. C.G. Howell and Beresford 
Stookes argued that adding another representative from the membership of the AAA was 
inviting problems because such an official was not expected to side with the government 
but would rather have allegiance to his communities. 
167 N. R. Montgomery, Provincial Commissioner, Coast to Colonial Secretary, ref. No ADM/5/l1l 111 116 of 












Irrespective of the differing opinions it was crucial for the problem at hand to be 
resolved. Were Arabs native or not? Were the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa Arabs? In 
the debate about representatives in the Legislative Council the identity of a "native" was 
the hardest riddle (kitendawili kigumu) that the communities and the government had to 
solve.169 Generally, for the AAA the problem was not whether they were wenyeji or not; 
rather, the problem was how to continue with a policy that denied indigenous 
communities participation in the Legislative Council. 
By the mid 1931, it was evident that the Attorney General was faced with a real difficulty 
in his attempts to meet the demands of the two antagonistic Muslim communities. 
Amending the Interpretation and General Clause Ordinance to declare all of them non-
natives would not have met the demands of the communities. Despite such misgivings 
and notwithstanding the proviso of any other Ordinance to the contrary, the Attorney 
General proposed for debate in the Legislative Council a draft Bill to declare certain 
races, viz. the Arabs, Swahili, Somali and Baluchi born in Africa, as non-native. 170 In 
fact, such attempts were later pre-empted by Sharif Abd Allah Salim, the elected Arab 
member of Legislative Council. He asked in a Westminster parliamentary tradition 
whether the government was aware that the Arabs were not natives of Africa but Semitic 
communities and that their presence in the East Coast of Africa was merely in search of 
empire and trade. When he posed his question, Sharif Abd Allah wondered why Arabs 
16~arzuk Omar Dzimba, Personal interview. Nyali, Mombasa, 20th September 1998. 
170 These are the wording of the Bill titled "The Status of Arabs and others Ordinance 1930", the 
communities mentioned were all Muslim communities and the spirit of the Bill was to declare them non-











were classified as natives. 171 His intentions indicated to the government that he would 
support declassification of Arabs as native. It is equally relevant to consider that 
Sharif Abd Allah was a beneficiary of a policy that denied communities opposed to his 
leadership the chance to participate in the Arab franchise. Sharif Abd Allah's 
contributions caused considerable anxiety in Mombasa. The government was also 
concerned about its inability to define the native appropriately although consultations 
were being held with the Provincial Administration at the Coast. 172 
Did Sharif Abd Allah's contributions assist in resolving the predicament to define a 
native? Not really. His contributions did not favor the positions of the Mijikenda, 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa. Instead he wanted to ensure the protection of the 
privileges of the so called pure-Arabs to which he was a direct beneficiary. Sharif 
Abd Allah's lengthy correspondence with the Attorney General registered his strong 
objection, to the inclusion of other Muslim communities in the category of non-natives. 
But due to the tensions generated by the debate amongst the Muslims he did not wish for 
the government to inform leaders of the Thelatha Taifa or Tisa Taifa about his objection 
fearing the repercussions of the Thelatha Taifa, Tisa Taifa and Mijikenda once they came 
to learn of his sentiments. 173 
171 Daily Standard of 5th June 1931. 
172 Native Commissioner to Attorney General, ref. NLEG. 74116 of 22nd March 1932 in KNAI AG/1/313. 











Meanwhile the AAA also lobbied the government. In April 1932 a delegation of ten 
AAA members under Soud Ali Bashir met the governor and raised their concern over 
continuous exclusion of the 'African Arabs' from the Arab Franchise.174 Soud Ali 
Bashir's argument made reference to the period when the Sultan had granted them equal 
status with the so-called waarabu halisi. The government continued to rely on the 
difficulty in drawing a dividing line to distinguish some members of the Thelatha Taifa, 
Tisa Taifa and perhaps some Mijikenda from their kin who were claiming Arab status. 
But more central was the government's open intention to absolve itself from the 
responsibility by asking the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa to negotiate with the pure-
Arabs and come to an agreement. 
Apparently an early agreement between those Arabs who were already participating in 
the franchise on the one hand and members of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa on the 
other, about who was eligible for the Arab Franchise was unlikely. Defining whether the 
Swahili were natives or not proved to be a difficult task. If the proposed Bill had been 
passed in Legislative Council, it would have allowed the Swahili communities non-native 
status and made them eligible to vote for a leader in the Legislative Council. It is easy to 
conclude that there was an opinion within government that the Muslim communities were 
only concerned about the status of being declassified as natives and that they would be 
content once they had been declassified. This was the gamble that the Provincial 
Commissioner for the Coast was asking other officers to consider, which was opposed by 
174 A. I. Salim. "Native or non-native" The Problem of Identity and Social Stratification of the Arab-
Swahili of Kenya", in B. A. Ogot (ed.,) History and Social Change in East Africa, Hadith 6 (Nairobi: East 











the legalistic thoughts of A. D. MacGregor. The government however had to hasten the 
decision to table the Bill in the Legislative Council for debate. It was easy for the 
government to simply delete all references to the Swahili for as long as satisfactory, 
clear-cut and comprehensive definition was not found for the community.175 This was the 
action taken by the government to the detriment of members of the Twelve Tribes who 
had come close to being included in the 'Arab franchise'. 
Ultimately the Bill was brought before the annual Governors' Conference of 1933 for 
executive discussions. Intended to categorize some Muslim communities outside the 
native identity, the Governors' conference foresaw potential trouble in exercising 
colonial authority. If the Bill was allowed to go through, it would have excluded the 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities from the authority of any native ordinances. 
In a way this was an attempt not to confer status, rather to distance the communities 
mentioned from colonial power. In the light of these considerations the Governors' 
Conference recommended that the government of Kenya should shelve the discussion on 
the Bill awaiting recommendations of its deliberations by the law officers' conference. 176 
4.9 Conclusions 
To re-emphasize appropriation of race by colonial authorities, this chapter's concluding 
remarks confirm Mahmood Mamdani's notions that British colonial policy racialized 
175 A. D. MacGregor to Chief Secretary Ref. No. L.329/29 of23rd September 1932 in KNAiAG/1/3 13. 
176 C. Walker, Secretary, Governors' Conference to A. D. MacGregor, Attorney General, Ref No. 











structures and order. Reformulated, direct and indirect rule are better understood as 
variants of despotism: the former centralized, the latter decentralized. As they learned 
from the experience - of both the ongoing resistance of the colonized and of earlier and 
parallel colonial encounters - colonial power generalized decentralized despotism as their 
principle answer to the native question. 179 The dovetailing of both direct and indirect rule 
and the demarcation between urban and rural sites meant that the colonial state was 
effectively a bifurcated state in which two systems of rule co-existed under a single 
hegemonic authority. On the one hand, it functioned through the rule of law and rights 
when it came to Europeans and Arabs who were classified as citizens on the other hand, 
it was a state that ruled over subjects who were not entitled to any of the rights associated 
with real citizens. It was only at the time of decolonization that the boundaries of civil 
society were extended to make room for an indigenous civil society, but when it first 
emerged via organizations such as the CAA, the AAA and the AMS, it was not suprising 
that it took a 'tribalized form' . 
Thus, contests about political leadership in Muslim communities were based on the 
question of identity categorized in a triune of Europeans, Asians and Natives. This last 
category comprised the underprivileged communities, amongst them the various groups 
of Muslim Arabs, Bantu communities and communities of mixed descent of Arabs and 
Bantu. For communities to join the privileged groups of Asians and Europeans, they had 
to claim to be non-natives. Thus both the Arabs and the mixed descent communities 
claimed to deserve inclusion in the hierarchy of power and authority in the colonial state. 











However, the real natives, the Mijikenda, too deserved to participate. The real problem 
was that including all these communities did not fit into the colonial organization of 
power. What it meant in practical terms was that certain communities were in fact 
necessary to exercise colonial power. In this situation it happened to be the Arabs who 
were the fortunate ones. The identity of Arabs was problematic, however and the diverse 
identities of the Muslim peoples unavoidably led to the emergence of racial and ethnic 
group alliances. Muslims identified themselves as pure-Arabs or African Arabs, and 
negotiated for leadership based on this identity. Attempts to consolidate a 'Muslim' 
leadership in the face of colonial power culminated in racially based groups such as the 
CAA, the AAA, the AA and the AMS. 
The use of the 'Arab' identity to include those who were in positions of leadership in the 
Muslim communities was a cunning ploy to deny the majority of the Muslim people the 
right to exercise leadership. Colonial authorities efficiently used this practice in order to 
continue exerting indirect domination. Instead of acting in accordance with the colonial 
preference, Muslim groups under the AAA offered alternative definitions of the identity 
of an Arab, which included most of the Muslim communities. For the AAA an Arab was 
not necessarily one whose parents were both Arabs nor was it one who had recently 
immigrated to the East African Coast from Arabia. Rather, an Arab by definition is a 
person whose father was an Arab. In view of this definition, the AAA asked the 
government to consider that the intermarriages between Arabs and Bantu communities 
along the Coast had in fact produced communities that had legitimate claims to Arabness. 











order to participate in the voting exercise was unacceptable to the AAA. This principle 
was another construction by the colonial government to exclude other Muslim 
communities from participating in the election of leaders in favor of a section of the Arab 
people. 
The AAA brought together Muslim communities because of their realization that by 
allowing the communities to participate in the 'Arab Franchise'; it was providing a 
representative for the Muslim community of the coast. This was a community that the 
AAA recognized as having a common system of laws, customs and cultures. However, 
the government which was oblivious of this granted the right to vote based on racial 
grounds, discriminating between pure Arabs and African Arabs or coast Swahili. The 
Muslim community regarded this action as arbitrary and instead proposed literacy as the 
qualification and basis for Muslim leadership. This would in fact enable every Arab and 
African Muslim who was able to pass the prescribed literacy test, to be admitted to the 
voters' rolL 180 
This chapter has shown how; within a religious community social groups based on racial 
identity compete with religious identity. The Muslim community did not use its religious 
identity because doing so would have curtailed privileges that some communities were 
enjoying exclusively. Thus those communities who were to participate in leadership 
positions did not approve of the use of religion as a unifYing identity. It is in this sense 
that the leadership institutions of the Liwali and the Kadhi, which were apparently 











religious and political posts for Muslims and accessible to any Muslim person, turned out 
to be exclusive leadership institutions for specific racial communities and not for the 
Muslim people as a whole. Those who held these positions chose to rely on narrow racial 
sentiments to maintain their positions fearing that they might lose them. Thus, Liwali 
(All b. ~alim who was considered to be Muslim representative and holding a Muslim 
community leadership position did not find it against the principles of religious solidarity 
when he 
exploded the bombshell on the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa when he announced in the assembly 
of Arabs dressed in their rich robes and turban ... that only Arabs were eligible to participate in 
the 'Arab Franchise.' Members of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa were not recognized as Arabs 
and so would not be allowed to vote. 181 
In actual sense non-pure Arab Muslims were not only disenfranchised by being denied 
the rights of participating in the elective politics, they would also not be appointed to 
posts of religious significance which were also reserved for Arabs, one of which was the 
post ofShaykh aI-Islam and Chief Kadhi, which forms the discussion in the next chapter. 












5.1 Conflicts and Tensions: 
The Appointments of Shaykh al-Isliim and Chief Koohi ca.1898-1963 
In Maker of Modern Arabia, Ameen Rehani wondered whether Saudi Arabian religious 
elites were the powers that held rulers and their people together and thereby acted as a 
'medium of control', despite claims that the cuiamii::i seldom meddled in politics. 182 In 
response to Rehani but within the context of the culamtP in Kenya, this chapter discusses 
the establishment of a bureaucratized post of Shaykh ai-Islam and its variant of Chief 
Kadhi by way of reviewing social debates in the chronology of appointments. I intend to 
discuss the development and evolution of the authority of the Culamii::! from their pre-
colonial positions as local interlocutors of religious authority to urbanized, bureaucratized 
officials. Likewise, I will trace the social origins of discourses of differences and 
contradictions based on the appointments of individuals to occupy the post of 
Shaykh al-IsHim and Chief Kadhi. 
At the onset of colonial rule in Africa, Islam seemed to represent the most comprehensive 
ideological challenge to colonial hegemony as it provided a transcendental justification 
for resistance and a religious imperative for action. This led early colonial officials to 
consider Islam as a mortal danger to their rule, and hence gave rise to their decision to 











manage Muslims with care. Such colonial schemes to manage Muslims ranged from 
demonological classification to attempts at co-option and incorporation. Defined broadly 
within the framework of 'indirect rule' started by Lord Lugard with regard to the co-
option of the defeated leaders of Hausa-Fulani in Northern Nigeria, the British policy of 
indirect rule was also applied in Kenya. I want to clarify the fluidity of the phenomena of 
colonial power by paraphrasing Homi Bhabha to the effect that colonialism took its 
power in the name of history and repeatedly exercised its authority through the drama 
deployed by a galaxy of practitioners and interlocutors of law, culture and custom, 
appearing in cultural and historically specific milieus. IS3 
The historical and cultural significance of the production of political leadership and 
institutions, and the experience that inherently implicated the power relations between the 
indigenous and the colonizer was a racial confrontation of developing political 
institutions of leadership in the Islamic community. Its interface, in terms of colonial 
power relations with regard to the religious elite, will be shown to have been 
substantiated, secured and established by coalescence and consent. Colonial power thus 
fell within the paradigms expounded by Antonio Gramsci, Partha CharteIjee and Ranajit 
Guha who argued that, for hegemony to be complete, dominance must be secured by 
overtly peaceful means. IS4 In other words it was pertinent that the success of the colonist 
project required a guarantee of the active participation of groups of elite, or a portion of 
183 Homi Bhahha's actual words were: "If colonialism takes power in the name of history it repeatedly 
exercises its authority through the figures of force." See "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of 
Colonial Discourse," Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions and Empire: Colonial 
Cultures in a Bourgeois World. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 153. 
184 See especially Ranajit Guha, "Discipline and Punish," P. Chattejee and G. Pandey, eds., Subaltern 











them, since hegemony critically required ideological domination. I8S To contextualize 
Rehani's queries to Kenya, I will argue that, at the heart of British colonial power was the 
negotiation of the relationship between Muslim interlocutors of religious knowledge and 
authority, the cuiamiP, who were eventually co-opted into the colonial bureaucracy 
through appointments. The process of such appointments shaped Muslims' ideas on the 
appropriation of colonial power leading to a discourse of inequality, rivalries and 
racialized competition. 
The specifics of this study include identifying and discussing the appointments of the 
CuiamiP to the position of Shaykh al-IsHim and Chief Kadhi. I will begin by introducing 
what is known about them and then proceed with a historical chronology of their 
appointments from the early colonial period onwards. What is known is that there was a 
post-colonial constitutional arrangement that created the juridical post of the Chief 
Kadhi; this was developed during the colonial period from another arrangement that 
guaranteed the non-interference with Muslims' religious affairs, as the British agreed 
that; 
The Mohammedan religion will remain the public and established creed in the Sultan's 
dominions and all cases and law suits between natives will continue to be decided 
according to the Sheria.186 
185 N, Abercrombie, S. Hill and B. Turner, eds., The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: 1985):12. 
186 See agreement between Great Britain and Zanzibar respecting the possessions of the Sultan of Zanzibar 
on the Mainland and adjacent Islands, exclusive of Zanzibar and Pemba." The agreement was signed 
between the Sultan of Zanzibar and Sir Arthur Hardinge, Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul 











Apart from the assurance that the British would not hinder the religious practices of the 
colonized people they also undertook to confirm all present administration in Mombasa, 
and all walis, cadis ... in their present positions.ls7 
The walis identified above was a misspelling of the Swahili word Liwali, being the 
position of leadership that represented the Sultan of Zanzibar, which was mentioned and 
discussed in Chapter Four. The Cadis are Kadhis (or in its Arabic form the qiiqJ) who 
will form the basis of discussion in this chapter and the following ones. Without wishing 
to infringe on the personal sensitivities of individuals and families whose relations were 
appointed to serve as Chief Kadhi or Shaykh aI-Islam, I attempt to come to terms with 
the differences of opinion and lack of chronological knowledge on how such prominent 
(u/amiP came to occupy their posts. More specifically with regard to the posts, I ask 
questions including, who, when, how and why a certain calim was appointed and not 
another. I ask these questions because of the depth and seriousness with which Muslims 
held and continue to hold the posts and its holders in high regard. Simple as these 
questions might appear, they are in fact challenging for reasons having to do with the 
complexity of the events that took place both at the time this study was conceptualized 
i.e. in 1994 and at present in relation to the post of Chief Kadhi. The chronology of 
appointments from 1898-1963 endeavors to explain the implications of the post of Chief 
Kadhi in relation to the problem of religious roles performed by the (u/amiiJ • Amongst 
these events currently taking shape with regard to the post of Chief Kadhi is the 












occupied the post from 1982-2002, had actually retired from the judiciary services in 
February 1990 and had been on contract appointment for a decade since then. On 1st 
October 2002, Shaykh Nasor Mul).ammad al-Nahdy was informed that his contract would 
not be renewed, thus paving the way for the appointment of a new Chief Kadhi. 188 To 
add to the melodrama of appointments was the fact that Shaykh Nasor Nahdy was 
replaced by Shaykh I:Iamad Mul).ammad Kassim a1-Mazril(I (b.1950), the son of 
Shaykh Mul).ammad Kassim a former Chief Kadhi until 1963. Being a Mazrui the 
appointment of Shaykh I:Iammad's points to the continuity of Mazrui stronghold of the 
post of Chief Kadhiship which began in the early 20th century. 
At the time that the post of Chief Kadhi was changing hands from 
Shaykh Nahdy to Shaykh I:Iammad there was another significant development expected 
after the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) had recommended the 
strengthening of the functions and authority of the Kadhis Court. In its draft 
recommendation, the CKRC had wished to create a Kadhis Court of Appeal, and further 
sought to elevate the posts of Kadhis, especially that of the Chief Kadhi so that, the 
Chief Kadhi shall have the same status, privileges and immunities as a High Court judge, the 
Senior Kadhi as a Chief Magistrate and the District Kadhi as a District Magistrate in a magistrate 
court.' 189 
The CKRC also recommended that revisions of decisions, judgments and decrees from 
Kadhis Courts should be the duty and prerogative of the Islamic Courts, thus suggesting a 
188 See Daily Nation, October 30,2002, as Dola Indidis from the Judicial Service Commission responds to 
complaint by Muslims to the effect that the retirement ofShaykh Nabdy was irregular. 











departure from the previous constitutional practice where appeals from the Kadhi Courts 
could be heard and determined by any judge of the Appeals Court, irrespective of their 
religious affiliations or knowledge. While these are the anticipated changes in the 
functions and authority of the Kadhi' s Courts in Kenya the appointment of Kadhis also 
departs from the Constitution of Kenya. This had been enacted by the new Parliament in 
1963, which basically acknowledged the existence of Muslim Courts. The changes 
anticipated as a result of the CKRC's recommendations are viewed as historical 
progressions that began in early nineteenth century. I will now tum to discuss this history 
from the colonial period. 
5.2 Pre-colonial Authority of the cUlamiP 
The British colonial period was a brief, constitutive moment in the history of Kenya, 
ending in 1963. It lasted about sixty years, but the social imagery that Kenyan colonists 
used to represent others and construct narratives of domination and subordination can 
best be understood as emanating from social processes taking place in the borderland of 
experiences between European and indigenous peoples' knowledge and experience!90 
This borderland is a space of interculturality, of overlapping 'part' societies and local 
communities influenced by both local traditions and colonial innovations. Local 
traditions are those that identifY patterns of behavior during the pre-colonial period. 
190 Just to reiterate the historical scope of this study, this discourse is true of the period since when the 
Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA) was awarded a Royal Charter in 1888, after Germany and 
Britain signed accords defming their spheres of influence in East Africa. In 1895 the IBEA relinquished its 











Prior to the establishment of colonial ru1e Muslims along the Coast recognized the 
authority of Cu[amiP on the basis of traditional forms of leadership in each community. As 
prominent members of the communities, CuiamiP were only influential within the 
boundaries of their miji, or ethnic groups. Rarely was the authority of cuiamiP from the 
Arabs, for example, easily recognized by the Thelatha Taifa or Tisa Taifa communities. If 
this did happened, it was made possible with the necessary influence of community elders 
or the patronage of a local catim. For example, an catim from another community would 
be invited to participate in Muslim matters of another community as a guest of his 
contemporaries, but they would rarely wish to be overall masters in other communities. 
With the exception of a Sufi Shaykh who had followers cutting across social cleavages, 
the authority of the CuiamiP to institute Muslim rituals such as marriage and burials was 
usually confined to their ethnic communities and miji. During the reign of various sultans 
from Zanzibar attempts to establish functional Muslim jurisdiction included appointing 
CuiamiP as Kadhi but their authority was confined to their locality of birth or residence. 
This fact has already been pointed out in Chapter Three of this work in the case where the 
Thelatha Taifa Swahili entered into agreements with the Sultan which enabled their 
leaders to claim exclusive authority over their communities. Based in the local miji, the 
Kadhi instituted the sharfCah as local elders (wazee) who represented their communities 
in the Sultan's court. It was common that their legal competence in Islamic disciplines 
was not a central factor when considering their inclusion in the Sultan's hierarchy of 












The onset of British rule in 1895 initiated fundamental changes in the organization of 
Muslim social life. Colonial rule initiated in the defeat of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, and 
by the protectorate agreements, established British control over coastal strip from Vanga 
in the south to Kipini in the north. This area was previously controlled by the Sultan of 
Zanzibar. Amongst other things the agreements served to affirm the Busaidi Sultanate of 
Zanzibar's influence in that region, recognized the authority of Islamic judges (qii(j'i or 
Kadhi) and guaranteed the maintenance of Muslim codes of law. 191 But once British 
authority was entrenched, a process of change ensued with far-reaching impact and 
responses. 
Colonial authorities initiated changes by establishing posts for culamii', arguing that it 
was meant to streamline the operations of Muslim elites by institutionalizing and 
incorporating Culamii) in a colonial bureaucracy. Its consequences were contests over 
appointments. The CulamiP vied for positions in competition with others, and 
communities showed strong inclinations to support individuals from specific towns and 
racial communities. What ensued was ethnic and racial competition for positions. During 
the pre-colonial era Muslims were comprised of differentiated, non-homogenous 
communities. They were not under any obligations to accept or recognize the influence 
and authority of Culama) from beyond racial social barriers. When posts of Kadhi were 
191 Under British rule Kadhi were expected to serve as legal advisors and to decide all cases affecting the 
personal status of coastal Muslims in regard to marriage, divorce, inheritance and religious disputes. In 
1897, an Order-in-Council created the new position of Shaykb aI-Islam and later changed to Chief Kadhi, 
charged with hearing appeals from Kadhi's courts and serving as Islamic legal advisors to the High Court. 
A. I. Salim. Swahili-Speaking, 79,82; Y.P. Ghai and J.P. McAustin. Public Law and Political Change in 











included in the colonial hierarchy, colonial authorities required its holders to be 
recognized across social differences. 
The careers of prominent elites appointed to be Shaykh ai-Islam and the Chief Kadhi 
indicate the relevance of racial identity but also emphasize the relevance of loyalty to 
colonial policies, the ability and reliability of the appointee to assist in managing the 
affairs of Muslims. Arguably, the posts of Kadhiship were established to meet the 
'Protectorate Agreements' but colonial officers had a habit of making unilateral decisions 
to abolish them. Failure to meet these attempts led to a gradual weakening of the 
authority and influence of holders. Throughout the changes and new appointments, the 
post of Shaykh aI-Islam and its later development to Chief Kadhiship were maintained by 
the colonial state to appease Muslim sentiments. 
In 1898, Sir Arthur Hardinge, the British Consul General, introduced in an innovation 
with far reaching consequences when he thought of ways to streamline and organize the 
culamijJ and meet the condition of the 'Protectorate Agreements'. To apply the shar'icah 
the Mohammedan Marriage Divorce and Succession Ordinance 1898 was promulgated. 
Two goals were achieved through this. First, it created the authority on which ritual 
power and authority espoused by the cuiamiP was formally articulated in the British 
colonial bureaucracy. Second, it established a hierarchy of positions for Kadhi who were 
incorporated into a state bureaucracy as functionaries of the state. However, a chronology 











Shaykh aI-Islam and later the Chief Kadhi, reveals emerging social and communal strife 
amongst Islamic communities, as individuals challenged one another for appointment. 
5.3 The Shaykh al-lsliim: 
CShan! Abd al-RalJmiin b. AlJmad al-Sagga! 1844-1922 
Arguably Kadhis existed as a distinct category prior to British colonial occupation 
because the Sultanate of Zanzibar had established and recognized the authority of such 
social leaders. We ought to include such developments as well, but for the purposes of 
this study and for historical convenience we shall confine the discussion to the colonial 
period.I92 The year 1898 is an appropriate beginning to discuss the effects, reactions and 
consequences of including the culamii' in the bureaucratic institutions of the colonial 
state. It is at this time that, Sharif'Abd a1-Ral:1man b. A1;unad al-Saggaf (1844-1922), 
popularly known as Mwinyi Abudi, was appointed as the first Shaykh aI-Islam. Born in 
Siyu in the Lamu Archipelago, Sharif (Abd al-Ral:1man b. Al;Imad al-Saggaf was 
unexpectedly co-opted into the Muslim elite leadership.193 His appointment was least 
expected in Mombasa as he was not known amongst the existing vocal personalities. In 
192 Pre-colonial discussions of leadership roles especially the Mazrui are best argued in Shaylm AI-Amin 
bin Ali al-Mazrui. The History of the Mazru'i dynasty of Mombasa. Translated and annotated by 1. Mcl 
Ritchie (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, Abdallah Salih Farsy. The Shafi Ulamaa of East 
Africa, ca. 1830-1970; A Hagiographic Account. Translated, edited and annotated by Randall L. Pouwels 
(Madison, University of Wisconsin, 1989). 
193 For a history of Siyu, not necessarily include a discussion of the (uiamtP see Brown, W. Howard. 
History of Siyu: The Development and Decline of a Swahili Town on the Northern Kenya Coast (PhD 











fact his was the first indication that the British discouraged the appointment of vocal local 
'ulamiP. Even before choosing Sharif cAbd al-Ral,unan, the British thought of appointing 
the first Shaykh aI-Islam from Egypt. But they did not carry out this plan due to financial 
consideration expected by the anticipated appointee that the government could not 
meet. 194 Thus, when SharifcAbd al-Ral,unan was appointed in 1898 it was to be a 
temporary appointment until a permanent one was found. In 1921, it was reported by the 
Senior Commissioner of the Coast, that 
The position of Shaykh aI-Islam was recognized by Sir Arthur Hardinge who 
attempted to obtain a man learned in law from Egypt. The salary asked however 
by a man who would have met the case was Fls. 900 a month which could not be 
afforded. 195 
Considering that by the virtue of various agreements the government had to ensure the 
continuity of forms of leadership already recognized by Muslims, it is not clear why the 
first local person appointed was considered temporary. We can speculate that the 
government still wanted to appoint someone from Egypt if they could find a leader who 
was agreeable to their remuneration package. Were an Egyptian to be appointed 
Shaykh aI-Islam, perhaps the discourse that emerged subsequently would have been 
different from the existing one. Nevertheless, a local person was indeed appointed, 
eliciting localized reactions. 
194 Egyptian (ulama' especially from AI-Azhar were popular with the British as most appointments to 
positions of Grand Qlil;lI were by default Egyptians. For Sudanese case see Shamil Jeppie, Containing 
"Colonial sharia" in the Sudan." Paper presented at the Third Symposium of the Islamic Law in Africa 
Project, Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, 11-14 March 2002. 












The Shaykh aI-Islam had to reside in Mombasa which was then the city of colonial 
government before it was moved to Nairobi around 1900. Because the office was to be 
based in Mombasa, its wamifi (townspeople) expected some of its erudite scholars to be 
appointed as the Shaykh aI-Islam. The British Administration anticipated that the 
communities would disagree and challenge the authority of any local appointee because 
of the dominance of pre-colonial practice whereby each community recognized and 
respected CuiamiP from their respective ethnic groups. This could be one of the reasons 
why Sharif 'Abd al-Ra1;tman's initial appointment was considered temporary. What is 
important here is to note that the appointment localized the debate but did not eliminate 
sharp divisions and opposition to Mwinyi Abudi. A resident of Lamu with hitherto 
unknown connections in Mombasa, Sharif'Abd al-Ra1;tman's appointment seemed a 
pragmatic administrative decision taken by the British government. The intention to 
import an Egyptian was a response to avoid feuds between the local communities over 
the position. Despite these precautions the appointed of a non-resident of Mombasa 
reveals a continuity of similar thoughts. 
Equally significant, the British could not have thought of appointing a local alim because 
of the oppositional role that notable individuals and groups of Mombasa, especially the 
MazrU<I and members of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa, communities had expressed 
over the Sultan's actions to hand over his reign to the British. Earlier opposition to 
colonial rule also influenced the choices of appropriate holders of Kadhiship, even 











served Sultan Sayyid Barghash as Kadhi of Siyu.196 But can this mean that the appointed 
Calim, Sharif <Abd al-RaI:unan supported the Sultanate of Zanzibar which most residents 
of Mombasa had opposed? Certainly this could have been one of several reasons, but the 
most pronounced reason for opposing Sharif <Abd al-RaI:unan's appointment was that he 
was considered mgeni (outsider) to the political and religious debates about leadership in 
Mombasa. Conversely, his appointment, although perceived as being temporary was not 
received well in Mombasa. In early 1902 Swahili residents protested against the existence 
of Sharif Abd al-Ral}.man as Shaykh aI-Islam at the expense of Swahili cuiamiP, notably 
from the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa Swahili people. 
Once the post of Shaykh al-Is1am was established, institutionalizing it in the colonial 
bureaucracy took a long time. The first decade since its establishment was a period of 
trial and error, characterized by a lack of clear guidelines as to its operations and 
existence. Most often the post depended on the whimsical attitudes of senior colonial 
officers, as this phenomenon of an undefined policy revealed its repercussions in 
subsequent new appointments. 
It is not clear whether colonial authorities favored the existence of Muslim elites in the 
bureaucracy as a constitutional arrangement or as means to appease the disgruntled 
Muslim population. During his tenure Sharif <Abd al-RaI:unan's position was rather 
ambiguous even to Muslims. He was a qiictf (a judge) and not a mufti (jurist). As a judge 
196 It is important to note that Sharif Abdulrahman bin Ahmed had initial troubles with the Sultanate of 
Zanzibar as he was incarcerated at Fort Jesus on the orders of Sultan Majid. See Farsy Abdalla Salih, The 
Shaj'i Ulama of East Africa. ca.J830-J970: A Hagiographic Account. Translated, edited and annotated by 











he institutionalized and rationalized the sharicah in the Kadhis Court, and was thus a state 
functionary. However, the Muslim population expected much more of his role than the 
stipulated legal duties. As Shaykh aI-Islam, he was expected to be the titular head of the 
community and to guide the Muslims on religious and political matters, in addition to 
performing his legal duties in the courts. 
The Shaykh aI-Islam's judicial sphere was mainly defined by British colonial logic. By 
1912, two diverging views had emerged in response to the problem whether 
Sharif (Abd al-RaJ:nnan was a judge or an administrator, as two sections of the 
government's bureaucracy argued about the establishment of the position. Justice Bonhar 
Carter of the coloniaIjudiciary was of the opinion that the Shaykh aI-Islam was ajudicial 
officer. Contrary to Carter, the Provincial Commissioner, upon realizing the important 
role of the Shaykh aI-Islam amongst the Muslim populations, wanted to have an influence 
on the role of Sharif <Abd al-Rabman and insisted that the alim was an administrator. 197 
As a result of its ambiguity the post of Shaykh aI-Islam was left to develop into an almost 
parallel institution within the government, thus raising a considerable concern. The role 
of the Shaykh aI-Islam, remaining undefined, worried some colonial officers for its 
apparent lack of supervision by either the judiciary or the executive arms of the 
government. This led the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast to question the 
desirability of having a native member of the administration holding an office 
197 See exchange of opinions on the position of the Shaykh aI-Islam in the state bureaucracy in 
communication between the Provincial Commissioner, Coast, the chief Justice J. W. Barth and Judge A.T. 











independent from European executive. 198 These intennittent developments eventually 
necessitated the confinement of Shaykh aI-Islam to judicial functions. 199 
In the eyes of the Muslims of Mombasa, the Shaykh aI-Islam was subject to a different 
discourse. But, thus confined, Sharif <Abd al-Ra1;unan became famous only as an alim 
who held the grandiose post Shaykh aI-Islam. As a matter of fact he was the only person 
to hold the title, as after him the title was changed. His best know virtues were prudence, 
piety, moral righteousness and an almost Sufi denial of wealth, pride and all things 
worldly. At the time that SharifcAbd al-Ra1;unan was appointed as Shaykh aI-Islam, he 
had been a Kadhi of Siyu since 1878, but his appointment in 1902 brought him to an 
urban Islamic discourse with political, racial and ethnic inclinations and overtones. The 
people and leaders of Siyu had historical disagreements with the communities of 
Mombasa.2oo They are known to have supported different foreign powers in the extensive 
battles over control of the Eastern African Coast. When a man from Siyu was appointed 
to a post which was tenable in Mombasa, some communities of Mombasa opposed him. 
Although he had accumulated over two decades of experience working as a Kadhi, the 
people of Mombasa immediately opposed his appointment in favor of locally based 
For example, the MazrtiCI were initially In favor of 
Shaykh Sulayman b. CAlI b. Khamls al-MazrucI (1867-1937), while Swahili patriots ofthe 
198 Provincial Commissioner, Coast, to Chief Justice in ref No. 38 of September 08, 1912 in 
KNAIPC/Coast!1/21192. 
199 J.W. Barth, Acting Chief Justice to Acting Provincial Commissioner, Coast on September 18th, 1912 in 
KNAIPC/Coast!1/2 1192. 
200 See Brown, W. Howard. History of Siyu: The development and decline of a Swahili Town on the 











Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa communities supported one of their Wanachuoni wakubwa, 
(one of the leading scholars) Shaykh Ahmad b. Ali Matano whose madrasa (Islamic 
school) was situated at the A{ji wa Kale quarters of Mombasa.201 
Sharif'Abd al-Ral;unan was opposed in Mombasa because he hailed from outside town. 
However, he possessed personal qualities that eventually endeared him to the colonial 
government and the MazrU'i clans. It is reckoned that he was of a peaceful character and 
disposition and shunned controversy. His character won him accolades from the 
government and the sympathy of the MazrU'i who allowed him to deliver darsa (mosque 
lectures) at Shaykh Mbaruk Mosque on the Makadara grounds.202 Despite initial 
opposition Sharif'Abd al-Ral;unan survived racial challenges through his career. But it is 
clear that his appointment generated the way in which future Muslim officials were 
defined between colonial administration and Muslim interests. 
In the early 1920's old age had caught up with him, he was frail and described to be 
"almost out of work and merely a figure head".203 The most possible solution was to find 
another person to replace Sharif 'Abd al-Ral;unan, especially since Muslims still held the 
position to be theirs by way of agreements. However, during this time an idea started to 
201 See KNAlPC/CoastlllI7/118. 
202 This mosque was built for the benefaction of the oppositional and leadership activities of Shaykh 
Mbaruk bin Rashid Salim al-Mazrui (d. 1910). For his brief biography see T.R. R. Cashmore "Sheikh 
Mbaruk bin Rashid Salim el-Mazrui" in Norman R. Bennett ed., Leadership in Eastern Africa: Six Political 
Biographies (Boston: University Press, 1968): 109-137. 
203 These sentiment were expressed by the outgoing Acting Provincial Commissioner, Coast to C. W. 












develop amongst colonial officers that the post should be abolished. Chief Justice J.W. 
Barth, suggested in the early 1920's that a Shaykh aI-Islam should only be appointed 
whenever there was a need for such services Muslims thought that colonial authorities 
were inclined to abolish the post. 204 To contain such developments a temporary 
appointment of any expert on Mohammedan law was suggested. Though Muslims had 
opposed the first incumbent, they expressed a strong desire to have the post maintained 
because the occupant served as a source of guidance to the Muslims. The desire to 
abolish the post from the colonist was desire either, and the government was advised that 
it needed someone to represent the Muslim population. 
I will show that the debates on whether to abolish or not to abolish, to appoint on a 
permanent, a temporary or an ad hoc basis to the post of Shaykh aI-Islam or ChiefKadhi 
were issues discussed throughout the 1920's to the 1960's. For example, in the case of 
Sharif'Abd al-Ral;u:nan's successor, abolishing the post would have been too severe a 
step. It was too soon, and Muslims still sentimentalized the partly existing agreements 
with the Sultan. Thus, the initial attempt to abolish the position was not implemented, 
although it was decided to weaken the role of the holder. Further, the suggestion to 
appoint someone on a temporary basis would have meant ignoring the real possibility that 
Muslims had attached a special significance to the position. In a nutshell, Muslims would 
be dissatisfied with a mere advisor, especially when the appointee was less qualified than 
the now venerated SharIf (Abd al-Ral;u:nan b. A1;nnad al_Saggaf.205 











Despite being characterized as cumbersome, undefined and temporary in the colonial 
bureaucracy, Sharif CAbd al-Ra1;lman maintained the post and his posture for over two 
decades. By the 1920's he was old and his productivity was questioned. He was not 
relieved of his position, and neither was the post abolished. Rather, he was retired with 
pension. On the 20th May 1922 when the venerated Shaykh ai-Islam passed away, it was 
important enough to inform Winston Churchill of this.206 He in turn authorized a 
condolence dispatch to the family, expressing his sympathy with the family and the 
Muslim community in their bereavement. Sharif'Abd al-Ra1;lm~'s career, spanning over 
three decades, illustrates that the post of Shaykh al-Islam played a symbolic role for 
Muslims in Kenya and that it was geared to develop as a focus for unified religious 
leadership except when Muslims argued about the racial identity of the holder and the 
town from which he emanated. Nevertheless, it developed under the watchful eyes of 
British officers who were concerned that the post might acquire independent or parallel 
authority with posts held by Europeans. In this case, the post had to be under the 
supervisory realm of senior officers in the government preferably British. Of course, the 
post pointed to several matters pertaining to the relationship, between Muslims and 
colonial state, as well as amongst diversified Muslim communities. It laid the foundations 
on which to review the perspectives on Muslim and colonial state relationships, which 
became clearer in subsequent appointments. 
205 Sentiments of Senior Commissioner, Coast in response to queries from Acting Colonial Secretary, ref. 
No. 3726/87 of September 2200 1921 in KNAIPC/Coastl1l211302. 
206 Winston Churchill was then the Secretary of State for Colonies and Downing Street, London. See 











5.4 Shaykh MulJammad b. cUmar Bakore ca.1932 
The retirement of Sharif <Abd al-Ra1;lman necessitated a search for his replacement. At 
the same time attempts to abolish the position were not pursued further; but changes 
began to be implemented gradually. For example, the next occupant was not given the 
more respectful title of Shaykh aI-Islam but was termed the Chief Kadhi. What seemed to 
be a mere change in the nomenclature ended up being a conscious effort by the 
government to weaken the influence of the position. An interesting development ensued 
in the search for a replacement for Sharif <Abd al-Ra1;lman. It had been touted that 
Mombasa had some influential and knowledgeable culamll' amongst its residents For 
example, Shaykh <Abd <AIHih Salih Farsy noted that one of the most erudite Callm in 
Mombasa was Shaykh Sulayman b. cAli al-Mazrtici (l867-1932)?07 
Sulyaman al MazrtiCi had been neglected when Sharif cAbd al-Ra1;lman was appointed 
although he had occupied the post of Kadhi in Mombasa from around 1910. Probably, 
Shaykh Sulayman expected to be appointed however, when J. W. Barth consulted with 
other leaders in the government, Liwali CAli b. Salim expressed his opinion that there was 
hardly any local expertise to be relied upon to occupy the position.lo8 I was informed that 
207 Shaykb <Abd Allah ~anh al-Parsy, Tarehe ya Imam Shaft na Wanavyuoni Wakubwa wa Mashariki ya 











Liwali 'All b. Salim had purposely attempted to bypass the appointment of a Mazru'i 
kinsman because they were an influential family with considerable political clout in 
Mombasa.209 It seemed the Liwali was worried that the position of Chief Kadhi would 
develop into a parallel institution of Muslim authority and took the advice not to appoint 
a Mazrii(i kinsman. These worries inevitably ruled out the possible appointment of 
Shaykh Sulayman or his equally viable nephew, 
Shaykh Al-Amin b. 'Ali b. Naf'iC al-Mazriici (1891-1947). 
As had happened in early 1902, the Mazrfi'j were bypassed in 1922 when the successor of 
al-Saggaf was appointed. Non-Mazrfi'j candidates, Shaykh Mul:tammad b. 'Umar Bakore 
and Shaykh I;:Iamed b. Mul)ammad b. I~~ al-Timaml were proposed. The latter was a 
seasoned and experienced Kadhi who had served in Lamu since 1902. The former 
seemed to have qualified on the basis of his experience as a clerk or assistant to the 
Shaykh aI-Islam. Apart from these considerations Shaykh Mul)ammad b. 'Umar's strong 
credentials were his recommendation as a most straightforward, and in every way a 
reliable, Arab official.2lO The other competitor, Shaykh I;:Iamed b. Mul)ammad was a 
protegee of Liwali CAlI b. Salim, who recommended him with confidence as an Arab of 
good family who had served faithfully with diligence as a clerk in the High COurt.211 The 
208 These sentiments are expressed in correspondences between the Senior Commissioner, Coast as he 
responded to quarries directed to him by the Acting Colonial Secretary in ref. 3726/87 of September 22nd 
1922 in KNAIPC/Coastl1l211302. 
209 Munir Mazrui, Personal interview. Mombasa, January 06,1999. 
210 These were remarks by the Senior Commissioner, Coast expressed in KNN AP/1I21/302. 
211 See correspondence emanating from Chief Justice J.W. Barth to Colonial Secretary in confidential 











basis upon which the two were recommended indicated racial favoritism, as it was 
specified that the Arab identity of the contestants had to be clear. In fact it was incredible 
that ijamed b. Mul;tammad was considered for the post as he had never served as a Kadhi 
at any time in his career. Liwali Ali b. Salim's to recommendation of a clerk in the High 
Court at the expense of seasoned and experienced (uiamiP and Kadhis such as 
Shaykh Sulayman b. cAli and Shaykh AI-Amin b. (Ali al-Mazri1ci calls for explanation. 
His rejection of a Mazri1cJ appointments were politically motivated because apart from 
the Liwali putting obstacles to a possible Mazri1'i appointment he also introduced a 
requirement that potential candidates would be "Arabs above suspicion".212 Of course 
this could mean that there were Arabs whom the government suspected to be opposed to 
its policies and the rule of the colonial state. It might also imply that the Arab identity of 
some aspirants to posts such as Kadhis not acceptable. 
The racial qualification and requirement for loyal appointments were fundamental in the 
second round of conflicts about the appointment of the Chief Kadhi. The colonial state, 
supported by the Liwali, started to develop a bias towards Arabs whom it went on to 
appoint exclusively as Kadhi at the expense of other Muslim groups. Thus, the MazIii'l 
were Arabs but they did not yet fit into the category of reliable Arabs for the purpose of 
high-level government appointments. Liwali cAli b. ~alim had already made sure that 
they would only remain as Kadhi in towns and that they could not be elevated to the post 
of Chief Kadhi. Candidates from other Muslims groups such as the Thelatha Taifa were 
212 See correspondences emanating from Chief Justice J.W. Barth to Colonial Secretary in confidential 











disqualified on the basis of their non-Arab status, thereby disqualifYing Shaykh Ahmed b. 
Ali Matano. Once such protagonists were out of the race, a choice had to be made 
between Mu1;tammad b. CDmar and Mu1;tammad b. I~~ah al-TimamL 
To determine the most suitable amongst the Arab candidates, they were required to write 
a qualifYing examination. In keeping with a long tradition of scholarly collaborations 
between the Muslims of the Eastern Coast of Africa, the eminent Comorian, 
Sayyid Abmad b. cAbu Bakr Sumayt (1861-1925), was asked to prepare the examination 
for the two candidates.213 Of the two candidates Shaykh Mul;1ammad b. CDmar fared 
better and he was promptly appointed to the position. On the 9th August 1922, G.A. S. 
Northcote wrote to Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for Colonies and informed 
him that, 
Mol)ammad bin Omar, Kadhi ofLamu since 1909, has been offered and has accepted the vacant 
post of Shaykb aI-Islam, the title of which has been altered to the more appropriate one of Chief 
Kadhi.214 
!:lamed b. Mul;1ammad was offered the post of Kadhi of Lamu which was vacated 
Shaykh Mu1;tammad b. CDmar Bakore.215 But !:lamed b. Mu1;tammad declined the offer, 
213 The most recent, comprehensive and up to date account on the life and teachings of 
Sayyid Al)mad b. Abu Bakr SumaYf is Anne K. Bang, "Sufis and Scholars of the Sea: The Sufi and family 
networks of Al)mad ibn SumaYf and the Tariqa (Alawiyya in East Africa c. 1860-1925" (Thesis submitted 
for the Degree of Dr. Art, University of Bergen, 2000); earlier works include those of A. S. Farsy, The 
Shaft Ulama of East Africa, ca. 1830-1970 p. 74. See also R. L. Pouwels, Horn and Crescent: Cultural 
Changes and Traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 800-1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987. 











citing physical conditions that rendered him unfit to accept the appointment for Lamu. 216 
It is argued in Mombasa that I.Iamed b. Mul;1ammad actually felt slighted by the lower 
position he was offered. He thought that his experience as an assistant to the 
Shaykh al-Islam and having attended his darsa (mosque lectures) was adequate to 
warrant his elevationY 7 If this is what J.Iamed b. Mul;tammad felt when he was not 
appointed, it is interesting to speculate what the MaZIii(I felt especially after some of its 
members were denied the opportunity to compete. 
Shaykh Mul;1ammad b. (Dmar Bakore's elevation to Chief Kadhi, is an enigma. He was 
the first person to hold the position after its title was changed from that of 
Shaykh al-Islam to that of Chief Kadhi. Like his predecessor he was not favored amongst 
the CuiamiP on the Coast of Kenya. His name does not appear in other studies on 
prominent cuiamiP, and his appointment raises more questions than answers. Did his 
predecessor recommend him because they both hailed from the Lamu archipelago? There 
is a strong likelihood that this is what happened. Nevertheless, what is certain is that 
Shaykh Mul;tammad b. (Dmar Bakore had previously replaced 
Sharif (Abd al-Ra1;tman b. Al;tmad al-Saggaf as Kadhi of Lamu. When he was appointed 
the people of Lamu acknowledged the honor bestowed on their town for the second time. 
They were proud and concurred with the appropriateness of the appointment of another 
person from Lamu. Shaykh Mul;1ammad b. 'Dmar was popular, and there was a certainty 
215 See Colonial Secretary to Chief Justice in confidential communication ref. No. S. 3726 of July 29th 1922 
in KNAiAP/l/13 13. 
216 J. W. Barth to Colonial Secretary in confidential ref. 984122 of August 1922 in KNAIAP/l/13 13. 











that he would perform his duties with diligence. This was based on the confidence by the 
people of Lamu that Shaykh Mul).ammad b. 'Vmar was an honest Kadhi who never 
judged partially against the poor or the illiterate but judged equaIly and rightly according 
to the law.2i8 The bottom line was that the people from Lamu were proud at having 
surpassed the pride of the wamiji of Mombasa with the second appointment of someone 
from Lamu to replace Sharif Abd al-Ral).man b. Al).mad al-Saggaf. 
In August of 1922, Shaykh Mul).arnmad b. 'Vmar accepted his appointment. However, the 
post that he accepted was in fact going through certain unexpected changes that 
influenced his attitude towards his employers. They were not mere changes in the 
nomenclature from Shaykh ai-Islam to Chief Kadhi but a systematic attempt to erode the 
influence of the post in the community. These changes made it clear that the ChiefKadhi 
was but a mere judge and one amongst many other state functionaries in the judiciary. 
His authority was curtailed and confined to personal matters of marriage, divorce and 
succession. Against the expectations of the Muslim people, the Chief Kadhi could not 
comment on matters beyond his court duties. 
Shaykh Mul).ammad b. <Vmar Bakore received a lower salary than the Shaykh al-
Islam and his housing benefits were withdrawn. The government blamed the 
unsustainable economic position for its actions, but Shaykh Mul).ammad b. <Vmar felt 
slighted over the reduction of his emolument, even more so when the government argued 
21S These sentiment were expressed by residents of Lamu in support of the appointment of one of them as 











that the emolument granted to Sharif <Abd al-RaI.unan b. AI.unad al-Saggaf was personal 
to him because of the respect and status that the government had for him. The Chief 
Kadhi argued that, since he was performing similar duties as the former Shaykh al-IsUim, 
he deserved an equitable consideration and that there was no justification to accord him a 
lower remuneration unless the government was indicating that the post was not 
significant anymore. Apart from the remuneration Shaykh Mu1;lammad b. 'Dmar was 
worried about the negative implications for his standing in the community because the 
changes in the nomenclature had created a feeling that he was not worthy of the same 
status as his predecessor. When he did not move into the residence of his predecessor, all 
sorts of stories and speculations started to circulate in Mombasa. These stories included a 
feeling that Shaykh Mu1;lammad b. 'Dmar was not happy and not deserving of his 
appointment. Speculation was rife that the Chief Kadhi was not • wanted' by the 
government and neither was he ready to serve under unfavorable circumstances?19 
In mid-l 923, animosity and an uncompromising relationship had developed between the 
government and the Chief Kadhi, though sympathy towards Shaykh Mu1;lammad's plight 
from some European officials in the government was evident. They were concerned that 
the government was unnecessarily antagonizing a leader whom they should depend on to 
win over Muslim confidence. They argued that the Chief Kadhi could either reduce or 
increase antagonism between the state and Muslim faithful? Some government officials 
did not concur with the treatment meted out to the Chief Kadhi who was already held in 











high esteem and moreover was an old gentleman of deservedly high prestige.220 T.D. 
Maxwell, the Acting Chief Justice, was particularly concerned by the attitude of the 
government and its treatment towards Shaykh Mul;tammad b. (Vmar.He reminded the 
British that the Chief Kadhi had always proved his effectiveness in assisting the 
government to stop agitations against the government organized by what Maxwell 
viewed as "younger hot-headed Mohammedans.,,221 In support of a higher remuneration 
for the ChiefKadhi Maxwell advised the Acting Governor that, 
I am fully aware of the present fmandal difficulties of the government but I would submit that 
the difference between $72 and $42 per annum is a small price to pay to maintain the dignity and 
the contentment of a distinguished servant of the Crown whose loyalty and whose usefulness are 
above question.222 
T. D. Maxwell wished for the government to consider paying a small price to maintain 
the dignity and contentment of a distinguished servant whose usefulness was above 
. 223 questIOn. With T. D. Maxwell's influence Shaykh Mul;tammad b. (Vmar's 
remuneration was improved, but his authority remained weakened. He was only the Chief 
Kadhi but not the Grand Shaykh of Islam. Consequently, Shaykh Mul;tammad b. Vmar 
was not content with his position. He continuously complained of maltreatment by the 
government because such actions were responsible for loss of his heshima (respect) in the 
community. 















5.5 Shaykh Sulaymiin h. cAli h. Khamfs h. SlFul al-MazrUCf (1867-1937) 
By the time Shaykh Mul).ammad b. (Vmar was appointed, the authority of the Chief 
Kadhi had been weakened but it was still a popular position and CuiamiP craved to be 
appointed to it. But it was not possible for just any person who thought they were 
qualified to be appointed. The government had set its own standards and preferences on 
the basis of the significance of the position. It was important that appointees were loyal 
and sympathetic to government policies. Inter-communal rivalry also meant that 
communities would oppose the appointment of an individual from another community, as 
shown by the way the Swahili in Mombasa were opposed to the appointment of 
Sharif (Abd al-Ra1:,:lman b. A1;lmad al-Saggaf. The support and boasting expressed by the 
people of Lamu when Shaykh Mul).ammad b. 'Vmar succeeded Sharif (Abd al-Ra1:,:lman, 
further expressed the relevance of communal cleavages as critical factors for the post 
The government was also wary of appointing people whose families had a tradition of 
opposing European rule in their communities. The fact that the Mazrti(I were opposed to 
European rule in Mombasa, weakened the chances of its CuiamiP to be considered for the 
position of Shaykh al-Islam and Chief Kadhi. On the two previous occasions the top 
posts had eluded the Mazrti'I, though some of their highly knowledgeable members 











Takaungu.224 While in junior posts, the Mazrti'i waited for an opportunity to occupy key 
positions. 
In 1924 such an opportunity presented itself when Shaykh Mu1}ammad b. 'Dmar Bakore 
asked for accumulated leave after working for a couple of years without going on leave. 
The following sequence of events propelled the Mazrti(i to became likely contenders for 
Kadhiship. Before Shaykh Mu];tammad's leave could be approved, someone had to be 
found to replace him during his absence. Liwali 'Ali b. Salim suggested 
1;lamed b. Mu1}ammad al-Timami for the temporary appointment. This time 1;lamed could 
not take up the position since he was already serving as 'unofficial member' of the 
Legislative Council. At this time Liwali 'Ali b. Salim could not suggest the name of 
Shaykh Sulaymaan b. <Ali who was then serving as Kadhi of Mombasa. Instead he 
thought that he himself could perform the duties of the Chief Kadhi, with the assistance 
of a competent clerk. Nevertheless, he could also sit in for the Chief Kadhi but possible 
conflicts of interest ruled him out. Acting as Chief Kadhi meant that he would hold two 
official positions concurrently. Although other individuals were being considered, there 
was no mention of any Mazrti(i cuiamiP for the temporary appointment. It was when all 
the possible appointees had been ruled ineligible that Shaykh Sulayman b. <Ali, then the 
only Mazrti<i in the hierarchy of Kadhiship, was considered. As Kadhi of Mombasa, 
Shaykh Sulayman was appointed temporary Chief Kadhi and the Mazrti(i began to 
224 For a history of Takaungu see Peter Langer Koffsky. History of Takaungu, East Africa 1830-1896 











gradually assert their position.225 According to some oral informants 
Shaykh Sulayman b. <All was intellectually obliged to recommend his competent nephew 
and later son-in-law Shaykh AI-Amin b. <All b.Nafi( al-Mazrti<i (1891-1947) as Kadhi of 
Mombasa while he undertook the duties of a temporary Chief Kadhi.226 Within a short 
spell of time the Mazril'I fortunes began to rise again, as they entrenched themselves in 
official Kadhiship. 
Arguably, the Mazrti(I were not minnows in the politics of the posts of Kadhiship or 
strangers to general leadership politics in Mombasa. As we have shown, during the reign 
of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, they were a prominent community. Nevertheless, some had 
been appointed to such positions as Kadhi, Liwali and Mudir, amongst others. 
Shaykh <All b. Abd Allah b. Nafi' al-Mazrti'I (1825-1894) was one of the earliest and 
most far-sighted of pre-colonial Mazrti'I Kadhis. He was widely traveled and tutored by 
prominent 'uiamiP in the Middle East, especially the Hijaz and held the position ofKadhi 
under various Sultans?27 He pioneered pre-colonial Mazrti'I scholarship while his 
progeny sustained its tradition during colonial and post-colonial Kenya. Thus, when they 
were passed over in the first two appointments during the early colonial period all they 
225 This first temporary appointment amongst many for Shaykh Sulaiman b. Ali lasted between August 30th 
1924 through to February 19th, 1924, his other similar temporary appointment were made during April 1St, 
1929 to July l3th, 1929 and August 14th, 1932 to November l3th, 1932. 
226 1ambeni Salim, Personal Interview, Takaungu, 22th February 1999. 
227 The importance and relevance of the Hijaz to the Islamic Scholarship in the Coast of East Africa is 
discussed in Ulrike Freitag "Hadhramaut: a religious centre for the Indian Ocean in the late 19th and Early 











needed was a little patience before their fortunes began to raIse during the Chief 
Kadhiship of Shaykh Mul).ammad b. {Vmar Bakore. 
During his Chief Kadhiship Shaykh Mul).ammad b. {Vmar Bakore did not particularly 
cultivate a cordial working relationship in the government. I have already discussed his 
disillusionment, complaints, frustrations and accusation of maltreatment by the 
government. In 1926 the government awarded medals of honor to some individuals in 
recognition of their services during the First World War. The Chief Kadhi was not 
amongst these recipients. He thought however that he deserved the honor after serving 
the colonial state as a censor. In January 1926, the Chief Kadhi wrote to the Chief Justice 
stating that 
Having observed several persons in Mombasa have been awarded medal for War services, I 
make this application in the hope that Your Honor may be pleased to recommend my services to 
the proper authorities, for the grant of a War Medal. I served as a censor at Lamu from August 
1914 until the end of the war.228 
Previously, Shaykh Mul).ammad b. {Vmar had complained over his emoluments. This 
time he was disappointed when he did not make it to the list of recipients for medals of 
Honor. His demand was not modest either. He wrote to the government to the effect that, 
after observing that several persons would be awarded war medals, he too was applying 
to have his honor respected with a medal for his services during the war. 229 This demand 
had an underlining significance for the role of CuiamiP during the war. 
228 Shaykh Mohamed bin Omar to Chief Justice on January 30th 1926 in KNAlAP/1/1313. 











Shaykh Mul).ammad b. (Umar revealed that the cu/amiP did not just teach or give mosque 
lectures; they also participated in censoring Swahili, Gujarat and Urdu mail that passed 
through the postal services?30 The Kadhi also lodged a strong accusation, claiming that 
he had replaced the Kadhi of Lamu in 1908 and worked without remuneration when the 
government did not have adequate funds. Considering his frustrations, he contemplated 
resigning from the post of Chief Kadhi. 
The government contemplated abolishing the post once the Chief Kadhi hinted at his 
resignation. And true to his intentions, in early April 1932 
Mul).ammad b. (Umar Bakore tendered his resignation, ending a rather distressed career. 
From 1908 when he had taken up the Kadhiship of Lamu, until he was appointed to the 
substantial position of Chief Kadhi in August 1922, he had served the government for 
over three decades. Having reached the age of over sixty years he wrote to the 
government, urging to be ~llowed to retire.23 ! 
Whenever a new person was due to be appointed Chief Kadhi, the government made a 
concerted effort to abolish the position altogether, or to include new changes that either 
weakened that authority of the next holder or curtailed his influence in the society. In the 
first two appointments between Sharif Abd al-RaI;1man b. AI;1mad al-Saggaf and 
Shaykh Mul;tammad b. (Umar the government had implemented such changes 
unilaterally. In the 1930's when Shaykh Mul;tammad b. (Umar contemplated retiring, the 
230 Ibid. 











government revived their intentions to abolish the post by arguing that there was not 
enough workload to justify the post of Chief Kadhi. In fact, considering that the Chief 
Kadhi was an appeal position in the Court structure, the thirteen cases that 
Shaykh Mul)ammad b. (Vmar had sat on during the period 1930/31 seemed adequate. 
Furthermore, the Chief Kadhi did not just perform purely juristic duties in court. He was 
acknowledged as an important officer who was consulted by most administrators on 
many aspects of the Islamic community. The constant intentions to abolish the post were 
rather significant. 232 
When the Chief Kadhi finally resigned, the Muslims and some government officers first 
began to take positions on next choice. C. W. Hobley, the Provincial Commissioner for 
the Coast, revived hopes for the MazriiCj kinsmen. Hobley recommended 
Shaykh Sulayman b. CAli, citing his successful tenure as Kadhi of Mombasa, his 
leadership abilities and his considerable command of heshima (respect or honor) in the 
community?33 Added to these advantages we have also indications that 
Shaykh Sulayman also successfully served as temporary Chief Kadhi on a number of 
occasions. Shaykh Sulayman was thought of as a possible replacement, but there was no 
confirmed indication that he was willing to take up the post. On the other hand, 
Shaykh Al-Amin b. (Ali's intentions were more direct and forthcoming. He harbored 
232 See comments by District Registrar of High Court, Mombasa to Regis tar, Supreme Court of Kenya, ref. 
No. C 236/32 MP. No. 11132 of April 16, 1932 in KNAiAP/1I3 13. 
233 C.W. Hobley to Registrar Supreme Court of Kenya in confidential letter ST. 4/1/10/6 of April 21, 1932 











ambitions to be Chief Kadhl to continue with his late father's tradition. He did not 
hesitate to write to the government requesting to be considered for the post. 234 
In April 1932, C. W. Hobley supported the appointment of Shaykh Su1ayman as Chief 
Kadhi, but the deliberations whether to abolish the post or not been finalized. Murray 
Jack, the Registrar of the Supreme Court, was against the appointment of 
Shaykh Sulayman and favored abolishing the post. He argued that Shaykh Sulayman was 
more effective as Kadhi of Mombasa where there were more disputes for him to handle, 
than at the Chief Kadhi's office. He was concerned that the departure of 
Shaykh Sulayman would have an adverse impact on the effectiveness and smooth 
functioning of the Kadhis Courts in Mombasa?35 Despite these misgivings and a strong 
lobby to abolish Chief Kadhiship, the post survived for a second time. More significantly 
it re-propelled Mazri1Cl clansmen to the helm of Islamic elitist leadership albeit with 
changes that further weakened the position. The post was no longer pensionable.236 
In October 1932, Shaykh Sulayman offered an appointment to be the first Mazri1cl Chief 
Kadhi in the colonial era. Shaykh Sulayman held the position of Chief Kadhi from 1932-
1937. His tenure was famous as it indicated the beginning of Mazri1Cl power in the 
colonial state. There was grumbling in the community over the inevitable rise of the 
Mazri1<l, as Shaykh Sulayman favored and supported the appointment of his nephew and 
234 His letter was dated April 20, 1932 in KNAIPC/Coastl212/106. 
235 Murray Jack to Colonial Secretary, ref. No. JC 1646/19-24 of August 18, 1932 in KNAIAP/1/1313. 












son-in-law, Shaykh AI-Amin b. cAlI (1891-1947) to Kadhiship. Despite the opposition 
and accusation that he was attempting to make Kadhiship hereditary, 
Shaykh Sulayman argued that his basis for supporting Shaykh AI-Amin was his 
confidence in his knowledge after having tutored him personally. He was confident that 
his student and son-in-law had acquired competence in the relevant knowledge to meet 
the challenges of Kadhiship. This is what the MaZIiiCI claimed, but other Muslims 
speculated that to Shaykh Sulayman, Shaykh AI-Amin was what the Swahili would have 
proverbially termed zimwi likujualo (better the devil that you know). 
The desire of Shaykh Sulayman to appoint a fellow MaZIiici could only be understood 
within the context that the MaZIiiCI had previously been passed over in the position. 
Nevertheless, there was no unanimous support for this action from other wamiji in 
Mombasa. The most ardent critics of the MazruCI were other Swahili, especially the 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa. Like the MazrucI, these Swahili communities had also 
been passed over when the two 'ulamiP from Lamu were appointed. The Thelatha Taifa 
and Tisa Taifa communities thought that they would split the positions of Kadhiship with 
the MaZIiiCI. Their plan was that when a MaZIiiCI was appointed to Chief Kadhiship, then 
they would have left the lower position of Kadhi of Mombasa to other wamiji, preferably 
non-MaZIiiCI 'ulamiP. The Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa wishes were not acceptable to 
the MaZIiici, who however, seemed to have already made up their mind that they would 
hold onto both the Kadhiship of Mombasa and the Chief Kadhiship. These thoughts 











Mazrti(j Shaykh Al-Amin b. All Nafi( al-MazrtiCj (1891-1947) was poised to take over the 
Chief Kadhi position. 
5.6 Shaykh AI-Amin b. 'Alf b. Niifral-Mauii'i 1891-1947 
The most known, popular and well-documented Kadhi during colonial Kenya is 
Shaykh Al-Amin b. (Ali b. Abd Allah b. Nafi( b. Mazrti(j b. Abd Allah b. Khamjs b. Abd 
Allah b. Alj al-MazIii(j (1891-1947). Studies of the Shaykh indicate that he was largely 
associated with directing, impacting and dominating the local Islamic intellectual 
tradition and Islamic modernism in Kenya?37 There was no doubt that Shaykh AI-Amin 
had studied under some of the most prominent and well respected 'ulamiP on the Coast of 
East Africa including his father and his father's contemporaries such as Sayyid AJ:tmad 
b. Sumayt (1860-1925) and Shaykh C Abd Allah Ba Kathlr (d. 1925). With his insatiable 
desire for knowledge, Shaykh Al-Amin had exposed himself to the ideas of Ibn 
Taymiyya and Mul).ammad Abduh to sharpen his already critical contributions to Islamic 
social discourses in Kenya. Shaykh Al-Amin's tenure as Kadhi can be regarded as the 
most eventful period in the history of Chief Kadhiship. Inducted into an official 
government position in 1910 as a clerk to the Kadhi of Mombasa, he rose through the 
ranks to become the acting Kadhi, full-fledged Kadhi and then the Chief Kadhi. During 
his rise he also cut short his services to the government when he resigned from 1919 to 
237 See F.R. EI-Masri. "Sheikh al Amin b. Ali el Mazrui and Islamic Intellectual Tradition in East Africa," 
Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 8, 2 (July 1987): 229-237; R. L Pouwels, "Sh. AI-Amin b. Ali 
Mazrui and Islamic Modernism in East Africa 1897-1947," International Journal of Middle Eastern 











1921 to teach Arabic at the Arab school in Mombasa. He returned to Kadhiship and 
government service in 1924. Certainly his illustrious career can lead to the conc1usion 
that his appointment was conducted smoothly and was unanimously accepted in the 
community. On the contrary, though, Shaykh Al-Amin's Kadhiship was sometimes 
strongly opposed especially since it was associated directly with claims and accusations 
of favoritism and patronage by the Mazrii<I. B.G. Martin argues that being the son of an 
alim is very important for attaining authority and recognition among the (ulamiY>. This 
point is particularly true among the Mazrtfi. 238 At every major point of changes amongst 
Kadhis, the Mazrii'I c1ansmen have always had enormous influences as both aspirants 
and conspirators in the process of appointments. 
I have mentioned previously that in 1932 Shaykh Su1ayman b. <All was appointed Chief 
Kadhi and that he supported Shaykh Al-Amin for the vacant post of Kadhi for Mombasa. 
This heralded the beginning of Shaykh Al-Amin's career, as his appointment was 
supported by the District Commissioner in Mombasa who thought that 
Shaykh Al-Amin's support for the Kadhiship of Mombasa was unanimous.239 However, 
the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa were opposed to the possibility of two Mazrti<I 
clansmen holding both the post of Chief Kadhi and Kadhi of Mombasa. They suspected 
that the Mazrii<I were attempting to monopolize the Kadhiship in Mombasa. Under the 
Afro-Asian Association (AAA) they demanded clarifications of this and posed questions 
238 B.G. Martin, "Notes on Some Members of the Learned Classes of Zanzibar and East Africa in the 
Nineteenth Century," African Historical Studies, 4 (1971): 525-46. 












to the government wanting to know if the posts of Kadhiship were hereditary. Of course 
relations between the MaZ1ii'I and other communities in Mombasa were not always 
peaceful. The The1atha Taifa and Tisa Taifa sometimes disliked the MaZ1ii'i because they 
claimed that in the ancient history of wars in Mombasa the Mazrui lured one of their 
leaders, Stambul, into Fort Jesus, murdered him and left him to decompose without burial 
according to Muslim rites?40 Stambul's murder is sometimes an almost vivid experience 
to his followers. Mombasa poets have also immortalized his death. The historical 
animosity between the MaZ1ii'I and the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa prevailed, and even 
continues to be reenacted in important political affairs of the Mombasa polity. The 
opposition met by the MaZ1iiCI from other communities should therefore be viewed with 
this history in mind. 
However, in the matter of appointment to both positions of Chief Kadhi and Kadhi of 
Mombasa, the The1atha Taifa and Tisa Taifa were also concerned about a possible 
miscarriage of justice as a father-in-law and teacher was expected to review judgments 
emanating from a lower Kadhi's court, where, the Chief Kadhi's student, nephew and 
son-in-law was the judge. They based their opposition on civility and accountability. To 
avoid conflicts of interest in the course of the two MaZ1iiCi Kadhi's work, the AAA 
proposed that other non-MazruCI candidates be considered for appointment. While the 
AAA opposed the appointment of Shaykh Al-Amin b. All on the basis of ethnic 
favoritism, they could also be accused of similar attitudes. While proposing alternative 
candidates the AAA supported candidates such as Shaykh Mul}.ammad b. 'All Bashir, 











Shaib b. Shallo, Khamis b. Hussein, Khamis b. Shafy and Said b. Ahmed. All these were 
members of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa ethnic groups and ardent supporters of the 
AAA. 
Other political reasons were also advanced to oppose the appointment of 
Shaykh AI-Amin b. CAlI. In 1932 three elders and active members of AAA from the 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa, Shaykh CAlI Mul).ammad Muses, Al).mad b. Matano and 
Mul).ammad b. CAlI Bashir, objected to Shaykh AI-Amin's suitability citing his political 
involvement as editor and owner of a controversial journal, al-Islah (the awakening)?41 
Despite such opposition the MaZIiiCI did not desist from supporting the appointment of 
their kinsmen whenever an opportunity presented itself. In 1934 Shaykh AI-Amin was 
appointed as Acting Chief Kadhi and infuriated other Muslims when he appointed his 
relative Shaykh MaCmiin b. Su1ayman to became Acting Kadhi in Mombasa. These were 
only acting positions, as Shaykh MaCmiin would have to leave office once the Chief 
Kadhi returned from leave and Shaykh AI-Amin assumed his position. However, the 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa argued that the MaZIiiCi were practicing nepotism in the 
appointment of Kadhi. They argued that Shaykh MaCmiin b. Sulayman lacked sufficient 
knowledge for the post but was appointed because he was a MaZIiiCi clansman. 242 
241 The government was equally concerned over Shaykh AI-AmiD's involvement with AI-Islah which took 
a rather pan Islamic and oppositional view towards European and their treatment of Islam and colonization 
of Muslim communities. However, Shaykh AI-Amin had already given an undertaking that he would 
severe his relationship with al-Islah in the event of his appointment as Kadhi of Mombasa. See Provincial 
Commissioner, Coast to Chief Native Commissioner on October 18, 1932 in KNAlPCICoast/2/2/106. 











In 1937, Shaykh AI-Amin was elevated to Chief Kadhiship, resulting in more conflicts 
amongst Muslims. Shaykh AI-Amin's antagonists were cuiamii? from the Thelatha Taifa 
and Tisa Taifa who also harbored ambitions to be appointed Kadhi of Mombasa. Conflict 
was triggered by Shaykh AI-Amin's apparent support for the son of his mentor and 
relative, Shaykh Ma(miin b. Sulayman al-MazruCj, to be appointed Kadhi once he was 
appointed Chief Kadhi.243 This time round, the Cuiamii? of the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa 
Taifa gathered courage and petitioned colonial authorities to be considered for 
appointment as Kadhi in Mombasa instead. The aspirants included Khamis ShafY who 
put in his application but the government responded that "there were already several 
persons eligible for the post of Kadhi".244 This response seems to have infuriated Khamis 
ShafY who wrote back urging that it was quite clear to him that other people would also 
be interested in the position, but he anticipated the government would make the position 
competitive.245 Shaykh Mul).ammad b. Abd Allah al-Rudam and 
Shaykh SaCjd b. Al).mad applied. 246 
The Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa argued against the apparent intentions of the 
MazrU'j to make the posts of Kadhi hereditary, but were unable to dislodge any of the 
243 C. H. C Boulderson, Provincial Commissioner, Coast to District Commissioner, Mombasa in 
KNAiPC/Coastl2/2/106. 
244 Khamis bin ShafY to Provincial Commissioner, Coast on March 24, 1937 in PC/Coastl2/2/168. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Shaykh Mu1)ammad b. <Abd Allah al-Rudainhad previously served as Kadhi of Siyu from 1923 but was 
retrenched in 1928, while Shaykh Sa<id b. Alpnad had serves as Kadhi of Takaungu between 1926/27 and 












MazruCi appointees. As Shaykh Macmun b. Sulayman was made the Kadhi of Mombasa, 
ShaykhAI-Amin continued to be the Chief Kadhi from 1937 -1947. At the time of his 
death in Mombasa in 1947, Shaykh AI-Amin b. cAll b. Nafi aI-Mazrticl was one of the 
greatest Muslim scholars on the Coast of Eastern Africa. He had contributed considerably 
to Islamic intellectual life but a chronology of his career would be poorer if the role 
played by racially based tensions to his appointment or that of miji were ignored. 
5.7 Sayyid cAli b. Al;tmad Badawy lamal al-Laly (1907-1989) 
and Shaykh Mu1;tammad b. Qiisim al-Mauii:i (1912-1982) 
In this section I will discuss the careers of these two CuiamiP who succeeded Shaykh Al-
Amin one after the other. Their careers were intertwined despite the opposing attitudes 
from the people of the towns that both hailed from. In 1947 the death of 
Shaykh Al-Amin rekindled another similarly intriguing search for his successor. This 
time conflicts pitted the MazruCI against the 'uiamii/ of Lamu. Already the Swahili of 
Mombasa had expressed a general resentment over the MazrtiCi dominance of Kadhiship 
with which the people of Lamu seemed to have concurred. They thought that since two 
'uiamiP from Lamu had held the position concurrently, followed by two from Mombasa, 
it was now the tum for someone from Lamu to ascend to the position. The concern by the 
people of Lamu was not unfounded either. It was in response to the government after 





















In Lamu and Mombasa Muslims engaged one another in discussing which town would 
produce the next Chief Kadhi. It was in fact almost inevitable that a Mazrt.i<I would be 
appointed. But Liwali <Ali b. Salim influenced the government moved into another 
direction. As in 1897 when the government showed a lack of confidence in the abilities of 
local culamiP, when opted to appoint the Shaykh ai-Islam from Egypt, this time 
LiwaIi <Ali b. Salim revisited this idea, apparently to avoid the appointment of a Mazrti<i. 
He argued that it was not prudent to appoint a local person so as to avoid further 
animosities between the people of Lamu and Mombasa. Instead, he suggested that the 
position be given to someone from outside the feuding communities and thought of by 
suggesting the legendary Comorian and long-time resident of Zanzibar, 
Sayyid <Vmarb. Alpnad b. Sumayt (1896-1973). 
In 1947 when Sayyid <Vmar b. Sumayt was proposed for Chief Kadhiship of Kenya, he 
had been in the service of the colonial authorities in Zanzibar as its Chief Kadhi since 
1937. He was highly regarded and the government of Zanzibar refused to release him to 
serve in Kenya. With a sense of decorum Kenya's request was turned down. Zanzibar 
argued that it would be a great loss to its jUdiciary and difficult to replace the 
indispensable Sayyid <Vmar b. Sumayt?48 Apparently, Sayyid <Vmar b. Sumayt had been 
recalled from Grande Comoro to Zanzibar after the retirement of the then Chief Kadhi of 
247 See E. J. O'Farell, Registrar, Supreme Court to Chief Justice ref.. 659/6 of April 28, 1947 in 
KNAIAP/l!1206. 





















Zanzibar, Shaykh Tahir b. Abl Bakr al-Amawl (d.1938) because after the death of 
Shaykh Tahir, "finding a good qac)i was not easy, and the authorities now turned to the 
son of their former ChiefKadhi to take over".249 
The failure to secure the services of the illustrious Sayyid CVmar b. Sumay~ was 
disappointing for Kenya, but he was nevertheless involved in the process of appointing 
the next Chief Kadhi from the three identified candidate, Shaykh MaCmun b. Sulayman 
a1-MazrilCi, the Kadhi of Mombasa, Shaykh Mul.lammad Jambeni, the Kadhi of Lamu, 
and Shaykh cAbd AlHili b. Mul.lammad Ba Fadl (1902-1965), the Kadhi of Takaungu. 
Sayyid Omar b. Ahmad b. Sumeit was asked to prepare an examination for the 
candidates. 250 Not every candidate favored the examination as a means to fill the post. 
Liwali CAli b. Salim supported the method and was accused of interfering with the 
process in order to favor specific candidates. Surprisingly, the candidate that Liwali 
CAli b. Salim was accused of favoring was Shaykh Mul:Iammad b. Qasim (1912-1982), 
who was earlier mentioned positively though he did not seem to have pursued the idea 
after that. When the names of candidates for the examination were announced, his name 
did not appear, but he appeared as a late entrant poised to take the post. When 
Shaykh Mul:Iammad b,Qasim was included m the competition, 
Shaykh MaCmun b. Sulayman withdrew his candidature, apparently in favor of his uncle, 
and probably to avoid pitting one Ma7xiici against another. Likewise, 
249 See Anne K. Bang, Sufis and Scholars a/the Sea, 282-283. 
250 See Joyce R. Ginn, District Registrar, Supreme Court of Kenya to Registrar, Supreme Court of Kenya 




















Shaykh 'Abd Allah Ba Fadl declined to write the examination and withdrew, but he gave 
the excuse that the examination was a smokescreen to sneak in a MazriiCi, 
Shaykh Ba Fadl argued that he was not only much older but in fact deserved the 
appointment because he was the most experienced of the other candidates, having served 
many years as Kadhi and intermittently as ad hoc Chief Kadhi in the absence of 
Shaykh Al-Amin. He was sure he was going to replace him and hence felt that the 
requirement for him to write an examination with younger and certainly junior staff was 
an attempt to embarrass him. Feeling ridiculed, the thought of the possibility of him 
loosing his heshima (respect) in the event that the younger candidates performed better, 
Shaykh Bit Fadl opted out of the process and blamed Liwali Ali bin Salim for this 
debacle. 
Liwali CAli b. Salim told a different story in exonerating himself from the accusations by 
Shaykh Bit Fadl, dismissing the notion that serving as ad hoc Chief Kadhi was a 
guarantee or prerequisite for direct accession to a substantive post. He also believed that 
younger people were eligible for nomination for the post, as age was not a consideration. 
Moreover, Shaykh Mul;lammad b. Qasim al-Mazriici, whom Shaykh Ba Fadl referred to as 
the younger man who was also junior in a service, had actually impressed senior 
government officers when he also served as temporary Chief Kadhi. It was 
Shaykh MulJammad's impressive work that led Justice Bartley to recommend him when a 
position of Chief Kadhi became available. Liwali Ali b. Salim responded by absolving 




















to embarrass older (ulamiP but the need to see that the most competent Chief Kadhi 
served Muslims.251 
Shaykh Ma<mun and Shaykh Ba Fadl's withdrawal left Shaykh Mul).ammad b.Qasim and 
Shaykh Mul).arnrnad Jambeni, both hailing from Mombasa, in the competition. In order to 
include a regional balance, especially considering that the people of Lamu had equally 
raised a concern over possible Mazru'i dominance, 
Sayyid 'All b. AQmad Badawy Jamal aI-Layi (1907-1978) was included to give the 
exercise a representative and competitive character.252 A resident of Lamu, 
Sayyid AQmad Badawy was recommended and described as a "highly suitable individual, 
both as regards to his knowledge of the law and his upright character".253 Meanwhile, to 
prove his good intentions, Liwali Ali bin Salim impressed upon the government to hasten 
the process of appointing the Chief Kadhi, because the post had remained vacant for a 
long time while Muslims in the whole of East Africa were anxiously waiting for it.254 
The examination was thought of as a convincing way of appointing the Chief Kadhi, but 
its results were nullified because of discrepancies in the dates in which the candidates 
wrote the examination. Sayyid 'All Badawy wrote his papers two days later than the other 
aspirants and it was rumored that he could have had prior knowledge of the examination. 
251 Liwali Ali bin Salim to Provincial Commissioner, Coast on March 01, 1948 in KNAlCAl20/31. 
252 'Unofficial' implied an alim who was not in the service of the government as a Kadhi yet. 
253 E. R. A Davies, Provincial Commissioner, Coast to Chief Secretary in confidential letter ref. No. SF. 
29/2/52 of March 15,1948 inKNAlAP/1/1206. 




















This cast asperslOns on the standing of Sayyid (All Badawy. As a result of the 
discrepancies in the examination dates, the government ruled out Sayyid All Badawy; the 
Provincial Commissioner argued that he would not be appointed even if his answers were 
the most satisfactory or his appointment most desirable.255 In fact the Chief Secretary was 
not particularly impressed by the examination as a reliable or suitable way of appointing 
a Chief Kadhi. He favored the use of a board to interview and select the most impressive 
candidate.256 Thus, instead of the examination, a selection board was constituted to 
appoint the Chief Kadhi. 
5.8 Chief Kadhifrom the Interior? 
In the period 1898-1947, the post of Shaykh al-Islam and Chief Kadhi was exclusively 
dominated by Arab 'ulamiP, but it was a period characterized by communal strife. 
The post developed with considerable sentimental reference amongst Muslims and 
maintained an aura of importance in the community, as 'ulamtP who occupied the post 
were respected and viewed with nostalgia, despite constant oppositions during initial 
periods of appointment Towards the 1950's its characteristic coastal dominance was 
about to be changed. 
255 Provincial Commissioner, Coast to Chief Secretary in confidential ref. No. SF. 29/2/52 of March 15, 
1948 in KNAlAP/1I1206. 
256 J.B. Gould for Chief Secretary, to Provincial Commissioner, Coast, in confidential letter No. E. 7/3/\23 




















During May of 1948, Muslims resident outside the coastal area were invited to contest for 
appointment to replace Shaykh AI-Amin. In fact further steps towards the 
institutionalization were included as an advertisement was posted in all administrative 
centers inviting candidates for the post of Chief Kadhi. Candidates were required to 
posses a thorough knowledge of Muslim law pertaining to all sects and particularly the 
shafri sect, be of exemplary character and integrity, possess knowledge of the Arabic 
language, and preferably know English as well. 257 Contrary to previous attempts to 
abolish the post due to an inadequate workload, large number of Appeals waiting the new 
Chief Kadhi made the appointment more urgent. 258 
In 1948 when the post of Chief Kadhiship was opened to contestants outside the Coast, it 
was still dominated by applicants from the Coast and attracted only one interior-based 
Calim, Shaykh Is1;laq Mu1;larnmad, a Somali from the Uasin Gishu district. Other aspirants 
included four members of the Swahili groups, Haji Shaibo b. Shallo 259 , 
Mu1;larnmad b. <All Bashir,260 Kharnis Shafy and Mu1;larnmad b. <Ali Haji,261 from the 
Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa who contested with Sayyid <Ali b. A1;lmad Badawy.z62 
257 E.R. A. Davies, Provincial Commissioner, Coast to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, Rift Valley, 
Central, Northern Frontier Province and Officer-in-Charge, Ngong, in ref. No. SF. 29/2/58 of May 08, 1948 
in KNAlCAl20/31. 
258 District Registrar, Supreme Court to Provincial Commissioner, Coast in ref. No. 'C'8141P.7/34 of June 
23,1948 in KNAlCAl20/31. 
259 He stated that he was a student of Shaykh Abdul Majid bin Zahran who was Kadhi of Lamu and also 
studied under Shaykh Abdulrahman bin Ahmad Saggaf, the former Shaykh-ul-Islam. 
260 He was serving as a member of the WakfCommission. 




















Shaykh Mu1;tammad b. Qasim al-Mazril'i withdrew from the process in favor of Sayyid 
'All A1;tmad Badawy. The selection board was impressed by 
Sayyid 'All A1;tmad Badawy as well and he was appointed, making him the third person 
from Lamu to assume the position. Sayyid 'All A1;tmad resigned within a year after 
appointment, for reasons still unclear. Speculation abounded that because of the 
examination discrepancies discussed earlier the government was not willing to appoint 
Sayyid 'All Badawy. The selection board went ahead and appointed him anyway. When 
he resigned questions were asked. Was he forced to resign? Was he found incompetent? 
Was their fitina (strife by creating animosity) involved in his resignation? There was no 
doubt about Sayyid 'Ali Badawy's knowledge or his pedigree. The son of the venerated 
Sayyid A1;tmad b. $ali1;t Badawy Jamal al-Layl (1889-1936), he was tutored by his father 
and the contemporaries of his father, Sayyid 'All A1;tmad Badawy was appointed to the 
position of Chief Kadhi with the anticipation that he would bring both his filial 
connections and knowledge to the benefit of Muslims. But he was disadvantaged by a 
lack of experience in the colonial bureaucracy and its standards of duty probably 
contributed to his frustrations with the post. 
Other reasons advanced for Sayyid 'All A1;tmad Badawy's resignation include claims that 
because of his Sharifite lineage he was steadfast and unwilling to take orders from 
European District Commissioners and Provincial Commissioners. He could not withstand 
the supervision by colonial officers on when and how to perform his duties as a Muslim 
262 While all the candidates were invited to appear before the board Shaykh lsahak was not as he did not 
receive favorable recommendation from the District Commissioner, Uasin Gishu. See P.F. Forster, 





















judge. It is also argued that, amongst all occupants to the post of Chief Kadhi during the 
colonial period, he was the only one who left with his respect intact because when he 
realized that he could not cope with the demands of the position, he did not continue to 
cling to it but resigned to preserve his dignity?63 His detractors claimed that 
Sayyid (Ali Badawy fared so badly that his tenure strengthened the resolve of colonial 
officers to abolish the post of Chief Kadhi. Indeed, when he resigned in 1950, it was 
difficult for Muslims to convince colonial authorities to appoint his replacement 
immediately. There still remain contentious issues surrounding Sayyid Badawy's short 
tenure. It is only known that after resigning as Chief Kadhi he was invited to Zanzibar by 
Sayyid (Vmar b. Abd Allah, the Principal of the Muslim Academy, where he took up a 
post as an instructor on Ta~awuf. Perhaps the difficulty is expressed by the efforts 
undertaken by S. M. Muhashamy, the Liwali for Coast, to have the post revived. 
5.9 The .Lost Decades: 1950s-1960s 
For about a decade from 1950 since the resignation of Sayyid (Ali Badawy resigned, the 
post of Chief Kadhi remained vacant with no substantive appointment, though 
Shaykh Mu1;lammad b. Qasim al-MazrUci was occasionally appointed ad hoc ChiefKadhi 
to sit as Appellant judge in the High Court. Muslims agitated for its revival, but it was not 
until the mid-1960 when concerted efforts were made by S.M. Muhashamy who as 
Liwali felt duty-bound to represent the interest of Muslims to the government. He 




















reminded the government of constant demands from the Muslim community for the re-
instatement of the post of Chief Kadhi.264 The government responded with mixed 
reactions to Muhashamy. It argued that there were few cases to warrant the appointment, 
and claimed shortage of funds to sustain the post. Muslims viewed these as excuses to 
deny them the opportunity to be served by such an officiaL Some sensed interference in 
their religious affairs contrary to the 'Protectorate Agreements'. It was during the period 
of 1950-60 that Muslims started to critically analyze the relevance of having the Chief 
Kadhi appointed by the government 265 
A sense of frustration had engulfed Muslims over the extensive absence of the Chief 
Kadhi. In his petition to the government Muhashamy expressed Muslim feelings of 
frustrations over the absence of a Chief Kadhi. At the same time he also tried to 
understand government's apprehensions. Muhashamy acknowledged that there were 
fewer cases that the ChiefKadhi could preside on. He concurred that Sayyid CAli Badawy 
was a respected theologian but did not have experience as Kadhi. However, 
Muhashamy's opinion was that the accusation of inefficiency on the part of 
Sayyid CAlI Badawy and not lack of work had led the government to suspend further 
appointments to the post. 266 He argued that circumstances had changed since the early 
1950's. With an increase in the population of Muslims, the Chief Kadhi would be kept 
busy. There was also a clamor for an independent authority to advise the judiciary on 
264 S.M. Muhashamy to Provincial Commissioner, Coast, on July 15th 1960 in KNAlCAl9196. 
265 Salim Hoka, Personal Interview. Nairobi, January 2002. 




















matters pertaining to Islamic codes. Furthennore, there was a popular feeling amongst 
Muslims that there were qualified and suitable persons available and ready for 
appointment if only the government was willing to revive the post. 
The views espoused by the government and those of Muhashamy on behalf of Muslims 
were diametrically opposed. The government was of the opinion that the post was not 
abolished. It did not concur with the Muslims' sentiments and accusations that it had 
abolished a statutory post meant to serve Muslims. To support its argument the 
government had appointed ad hoc Chief Kadhi whenever there were Appeals that 
demanded the attention of such and official. The argument by government to maintain 
Kadhis in the District due to the availability of workload and to appoint Chief Kadhi on 
an acting case-by-case basis was consistent with this view. But some government 
officers were forthright and blamed Sayyid <Ali Badawy as a Kadhi who "was neither 
able nor willing to fulfill the functions of the Chief Kadhi".267 
S. M. Muhashamy initiated the process to have the Chief Kadhi appointed from 1960. By 
1962 no positive action had been taken by the government as yet. However, this was a 
period close to independence and the colonial government was involved in negotiations 
with various communities in Kenya. During one such meeting Muhashamy held a 
'corridor discussion' with Justice Rudd that triggered another sequence of events, leading 
to a substantive appointment of a Chief Kadhi.268 In fact, that meeting is probably 
267 These sentiments are found in a memo addresses to the Provincial Commissioner Coast, dated July 7, 











responsible for the institutionalization of the post of Chief Kadhi in independent Kenya 
because afterwards Muhashamy assisted other government officers in drafting concise 
roles and functions of the ChiefKadhi. The main tasks included allowing the ChiefKadhi 
to advise Judges on matters of Islamic Law, especially junior Kadhi who instituted 
matters of Muslim Marriages, Divorce and Succession; to supervise the work of other 
junior Kadhis throughout Kenya; to examine candidates for the post of Kadhi; and to 
train in Islamic Law Kadhi's clerks amongst whom are often future candidates for the 
post of Kadhi. 
Once the guidelines were agreed upon, Muhashamy informed the government that he had 
given the matter of the appointment of Chief Kadhi due consideration and was of the 
opinion that Shaykh MuJ:tammad b. Qasim al-Mazru'I was the most suitable person for 
the post. Muhashamy recommended Shaykh MuJ:tammad b. Q(;lsim because he came from 
a respectable family in Mombasa, he was brought up and trained in Sharfcah by an 
eminent scholar (viz. Shaykh AI-Amin b. 'All), his character was beyond reproach, and 
his service in matters concerning Sharfcah had always been reliable and usefuL Apart 
from holding the post of Kadhi of Mombasa, Shaykh MuJ:tammad b. Qasim previously 
acted as ad hoc Chief Kadhi since the time Sayyid Al,unad Badawy resigned from 
government service.269 
268 See Justice Rudd to D.W. Hall, Provincial Commissioner Coast, on July 06. 1962 in KNAlCA19/96. 











Shaykh Mul}.ammad b. Qasim's standing in the process of appointing another ChiefKadhi 
was enhanced by his intellectual achievement as well as his filial connections. He was 
appointed as Chief Kadhi from early May of 1963, onwards though he was almost like a 
default Chief Kadhi since the resignation of Sayyid <Ali Badawy. He had wished to be 
appointed Chief Kadhi since the late 1940's, but was appointed to an ad hoc position 
instead. Nevertheless, he held on to his ambition which took two decades to realize. 
When he was finally appointed to a substantive post, it enhanced not only his career but 
also the MazriiCi dominance on the post of Chief Kadhi in Kenya. He fitted well into a 
common Swahili adage, mvumilivu hula mbivu (patience bears rewards). 
Shaykh Mul}.ammad b. Qasim al-Mazriici maintained this post with dignity until early 
1968 when he resigned, citing ill health. 
5.10 Conclusions 
As Muslims in Kenya hold the view that the post of Chief Kadhiship is basically a 
manifestation of religious leadership by the 'ulamiP, it is equally probable that the 
reasons for the establishment of the post were political rather than religious. The British 
were interested in the reliability of the holders of the post of Chief Kadhi to help them 
administer the Muslim population. The chronology of the appointment of various 'ulamiP 
to the post shows the complicity of the 'ulamiP who went along to gain the post on the 











prominence, as culamiP probably concerned about competition from others, chose 
relatives and acquaintances to replace them or be appointed to strategic posts, 
anticipating to be succeeded by them in the future. The British established the post but 
could not predict how Muslims would perform. When the position proved popular and its 
authority gained confidence in spite of ethnic and racial competition, the British 
weakened its influence through changes. Some of the changes included trimming the 
jurisdiction of the Shaykb ai-Islam, or making temporary appointments. There were 
several attempts to abolish the post entirely as we1l. In addition, from the example of 
Shaykb Bakore, it was clear that the Chief Kadhi was expected to serve British interests 
during the First World War. The Muslim communities seemed to have found the post of 
relevance; as they faced a colonial power that only appointed Europeans to positions of 
power and authority, the Chief Kadhi symbolized their acknowledgement by the 
government. Among the Muslims themselves, the post extended the Arabization of 
religious power and authority, and enhanced competitions between the residents of 












6.1 The Colonial State and the Muslims of the Interior 
The making of pseudo Kadhi in Nairobi ca. 1945 
Previous chapters discussed aspects of institutionalization and racialization of leadership, 
power and authority along the East African coast. This chapter continues to show the role 
of racial predilections in the process of appointing figures of authority and power in 
Islamic communities. Unlike the previous chapters' discussions of the apex of Islamic 
religious authority in the post of Shaykh aI-Islam and Chief Kadhi, this chapter and the 
next show cases of similar attitudes of racialization of leadership positions in the interior 
of Kenya. A racialized discourse engaged officials in Nairobi who argued about the 
appointment of a 'pseudo-Kadhi' was argued?70 As mentioned earlier the strength of 
Muslim Courts on the Coast ensued from the agreements entered into between the Sultan 
and the British government, giving rise to what we have termed the 'Protectorate 
Agreements.' Unlike the situation that prevailed on the Coast, Muslims residents of the 
interior were not able to rely on existing agreements to substantiate and support their 
demands for the establishment of Kadhis Courts. Thus, colonial authorities developed 
separate rules which they applied in the process of deciding the appointments of Kadhi in 
270 Colonial authorities did not recognize Muslim officials outside the Coast as being Kadhi, I have decided 
to term them 'pseudo-Kadhi'. I will put this term in inverted commas when used for the first time. In its 
subsequent use I will depend on the vigilance of the readers and not revert to the inverted commas in order 
to avoid an unpleasant reading. It is specifically for this reason that I view the 'Kadhi' of Nairobi and the 











the interior. Muslims, of the interior too responded differently, in accordance with their 
situation. 
1bis chapter presents two arguments that will assist us to appreciate the existence of 
interlocutors of marriage rituals amongst Muslims in the interior of Kenya. First, colonial 
authorities were reluctant to establish Muslim courts outside the coastal strip but 
nevertheless wished to exert influence on the authority of existing practitioners of 
Muslim rituals. Second, through a unique interpretation of statutes aligned with the 
establishment of Muslim courts and its officials, Muslims residing in the interior of 
Kenya were not party to the agreements signed between the Sultan and British 
authorities. As a result demands for establishing Muslim courts in the interior were 
denied because the government viewed the interior as falling outside the bounds of 
Islamic laws. I will thus explore the mixed fortunes of the existence of Kadhis in the 
interior of Kenya as a constitutional irony solved by the establishment of not so 
authoritative, not so powerful, but mainly functionary Muslim officials. This chapter will 
look at the differences in colonial perspectives on the Coast and the interior in tenns of 
the obligations to establish Muslim institutions, but will also indicate similarities in the 
process that racialized the posts of Kadhi. The discussion is situated on the basis of a 
1906 Ordinance which created rules and guidelines on the conduct of Muslims pertaining 











6.1 Mohammedan Marriage Divorce and Succession Ordinance 1906: 
Its Impact on the pseudo-Kadhis 
The discussions on the post of Shaykh al~ Islam and Chief Kadhi were juxtaposed to the 
argument that rules established by the Mohammedan Marriage Divorce and Succession 
Ordinance 1898 required interlocutors to articulate and thus elevate the hitherto 
communally based authority of Cularml' to incorporate their influence and power over a 
wider society of Muslims. While the positions of Shaykh aI-Islam and Chief Kadhi were 
occupied exclusively by the elite from Mombasa and Lamu, this chapter and the next 
move away from the Coast towards the interior to discuss the development of the 
authority of the CulamtP in Nairobi and Mumias, Nyanza Province. Its premises remain 
the hegemonic concerns of the colonial state, as the posts under discussion were 
institutionalized and located within the jurisdiction of the Mohammedan Marriage 
Divorce and Succession Ordinance 1906, especially with regard to its rules on titles and 
the geographical areas of its applicability. Arguably marriage laws survived better during 
colonial rule in comparison with other aspects of African customary laws. Their good 
fortune was attributed to the essential differences between European social structures and 
African cosmologies. 
Whereas the perfect model of a marriage according to English law was a monogamous 
union, a customary marriage and, for that matter, an Islamic marriage (i.e. what was 
defined as a Mohammedan marriage) was potentially polygamous. Equally, customary 











those on which the succession laws of the Empire were based. A sympathetic attitude by 
colonial officers towards non-European marriage rules was thus evident, as they did not 
attempt to enforce British norms on personal aspects of the colonized communities. Of 
course, in areas that came under strong missionary influence, attempts were indeed made 
by missionaries to impose Euro-Christian standards of behavior, enforced through a Euro 
centric perspective of being repugnant to natural justice. Evidence of such non 
interference was the enactment of marriage ordinances that created space for non-
Europeans to observe their personal laws. I will not engage with the sociological 
assertions that such marriage ordinances supported African and Muslim cosmologies, but 
I will be concerned with the discussion of how they created official interlocutors as 
practitioners of nikah (marriage ritual) amongst Muslims, centered on the debates on 
appointments to occupy the post of 'Kadhi'. 
In 1898, the Commission of the East African Protectorate pointed out to the Foreign 
Office the inadequacies of a previously enacted Foreign Marriage Act which catered for 
the needs of non-African populations, because it did not allow for celebration of 
marriages between persons who were not British subjects. The Commissioner had asked 
to be granted the necessary authority to introduce the Indian Christian Marriage Act and 
"perhaps even extend it to native Christians".271 However, it is argued that the Foreign 
Office foresaw various legal difficulties if such a course were followed, and for several 
years no decision was taken. Reference to the Colonial Office, however, revealed that the 
approach in territories under their control was for the Governor to issue Regulations or 
271 H.F. Morris, "Indirect Rule and the Law of Marriage" , H.F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule 











Ordinances on marriages. The reaction of the Foreign Office was that such action was 
highly irregular and that the legislation was ultra vires, since authority in the respective 
Order in Council to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of the territory 
could not cover legislation on the subject of marriage. While such was the original view 
pertaining to non-European residents in the territories, in the same year Muslims were 
exempted from any form of colonial interference in their personal matters by the 
agreements entered into between British representatives and the Sultan, preventing the 
former from interfering with the Mohammedan religion. This action later became an 
unforeseen side effect that absolved Muslims from personal laws derived from English 
law precepts. 
In 1898, the East African Order-in-Council established separate Court structures, viz. the 
Mohammedan Native Subordinate Courts, falling under the general umbrella of Native 
Court Authority 1897. The particular Court structures formed include the Kadhis Courts, 
which inter alia instituted the Mohammedan Marriage Divorce and Succession 
Ordinance 1898, then applicable in the Sultan's dominion but later ratified to the 
Mohammedan Marriage Divorce and Succession Ordinance 1906, which enabled quasi 
Muslim court officials to be allowed authority to institute Islamic rituals of a personal 
nature in the interior of Kenya. The statutes enacted defined and assumed the territorial 
applicability of Muslim rules and norms. I have taken the liberty to identify the Muslim 
officials appointed in the interior of Kenya in the case study of Nairobi and Murnias, as 











into between the Sultan and British authorities, and because their authority and power in 
the eyes of government officials were lower. 
Before I discuss the practicality of ethnic disputes over candidates who made themselves 
available for appointment as pseudo Kadhi, I would like to mention that the 
institutionalization of the Mohammedan Marriage Divorce and Succession Ordinance 
1906 posed practical problems in both Nairobi and Mumias because the Ordinance 
created a statutory requirement that confined some titles to certain specific geographical 
areas. According to the Ordinance Kadhis were Muslim officials whose jurisdiction was 
confined to the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Thus, the government could not 
appoint Kadhis for Muslims who resided outside the dominions of the Sultan and the 
Coast of Kenya; neither was it under any obligation to recognize the authority of such an 
official whenever they exercised their authority over Muslims residing outside the 
dominions of the Sultan. Irrespective of this, Muslims somehow, less concerned about the 
statutory position of the titles of Kadhi, recognized certain individuals who instituted 
marriage rituals as Kadhi. Thus, there were Kadhis in Nairobi and Mumias and other 
parts of bara for that matter, whose authority Muslims recognized and called upon to 
institute and legalize (in the Islamic sense) their ndoa (marriage rituals) and ceremonies. 
If the government had ignored the authority of such practitioners of Islamic rituals, it 
would have lost control over a section of the community over which it wished to exercise 
power. Such Kadhi would also create parallel forms of authority and power, which was 
not desirable. To disentangle the predicament the government sought to recognize the 











of Kadhi. In an authoritative advice by R.M. Comber, the Crown Advocate to District 
Officers pertaining to the government's attitude towards Kadhis in the interior, it was 
made categorically clear, viz. 
His Excellency does not favor the appointment of Kadhi outside the Coast Strip as salaried 
Government servants. He is however prepared to appoint any person recognized by the 
Mohammedan community in any District to be Kadhi for such a District to be Registrar under the 
Mohammedan Marriage and Divorce Ordinance 1906.272 
Three reasons were advanced by the government as being applicable to Nairobi and 
Mumias: one, that the statutes did not allow for the appointment of officials designated as 
Kadhi outside the Sultan's dominions; two, that the government was not prepared to 
remunerate such officials when appointed; and, three, the government did not favor the 
establishment of Kadhi Courts in areas outside the confmed districts of the Coast 
Province that were initially under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar. In these three factors 
were centered the racial tensions and conflicts in the process of negotiating the 
appointment of Kadhi in Nairobi and Mumias. 
In the Protectorate, i.e. the areas falling within the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, 
Islamic Shali(ah was partially applied, but Nairobi and Mumias fell into the colony of 
Kenya, where British laws applied in toto, thereby creating a practical dilemma as 
Muslim immigrants in these areas did not perceive a geographical application of rules on 
religious rituals and norms, but rather assumed a spiritual and moralistic inclusiveness 
irrespective of political geography. Assuming a universalistic application of Islamic 
norms, coupled with an anticipated establishment of the ummah ideal Muslims demanded 











the establishment of Muslim Courts in the interior of Kenya, which was compounded by 
diverse interests of Muslims based on strong ethnic and racial affiliations. The discussion 
herein considers the circumstances under which pseudo-Kadhis were recognized, 
appointed and subsequent ethnic and racially based conflicts emerging out of competing 
interest by individuals who wished to occupy the posts. Its practicality in the interior of 
Kenya will be discussed by way of two case studies, one for Nairobi in this Chapter Six, 
and the other for Mumias and the Nyanza Province in the proceeding Chapter Seven. 
6.3 Nairobi: the New Frontier 
The concept of ummah is significant in Islam because of its strong emphasis on unity of 
believers in the case of the need to unify diverse social elements on the basis of a 
common adherence to faith. Factors that provide an opportunity for co-religionists to 
display an impressive solidarity include increased travel, trading interactions, migrant 
labor and the development of administrative towns. Expecting a convergence of Muslims 
to result in increased unity however is an over-statement of the realities in Muslim 
societies. Most often Islamic societies display striking differences in their perceptions of 
the ummah. Instead of providing unity amongst diverse communities, Islam tends to 
provide religious symbols of one sort or another over which Muslims assert 
exclusiveness. 
Heterogeneous Muslim populations thus do not necessarily produce a collective religious 











Hausa and Y oruba co-religionists.273 Established by a few Y oruba Muslims in Ibadan, the 
popUlation of Muslims increased as a result of the proselytization efforts of the Hausa 
amongst the Y oruba. Eventually, the Hausa were a minority amongst the Muslims in the 
city. Using their numerical advantage the Y oruba began to dominate the jumaah mosque, 
which was the most important symbol of Hausa claims to exclusiveness. Realizing that 
they could no longer claim exclusiveness on the basis of Islam alone, the Hausa turned in 
large numbers towards the Tijanniya, eventually holding jumaah prayers in another 
quarter of the town. The actions of the Hausa constituted an attempt to establish an 
exclusive and separate 'ritual community'. Ritual exclusiveness played a political role 
that they did not want to share with the Y oruba. The depiction ofthe relationship between 
Hausa and Y oruba and the ensued competition over religious authority indicates a failure 
by Muslims to conform to the ummah ideal. Instead, it emphasized ethnic exclusiveness. 
The Nigerian example is applicable to Muslims in Kenya. A review of how Muslims 
related to one another in the growing metropolis of Nairobi reveals similar communal 
strife over religious authority and symbolism displayed by competition for Kadhiship. 
6.4 Muslims in Nairobi 
The city of Nairobi was established during early twentieth century as a small railw3f 
camp grew rapidly to a modem metropolis.274 Pressed by the need to exploit the interior 
of Kenya, the British craved a reliable means of communication between the interior and 
273 This argument on West Africa is well developed by Michael Bantom, West African City: A Study of 
Tribal life in Free Town (London: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
274 The importance and historical significance of the railway to the development of Nairobi is discussed in 











the Coast. A survey to build a railway line was commissioned in 1892, and its 
construction began in 1895. Six years later in May of 1901, the line reached a swampy 
stretch of land that local Maasai tribesmen called Uaso Nyirobi (a place of cool waters). 
Later anglicized Nairobi, it was the last stretch of open ground before the long climb up 
the Kikuyu escarpment towards Lake Victoria. Nairobi's development owes much to the 
building of the railway headquarters and its centrality, which attracted all sorts of 
European missionaries, settlers, travelers and their handlers and porters. Gradually 
Nairobi developed in importance until in 1901 the British made it the administrative 
capital, surpassing the coastal town of Mombasa in importance. 
The establishment of Nairobi as the capital of Kenya further attracted visitors who came 
to settle and trade in the city. In a span of less than a decade Nairobi had became a hub of 
activities with a diverse urban popUlation. The town's popUlation comprised people from 
diverse social, racial, ethnic, religious and political backgrounds. Europeans were mostly 
colonial administrators, missionaries and seekers of fortune. The African people were 
usually porters and guides, while most Asians were directly involved with the railway 
company and employed as clerks and artisans. A few Asians were traders. Muslims were 
found amongst Asians and Africans from the coastal communities of Kenya and 
Tanganyika. These include ethnic groups such as Manyema, Makua, Nyamwezi, Bajun 
and Digo. In the beginning there were hardly any Muslims amongst the local Kamba, 
Kikuyu and Maasai communities of the interior. However, through social interaction and 











Nairobi developed a diverse and active Muslim population whose social interactions 
displayed the internal dynamics of a society coming to terms with the crisscrossing 
loyalties of ethnic groups and religious identities. 275 In the foremost communal strife was 
indicated by the separate ethnic based settlements. In Nairobi, Africans resided in 
separate locations with the Asians or Europeans. Amongst African groups ethnic 
divisions accounted for differences in residence (kambi). Two important camps of 
Muslims included Kambi ya Waswahili (the Swahili camp) and Kambi ya Wasomali (the 
Somali camp). There was also a significant import of Nubi Muslims. These were Nubi 
tribesmen who served the British government during the First World War. After the war 
by way of gratitude, they were given the land that they called Kibra (bush or thicket)?76 
The end of the Second World War also witnessed an increase in the Muslim population 
of Nairobi when members of two Somali clans, the Essak and the Habruwal, settled in 
Nairobi. In the African settlements Muslims resided in separate quarters identified by 
ethnic identity. I have already mentioned above that, in Nairobi, the Swahili quarters 
were referred to as Kambi ya Waswahili (the Swahili camp). Its residents comprised 
categories of coastal communities such as the Manyema, Nyamwezi, Digo and Bajun. 
Though these communities were of diverse ethnic origins in their native locations, in 
Nairobi they were all identified as the Swahili on the basis of a common dialect, 
275 For a history of Islam in Nairobi see Yusuf A. Nzibo. "The Swahili and Islamization in Nairobi: 1888-
1945" (Staff Seminar Paper no. 1 1986/87, Department of History, University of Nairobi). A. N. Maingi, 
"The Diversity Factor in the History of Islam in Nairobi 1900-1963", (MA Dissertation, University of 
Nairobi, 1987). Kabiri, Ngeta, "Islam and Colonialism in Kenya: A case study of the Kenya African 
Muslims in Nairobi to c. 1939" (MA Thesis, Kenyatta University, 1990). 
276 A description of the history of the Nubi settled at Kibera in Nairobi can be found in Timothy Parsons, 
"Kibra is our Blood": The Sudanese Military Legacy in Nairobi's Kibera Location 1902-1968" The 











Kiswahili, and their adherence to Islam. Amongst them, true Swahili were communities 
who resided much closer to the sea. Thus, the Bajun would claim to be more Swahili than 
the Nyamwezi who lived more inland. Further, closeness to Arabs through intermarriages 
also authenticated one's claims to be a true Mswahili (Swahili person). In the case of 
Nairobi, communities such as the Digo, Makua, Nyamwezi and Manyema were mere 
'hangers on' to Swahiliness. When the Swahili held religious rituals, like the maulidi 
(from Arabic Milad-un-Nabi), true Swahiliness manifested itself as each of the 
communities organized their rituals separately. It was common in Nairobi during the 
early twentieth century for the Nyamwezi or Digo to hold separate maulidi to challenge 
another maulidi held by the Bajun. Equally each kambi (camp) settled by Muslims 
recognized its own leaders, the wazee (elders)?77 
Pangani, one ofthe largest African settlements in early nineteenth century Nairobi, is said 
to have comprised several mosques all associated with a separate ethnic group. Mji wa 
Mombasa fell within Pangani and was inhabited by various Swahili groupS.278 
Communities built mosque according to group affiliations. The first ever Mosque built in 
this area was known as Masjid Awal or Masjid Anisa and had been built by the Bajun.279 
Other non-Bajun coastal communities worshipped at another Mosque, Msildti wa kati 
(center Mosque), while converted African Muslims from the Kikuyu, Kamba and Maasai 
were inclined toward building their own mahaji mosque as well. Muslims religious 
277 Omar Suleiman Mwajambia, Personal Interview. Nairobi 22nd June 2001. 
278 For a history of African Settlements in Nairobi see Werlin H. Herbert, "The Nairobi City Council, The 
Politics of Co-operation in African Local Politics" (Ph.D Dissertation: UCLA 1966), 











rituals followed a similar pattern at the settlements. Each community prayed at their own 
mosque and recognized separate leaders of mosques and kambi (settlements). These 
considerations became manifest with attempts to institute a single practitioner of rituals 
especially kuoza (marriage).28o 
Interactions between Muslims and colonial officers occurred when the latter initiated 
attempts to exercise authority over the recognition of Kadhi. In 1906, the Mohammedan 
Marriage, Divorce and Succession Ordinance was promulgated to stipulate guidelines on 
what would make up a legal Muslim marriage: the role and functions of officials who 
constituted the same; regions where Muslim marriage laws were applicable; and the title 
of various categories of officials, their functions and areas of jurisdiction. Initially the 
Ordinance only applied to the coast of Kenya as part of the government's undertaking 
with the Sultan. In principle, British officers were under obligation to implement Islamic 
laws at the Coast, but there were no specific guidelines on how to deal with Muslims in 
the interior. The absence of guarantees for implementing Muslim laws in the interior 
meant that Muslim petitions for its application were left to the discretion of colonial 
officers on the ground. 
Muslim immigrants from the Coast settled in the interior faced an ambiguous 
arrangement. They appropriately recognized wazee (elders), maalims (teachers) and 
shaykhs who officiated in Muslim marriages as Kadhi. But the government was 
concerned about the constitutional applicability of the title of 'Kadhi' in the interior of 











Kenya. I will show that, according to the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and 
Succession Ordinance 1898, Kadhi were Muslim officials whose domain, areas of 
influence and authority were confined to districts along the Coast of Kenya. The 
government was not obliged to implement Islamic codes in the interior and thus assumed 
that titles like 'Kadhi' were not applicable to such areas. Thus, when Muslims termed the 
wazee, tribal Shaykhs and maalims who instituted marriage rituals as Kadhi, colonial 
officers considered this an aberration or against the rules and regulations. 
Different perspectives between Muslims and colonial officers with regard to the titles of 
Kadhi created an administrative bottleneck calling for the resolution of three contentious 
issues. First, with or without the government's recognition, Kadhis had previously existed 
in Nairobi because for as long as one was capable of meeting the religious roles and 
functions and was acceptable in a community, such individual was titled Kadhi. On the 
other hand, the government was not in favor of having each community recognize a 
separate Kadhi, arguing that it was not a prudent and acceptable administrative practice. 
Secondly, there was the problem of statutory use of the title of Kadhi. The government 
rejected the application of the title ofKadhi amongst Muslims in the interior, arguing that 
the title was statutorily applicable only in the Sultan's domains. Third, the government 
wanted to inhibit the practice of having every community recognize its own Kadhi. 
Instead, it favored having one individual, appointed by the government and recognized by 
all Muslims, to institute Muslim marriages. During the period 1902-1945 these insoluble 











6.5 Appointing pseudo-Kadhis in Nairobi 
The Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession Ordinance 1906 granted colonial 
officers the authority to supervise and decide who could be Kadhi. District Officers, 
District Commissioners and Provincial Commissioners interpreted and implemented the 
rules to be observed by Kadhi, as they assumed a supervisory authority over appointees. 
When intentions to institute one Kadhi for Nairobi were revealed to the community not 
only did the Muslims jostle for the position while aligning themselves on racial and 
ethnic grounds, but government's practice and thoughts and interference were made 
manifest. 
The first aspirant, Shaykh Ibrahim Abdullah, a Somali, applied to be appointed 
"Mohammedan Kazi (sic) in Nairobi".281 He supported his request with credentials 
claiming to have a thorough knowledge of Arabic, Swahili and Urdu, complemented with 
a fair comprehension of English.282 The Swahili proposed Shaykh Abud b. Shaykh Kale 
al-Bajun to challenge the Somali aspirant. Collectively, the Swahili and the Somali 
viewed the government's intention to appoint one Kadhi for all Muslims in Nairobi as an 
opportunity for the appointee to exercise authority beyond the confines of the racial 
group. Aware of this, Lalli Ahmed, the mzee (elder) of the Swahili rallied his community 
281 Sheikh Ibrahim Abdulla to Registrar of the High Court, Mombasa, of 30th February 1907 in 
KNAI AP/1I368. 
282 Sheikh Ibrahim claimed to have been to the Government School at Steamer Port, Aden where he 











behind their kinsman?83 This action eventual led to an acrimonious competition between 
the Somali and the Swahili. 
An appraisal of the nature of racialized Muslim posts of pseudo-Kadhi benefits more 
from a review of the process of appointments once initiated. Individuals and communities 
were already in disagreements. Hence the government pursued demands made by the 
Swahili to the effect that previously colonial officers recognized the Swahili candidate, 
Shaykh Abud b. Shaykh Kale as Kadhi for Nairobi. The government's concern was not 
so much the individual but the title. Thus when Judge R.W. Hamilton inquired about the 
position of Kadhi he was concerned about the terms under which such officials existed?84 
As a matter of fact F.W. Issack, the government's representative in Nairobi, responded in 
favor of the Swahili claims advising that Shaykh Abud had previously performed the role 
of a Kadhi?85 The Swahili expected an immediate confirmation of Shaykh Abud but, to 
be fair to the other applicant, the certificate that the Swahili had produced was not taken 
into consideration. Instead, it was impressed upon the colonial officers in Nairobi to be 
wary of the government's principle that Kadhis were performing an important religious 
function for the Muslims but that they were also helping in general administrative 
function. Thus, whoever was appointed had to meet, amongst others, the qualities of 
being reliable and sympathetic to the attitudes of the colonial administration. 
283 The Swahili produced a certificate with the seal of the East African Protectorate dated 20th November 
1906, stating that "... Sheikh Abud has been appointed Kadhi by the sub-committee of the Swahili 
community in Nairobi". See KNA/API1I368. 
284R W. Hamilton, Principal Judge, made this inquiry on 5th February 1907 through F. W. Issack, 
Collector, in Nairobi. 












Furthermore, the Kadhi of Nairobi should by necessity be acceptable to the community if 
he were to be successful in performing his task. The most important consideration was 
that colonial officers had to be sure that the appointee was a "man of reputable 
character. ,,286 
Communal tensions and competition became evident as Muslims lobbied influential 
individuals amongst themselves. Maulana Abd Allah Shah, an Asian Muslim 
philanthropist, was approached to support the Swahili candidate but he thought none of 
the aspirants was competent to effectively undertake the duties of a "Kadhi", and 
suggested the government should engage someone competent from the Coast?87 Before a 
decision was reached, Shaykh Ibrahim Abd Allah became rather impatient out of concern 
that the Swahili were attempting to influence prominent people in their attempts to cheat 
him of the position. In desperation, he challenged Abud's candidature arguing that the 
latter's knowledge was inadequate. Shaykh Ibrahim requested a duel with Shaykh Abud 
where he, Shaykh Ibrahim, would ask his competitor "one question or two" to determine 
who was more knowledgeable and appropriate for the appointment.288 
In Nairobi, the Somali comprised two opposing clans, the Essak and the Habruwal. 
Unlike the Swahili, the Somali did not necessarily support Shaykh Ibrahim's candidature 
as some faulted his knowledge and character to indicate that he did not enjoy a privileged 
286 R.W. Hamilton, Principal Judge to F. W. lssack, the Collector, on 7th February 1907, in KNAlAP/1I368. 
287 This was the opinion of one Maulana Abdulla Shah one influential Muslim amongst the Asian 
community, to F. W. Issack on 15 th February 1907 in KNAI AP/l/368. 











position. One Somali elder, Ibrahim Hassan was critical of Shaykh Ibrahim and 
accordingly intimated his opinion to the government, suggesting that Shaykh Ibrahim 
AbdAllah 
... should not get the position of 'Sheikh ofIslam' (sic), because he does not know Mohammedan 
religion well, he could not differentiate between wrong and right and was a backbiter.289 
Ibrahim Hassan's reference to 'Sheikh of Islam' above might create two false 
impressions, viz. that Shaykh Ibrahim Abd Al1ah was considered for the post of 
Shaykh aI-Islam or that the Muslims in Nairobi thought that once one had been appointed 
'Kadhi' then you are the 'Sheikh of Islam'. I think Ibrahim Hassan confused the two 
terms so that it was a case of improper perception of the post of Kadhi in Nairobi and its 
relation with the post of Shaykh aI-Islam, then held by 
SharifCAbd al-Ral)man b. A1;tmad al-Saggaf. Nevertheless, Ibrahim Hassan's objections 
revealed intra-Somali rivalries, adding to the already existing inter-racial differences 
between the Swahili and the Somali. Ultimately intra-Somali rivalry enhanced chances 
for the appointment of a Swahili as R. W. Hamilton, the Principal Judge, thought it was 
inadvisable and undesirable to appoint a Somali 'Kadhi' in Nairobi.290 Contrary to the 
suggestion by Maulana Abd Allah Shah, the government thought it was untenable to 
import someone from the Coast, as they would have higher financial demands.291 
289 Ibrahim Hassan to Government on 6th March 1907 in KNA/AP/1/363. 
290 Sentiments expressed by Judge R. W. Hamilton regarding the appointment of Sheikh Ibrahim Abd Allah 
on 20th March 1907 in KNN AP/l/368. 
291 There was an element of financial consideration here, a Kadhi from Mombasa would probably ask for 











Emerging communal differences delayed the appointment of a "Kadhi" in Nairobi, but its 
urgency was felt when the judiciary department came under pressure. They could not 
decide upon Muslim matrimonial matters without the assistance of a "Kadhi". In fact 
cases involving Muslims had in the interior been filed in the Court but adjourned since a 
"Kadhi" had not yet been appointed.292 Since the idea to appoint a Kadhi had been 
mooted for a long time, an immediate appointment was demanded. Referring to the 
availability of Shaykh Abud bin Shaykh Kale al-Bajun, G.A. Logan, Nairobi's Town 
Magistrate, expressed the view that the judiciary had already identified a man from 'Siu' 
for appointment. 293 
By September 1907 the appointments of a 'Kadhi' became even more likely once various 
bureaucratic procedures involving authentication of the appointee's knowledge by the 
Shaykh ai-Islam had been complete?94 Involving a visit to Mombasa, the process took 
some time, but when Shaykh Abud visited Mombasa, the Shaykh ai-Islam recommended 
him positively though with some reservation, because "Shaykh Abud b. Shaykh Kale al-
Bajun was not well qualified for all general laws, but pertaining to matters of Marriage 
and Divorce laws, he found him [a] qualified, intelligent and competent man.,,295 
Sharif Abd al-RaJ:1man's recommendation supported the appointment, but suggested that 
292 These were worries expressed by G.A. Logan, Nairobi Town Magistrate to Assistant Deputy 
Commissioner, Nairobi refno.l04/07 of22nd March 1907, inKNAIAP/1/368. 
293 Siu or Siyu is a location in the Lamu archipelago where Shaykh Abud b. Shaykh Kale al-Bajun hailed 
from before settling in Nairobi. It is also important to mention that Siu was then considered as one of the 
centers of Islamic learning having produced some of the prominent ulama in the Coast to include 
Sharif Abd al-Ral;unan b. Al;nnad, the Shaykh aI-Islam. 
294 R. W. Hamilton to Acting PC, Nairobi refno.Cl122I of 9th September 1907, in KNAiAP/l/501. 











Shaykh Abud should improve his knowledge of other matters of Islamic laws to gain 
competence as 'Kadhi'. Thus guaranteed, he was appointed to the post albeit on a 
probationary basis pending review and a further test after a year.296 The suggestion that 
Shaykh Abud improve his knowledge of other disciplines in Islamic law was intended to 
see that he performed better, but Shaykh Abud was contented with his appointment, and 
became complacent, which proved his undoing later. 
Temporary and probationary, Shaykh Abud's appointment declared the Swahili winners 
in the ethnicized competition for the position, but the Swahili candidate was a "pseudo-
Kadhi", not accorded the full authority of Kadhiship. Shaykh Abud was allowed to 
preside over Muslim marriages and divorces. To his adversaries, especially the Somali, 
the temporary appointment signified the government's lack of confidence in the "Kadhi" 
and the hope to dislodge him was raised as Somali detractors made Abud's task difficult 
by constantly challenging his authority. 
Disagreements abounded, and the government hesitated to confirm Shaykh Abud's 
appointment after he served for one year. Remaining precariously unconfirmed, Shaykh 
Abud lodged complaints to the government over its procrastination, expressing 
dissatisfaction and wonder as to why one year had elapsed since his appointment, yet 
"power was not invested upon him.,,297 Frustrated he blamed the Somali for his woes and 
responded to their challenge by accusing them as unauthorized people illegally 
296 Judge R. W. Hamilton recommended that Sheikh Abud be offered a salary of Rs. 30.00 to be increased 
to 40.00 after successful completion of probation and positive reports from the Shaykh aI-Islam. 











performing the roles of Kadhi. Because they were not appointed by the government 
Shaykh Abud viewed them as impostors and 'private Kadhi' (Makadhi wa kibinafsi), 
unlike himself who was the 'public Kadhi' (Kadhi wa ummah) appointed with 
government's authority. He impressed upon the government to allow him take 
disciplinary action against the unauthorized impostors but also accused the government 
of complicity because these 
... unauthorized Kadhi were adjudging people whom the government has no knowledge but 
government has not granted me the power to prosecute them ... these 'private Kadhi,' were 
corrupting the law and they did not listen to me, the 'public Kadhi'. Further they were making 
'fitina', making tricks and making tribal statements against me.298 
Shaykh Abud's complaints were not simply the frustrations of an embattled, powerless 
state functionary in the face of adversity. Rather, the scenario points to the difficult 
position Muslim officials faced while operating in multi-ethnic Muslim communities. 
The complaints and criticisms were based on the government's intents to appoint a single 
'Kadhi' for the entire population of Muslims. It brings to the fore the 'fitina', agitation 
and contests based on ethnic differences and considerations over Kadhiship in Nairobi. 
Episodes leading to Shaykh Abud's appointments were good evidence of British attempts 
for centralization of the post of 'Kadhi', but it is the racialization and Arabization part of 
the discourse that makes this discussion relevant to the thesis. Probably the government 
did not need to interfere with how or who conducted marriage rituals. In this respect, the 
Somali would have been left alone to recognize and respect Somali Kadhis, likewise the 
Swahili. However, the government's desire for centralization and bureaucratization 
meant that communities were compelled to recognize the person appointed by the 











government without recourse to infonnal tribesmen. This increased racial competition for 
the honor and respect emanating from the authority bestowed by the appointment. 
6.6 An unpalatable fiqh: 
The Story of Haji Hussein's marriage to Fatuma 
When Shaykh Abud was appointed Kadhi, considerable fitina was generated by his 
Somali detractors, and Shaykh Abud did not miss an opportunity to blame them. 
However, his troubles did not entirely emanate from the Somali. His perfonnance itself 
was wanting. When he was appointed, the government had anticipated a smooth 
administration of Muslim affairs through him. But ensuing agitation and opposition to his 
authority frustrated both the Kadhi and the government. Colonial officers such as F.W. 
Issack, the District Commissioner of Nairobi who had supported his appointment were 
generally not impressed by Shaykh Abud's perfonnance.299 
Differences between Shaykh Abud and F.W. Isaack were based on how each perceived 
the role of the other. While Issack thought that Shaykh Abud was under his supervision 
and as such his junior in rank, Shaykh Abud viewed Issack's interventions and 
supervision of his work as unwarranted interference. These differences persisted to such 
an extent that at one time F.W. Issack attempted to have Shaykh Abud re1ieved of his 
position and duties by accusing him of incompetence and financial impropriety. 
Generally, Issack and Abud each thought they had powers independent of the other, 
especially so for Shaykh Abud who could not withstand interference in Islamic matters 











while Issack, on the other hand, viewed Abud as a subordinate officer who should abide 
by orders from his superiors. 
The government did not to remunerate Kadhis in areas outside the Coast Province but, to 
meet their expenses, Kadhis were allowed to collect fees from their duties in a self-
remunerating process. Likewise, Abud collected fees for the services he rendered which 
F.W. Issack did not favor. Consequently, F. W. Issack accused Shaykh Abud of financial 
impropriety and inefficiency. The District Commissioner accused the Kadhi of not 
accounting for revenue collected in the process of marrying people, hearing cases and 
granting divorces. But a serious charge was leveled at him in that he had "collected fees 
but the amount stated in his books did not tally in every case with the sum paid to 
governmenf,.300 The Kadhi was thus implicated in serious and scandalous financial 
mismanagement bordering on theft. To further aggravate the matter F.W. Isaack accused 
the Kadhi of implementing bad fiqh (jurisprudence) by misrepresenting and transgressing 
the boundaries of Shari(ah law when he allowed women to ask for large sums of money 
as mahr (dowry).301 
F.W. Issack's sentiments sent clear signals that the administration in Nairobi was not 
satisfied with the performance of the Kadhi. Basically, Shaykh Abud was not meeting the 
government's expectations to maintain order and act as a mediator between the 
300 These were complaints by F. W. Issack, the District Commissioner, Nairobi to Provincial 
Commissioner, Nairobi, ref. no. 5 of 12th June 1909, in an attempt to have Sheikh Abud relieved of his 
position as a result of misappropriation of funds and inappropriate bookkeeping, see KNAlAPIl1501. 
301 Certainly F. W. Issack was himself embellishing on his understanding of the legal requirements 











administration and the Muslims. He had failed to assert his authority among the Muslims 
of Nairobi, and the government was disappointed. Shaykh Abud himself was accused of 
being responsible for stirring up endless strife between various ethnic groups. The 
government favored community leaders who commanded outright authority and 
recognition, because it was easier for colonial authorities to exercise indirect authority 
through them. In this regard, Shaykh Abud was a failure and a likely impediment to the 
good administration expected by colonial authorities. 
Generally, as has been discussed earlier herein, the colonial government supported 
individuals for positions of authority, anticipating that they would in tum uphold and 
exercise authority on behalf of colonial authorities. This explains why the government 
favored Abud as opposed to Shaykh Ibrahim. Nevertheless, signs of dissent against a 
particular official led the colonial government to review its appointments. As Shaykh 
Abud's authority was constantly challenged, his usefulness for the government 
weakened. Consequently, F.W. Issack thought it prudent for another official to be 
installed, and strongly recommended the dismissal of Shaykh Abud. However, the 
Principal Judge R. W. Hamilton did not concur with the reasons advanced, and thought 
the Kadhi had acted properly by deducting part of court fees for his remuneration.302 
Since there were also no fixed amounts for dowry in Islamic legal practice, Shaykh Abud 
was absolved of any wrongdoing. More importantly, 
302 R.W. Hamilton made reference to a rule published with the Mohammedan Marriage Divorce and 
Succession Ordinance, which allowed Kadhis who were not yet paid by government the authority to deduct 











R.W. Hamilton was surprised that F.W. Issack did not consider the difficult position 
faced by Abud with regard to the Somali. The bottom line was that Abud's task was 
difficult as a result of ethnic rivalry. In R. W. Hamilton, Abud found a formidable 
supporter and sympathizer, and the recommendation for his dismissal was not considered. 
R.W. Hamilton declined to take punitive measures against Shaykh Abud and held the 
government partly responsible for the situation. Had the government appointed Shaykh 
Abud and immediately bestowed upon him the authority to operate without obstacles, he 
would not have experienced any friction from his challengers.303 Hamilton pursued a 
conciliatory posture and sought the intervention of Somali elders to ease the tension. 
Consultations resulted in a guaranteed undertaking from the Somali to minimize their 
opposition to Shaykh Abud, but fell short of an undertaking to recognize his authority. 
Once R.W. Hamilton was assured of a reduced Somali opposition, he absolved Shaykh 
Abud of any wrongdoing, hinting towards a possibility that Shaykh Abud would be given 
fully-fledged Kadhi statuS.304 
R. W. Hamilton's interventions enabled Shaykh Abud to hold onto his 'Kadhiship' for a 
while, but his troubles were not yet over. Towards late 1909, he had to survive a major 
challenge to his authority resulting from his bad fiqh and conduct. Perhaps Shaykh Abud 
should have taken the suggestion by the Shaykh ai-Islam to improve his knowledge of the 
SharI'ah. If he had observed this counsel, he would not have made mistakes such as the 
303 Sentiments expressed by the District Commissioner, Nairobi, on 2nd February 1909. 











one involving one Haji Hussein and his marriage to Fatuma. In May 1909, Haji Hussein 
lodged a complaint about Shaykh Abud's competence and conduct as a 'Kadhi' accusing 
him of knowingly and wrongfully instituting nikah (marriage ceremony) between Haji 
Hussein and a Swahili woman named Fatuma, before she had completed her ig,g,iit305after 
being divorced from her estranged husband. Haji Hussein should have known about this 
himself, but he blamed the Kadhi when the marriage encountered problems. 
The Kadhi's judgment caused a dispute in the community that cost him his job, not only 
because he flouted Islamic rules but because he infuriated the Swahili when he married 
one of their women to an Arab. There seems to have been an obvious ignorance of 
unwritten rules outlawing inter-ethnic marriages. However, the Kadhi was worried about 
flouting the ig,g,iit requirements. Upon realizing his mistake Shaykh Abud retracted and 
ordered Fatuma to stay with her family until she had completed her ig,g,iit, but ordered 
Haji Hussein to pay for Fatuma's upkeep. As the suitor, Haji Hussein obliged. However 
upon completion of her ig,g,iit, Fatuma declined to return to Haji Hussein. Most Swahili 
accused Shaykh Abud of having conducted a secret marriage between Haji Hussein and 
Fatuma. Apparently, Lalli Ahmed, the leader of the Swahili, was not in favor of a Swahili 
woman marrying an Arab. Lalli used his influence to persuade Fatuma, who in tum 
declined to honor her marriage to Haji Hussein. 
305 This is the waiting period that a Muslim woman is required to wait before she can legally remarry after 











On the other hand, an infuriated Haji Hussein complained about Lalli Ahmed's influence 
on Fatuma. Since Shaykh Abud had officiated in the ritual, Haji Hussein anticipated that 
he would invoke his authority and influence Faturna to honor the marriage. To Haji 
Hussein's amazement, Shaykh Abud offered little assistance. Instead, he advised Haji 
Hussein to take up the matter in civil courts. While Haji Hussein followed this advice and 
sought the civil court's intervention, Shaykh Abud conspired with other Swahili men to 
render Haji Hussein's case null and void. The Kadhi arranged for and compelled 
Sharif Abd Alliih and one, CAlI b. Sayyid, to give false evidence against Haji Hussein in 
the civil courts. The three of them thus conspired and misled the civil courts by giving 
false evidence in the form of a categorical denial that Shaykh Abud had instituted any 
marriage between Haji Hussein and Fatuma, let alone instituting a secret one. 
Consequently Haji Hussein lost a wife and his court case for lack of evidence. However, 
if Shaykh Abud had thought that his troubles with the community were over, he was 
mistaken. Frustrated and embarrassed, Haji Hussein swore vengeance and sued the Kadhi 
for improper conduct. His litigation did not raise the legalities and moral implications of 
Shaykh Abud's actions, but strove to recover expenses incurred while taking care of 
Fatuma and wished to inform the government of the Kadhi's unbecoming conduct.306 
Haji Hussein aroused ethnic concerns by asking the government to seek proof of the 
misdeeds of the Kadhi from other ethnic communities. He anticipated the support of 
fellow Arabs and thOUght the Somali would support him against Shaykh Abud, 
considering that they had wanted to dislodge Shaykh Abud from the position of Kadhi in 












the first place. Since Shaykh Abud was a Bajun who had influenced fellow Bajun to give 
false evidence, the other Swahili groups were equally embarrassed and were not likely to 
sympathize with him. Certainly, Haji Hussein took advantage of ethnic differences in the 
community and strategically included other ethnic groups in his dispute, hoping to prove 
Shaykh Abud unpopular. J.W. Barth, the Principal Judge, dismissed his queries 
considering the allegations against the 'Kadhi' a result of jitina, owing to the 
conglomeration of ethnic groups and diversity of interests in the Muslim community of 
Nairobi. He concluded that the 'Kadhi's' position had been difficult and that there were 
no grounds to take dismissive action against him.307 
The government's actions in support of Shaykh Abud infuriated Muslims who 
sympathized with Haji Hussein and were aware that Shaykh Abud had transgressed 
Muslim law and questioned his moral standing for speaking falsehoods. Muslims 
demanded his removal and were infuriated when the government expressed confidence in 
the 'Kadhi.' In spite of ethnic diversity and differences they collectively defied the 
government's support of Shaykh Abud, accusing the government of imposing the Kadhi 
on them. To this effect, a joint petition was sent to the government accusing him of 
incompetence and unfamiliarity with the requirements of the Muslim law pertaining to 
marriage and divorce. Relying on Shaykh Abud's probationary appointment pending 
further proof of his competence, Muslims demanded that he produce an ijaza 308 from the 
307 Sentiments expressed by J.W. Barth to Provincial Commissioner, Nairobi on 5th November 1909 in 
KNAIAP/1/5 0 1. 
308 This is a form of certificate that a Shaykh would normally issue to a student to authenticate the students 











Shaykh aI-Islam to authenticate his knowledge. The Muslims of Nairobi did not agree 
with the government's view that opposition to Shaykh Abud was the result of jitina. 
Rather, they insisted that the manner in which Shaykh Abud had conducted his duties in 
the case involving Haji Hussein was proof of incompetence. Communities persistently 
objected and urged the government to relocate Abud to another area if it was the 
government's wish to continue engaging his services.309 
In January 1910, the government instituted an inquiry into the conduct of Shaykh Abud. 
Under normal circumstances, Sharif Abd al-Ral:tman b. Al:tmed, the Shaykh aI-Islam, 
would have headed such an inquiry. Considering that both the Shaykh ai-Islam and 
Shaykh Abud were from Lamu, it was thought inappropriate for him to head the inquiry. 
As a matter of fact Shaykh Abud had initially been recommended by the 
Shaykh ai-Islam. Sharif Abd al-RaI:tman would be compromised or accused of ethnic 
sympathy and connivance in the event that Shaykh Abud was cleared of wrongdoing.310 
To avoid an embarrassing situation, (All b. ~alim, the then Assistant Liwali for 
Mombasa, and G.H. Pickering conducted the inquiry. 
The findings of the inquiry cast aspersions on Shaykh Abud's character and knowledge. 
He was found to have given substantial false evidence with the intention to protect 
309 These were sentiments and demands by the Muslims in Nairobi sent to Town Magistrate, on 17th 
January 1910, under the leaderships of community representatives which included, Abdullah bin Salim 
(Arabs), Hussein bin Ali and Ibrahim Hassan (Somali), the Swahili were represented by one identified only 
as Maalim Swahili. See KNA/AP/1I501. 
310 Sentiments expressed by J.W. Barth when he made recommendations on the people to sit on the inquiry 











himself and mislead the court, and serious misconduct was proved against him. Ali bin 
Salim noted that Abud's actions were a very serious misconduct against SharI<ah law. 
With this report, the judiciary department had no option but to recommend that Shaykh 
Abud be deprived of his position. Upon its implementation, a new Kadhi was to be 
appointed. 3 1 1 The search for a Muslim official in Nairobi began by the government in 
1906 lasted for only four years as Shaykh Abud was relieved of his duties. His sacking 
further intensified ethnic considerations in future appointments of Muslim officials to fill 
the vacant post. 
6.7 A 'brie/Somali interlude', July 1913-February 1914 
In 1910 when Shaykh Abud was relieved of the post of 'Kadhi' no person was appointed 
to replace him until mid 1913, when Shaykh <Ali b. Hassan was appointed. The Somali 
were elated and felt honored that one of them was appointed. Shaykh 'All b. Hassan was 
a capable official as his tenure reduced inter-ethnic fitina and minimized intra-Somali 
agitation. Unfortunately his tenure was short-lived. He passed away in early 1914.312 The 
short experience with Shaykh 'Ali b. Hassan indicated that if an acceptable individual 
was appointed to the position of Kadhi the likelihood of reducing inter-ethnic conflicts 
was greater. At least, Shaykh <Ali b. Hassan's tenure had proved these sentiments and 
encouraged the government's attempts to find an effective successor to Shaykh 
3l! R.W. Hamilton, Principal Judge, to Secretary of Administration on 4th August 1910, in KNAJAP/l/501. 
It was realized that there was a need to get a suitable person for the position and to be achieved the holder 
should receive better pay. The search for a new Kadhi for Nairobi was again reactivated. 











<Ali b. Hassan. However, this initiative was not immediately realizable. An earlier 
suggestion to appoint someone from Mombasa was revisited when F.C. Hamilton thought 
it would minimize the ethnic antagonism and the fitina prevalent in Nairobi. An 
appointee from another place was expected to be neutral which would perhaps reduce the 
existing agitation and fitina between the Somali and Swahili.313 
An impression may be created by the above discussion that the government disapproved 
of the relevance of ethnicity in its nomination of Kadhi. In actual sense, the government 
followed the same policy of favoring the appointment of Arabs to official positions. With 
the anticipated appointment of a Kadhi from the Coast, the same policy seemed to have 
been followed. But when ever reservations were raised on the practicality of recruiting 
someone from the Coast who was ready to serve without direct remuneration from the 
government, it had no option but to search for a Kadhi from within Nairobi. 314 
From May 1914 the Muslims of Nairobi prepared for another contest over Kadhiship, as 
aspirants wanted to win over individual heshima (honor/respect) and prestige (had hi) for 
their respective ethnic groups. Anticipating the appointment of a new Kadhi, each ethnic 
group lined up prospective candidates. Sharif <Abd Allah and Abdi Somad represented 
the Swahili, while the Somali clans were represented by Shaykh 'All b. Hassan and 
313 F.C. Hamilton, District Commissioner, Nairobi, to Registrar High Court in ref. no.69/24/13 of 14th April 
1914, in KNAIAP/1I892. 












Shaykh Ibrahim. This display of ethnic enthusiasm hampered attempts to secure a neutral 
candidate. 
Once the candidates showed an interest, they were tested on their knowledge. The 
Shaykh aI-Islam was asked to examine the candidates purely from the point of view of 
their knowledge of Islamic law. Because Abdi Somad, one of the candidates hailed from 
Lamu, the Shaykh aI-Islam was cautioned against considering the ethnic origins of the 
candidates. In fact, other communities expressed a concern that Abdi Somad was likely to 
be favored and countered his inclusion amongst candidates eligible. They hinted that 
Abdi Somad was suffering from some sort of mental disability, and was incapable of 
holding the post of Kadhi.3 IS 
Nevertheless, Abdi Somad and Shaykh Ibrahim were the first to make the trip to 
Mombasa. The Shaykh aI-Islam reported that each one of them knew enough to perform 
marriages but neither was competent in other matters of Islamic law. On the other hand, 
Sharif Abd Allah of the Swahili was not successful, as he was found to be "inferior" to 
the other two candidates.316 Between the two candidates, the Bajun, Abdi Somad, and the 
Somali, Shaykh Ibrahim, the Shaykh aI-Islam could not draw any distinction based on 
superiority ofcilm (knowledge). He left the administration in Nairobi to pick either of the 
315 F.e. Hamilton, District Commissioner, Nairobi, to Registrar High Court, Mombasa for onward 
trartsmission to the Shaykh aI-Islam, on ref. no.69/24/13 of 2nd July 1914, in KNAIAP/1/892. 
316 Registrar High Court to District Commissioner, Nairobi, ref. no. 608114 of 2nd September 1914, 











two for the position. This was poised to be became another contest between the Somali 
and the Swahili. 
The process of choosing between Abdi Somad and Shaykh Ibrahim revealed odd 
government practice. Initially, the administration asked the Shaykh aI-Islam to test the 
competency of the candidates and cautioned him against considering the ethnic origins of 
the candidates. But when a clear distinction based on superiority of 'ilm between Abdi 
Somad and Shaykh Ibrahim was not possible, the colonial administrators relied on racial 
and ethnic consideration to pick the Kadhi. Shaykh Ibrahim, the Somali candidate, was 
ruled inappropriate because he belonged to the Habruwal clan, one of the ethnic groups 
of the Somali. The government feared that appointing a Somali to the position would 
cause endless 'fiUna' amongst other rival Somali sub-groups who would be jealous of a 
member of the third group holding such an office.317 The District Commissioner was 
aware that Kadhiship was based on the knowledge and expertise of the candidate. 
According to the District Commissioner, in fact, the Somali candidate was better 
educated than Abdi Somad and suitable for appointment. But there could be another 
objections against him by other sub-ethnic Somali groups, making his appointment 
undesirable and leaving the post open for Abdi Somad.31S 
3J7 Registrar High Court to District Commissioner, Nairobi ref No. DR.600!l4 of 28th August 1914 in 
KNAI AP/l/892. 












6.8 Pseudo-Kadhis and 'Registrars' 
The culmination of debates about the appointment of 'Kadhi' of Nairobi occurred when 
Abdi Somad was favored at the expense of Shaykh Ibrahim. The Swahili had again won 
in round two. However, the matter was not completely closed. In 1906 when the 
appointment of 'Kadhi' for Nairobi was first discussed, the obstacle was the use of the 
title of 'Kadhi' in areas outside the dominions of the Sultanate of Zanzibar. This matter 
was revisited at this stage. In 1914, reference was made to the precedent as it became 
clear that Abdi Somad would be appointed. J.W. Barth, the Attorney General, raised 
reservations on the legality and permissibility of appointing Kadhis outside the Coast 
Province and cautioned that such appointments were a reversal of the policy applied by 
previous government officials. He reminded the administration that the Mohammedan 
Marriage, Divorce and Succession Ordinance 1906 recognized the appointment of 
officials designated as 'Registrars' and not as 'Kadhi' for areas outside the Coast and 
suggested a continuance of this precedent.319 J.W. Barth emphasized his objection and 
caution based on the legal interpretation of the title 'Kadhi', as the statutes under which 
these officials were recognized stated that they were Muslim officials whose authority 
was confined to the Coast of Kenya. 












Justice J.W. Barth's apprehensions were discussed and argued, but rejected by H.R. Tate, 
the District Commissioner in Nairobi who considered these reservations unnecessary. 
Though 'Kadhis' appointed in Nairobi were 'pseudo-Kadhi', H.R. Tate urged that there 
was already a precedent in the appointment of Shaykh <Ali b. Salim as a 'Kadhi' in 
Nairobi and emphasized that the intention to appoint Abdi Somad was not a new 
invention, but rather an appointment to succeed Shaykh Hassan b. <AlL 320 According to 
Tate, Kadhis could be appointed in areas outside the Coast without obliging the 
government to remunerate them. Accordingly, the administration in Nairobi was not 
asking the government to remunerate the Kadhi but rather to authorize his 
appointment.321 Justice J.W. Barth emphasized that he based his decision on a previous 
government policy stipulated by Sir Percy Girouard, which did not allow the appointment 
of Kadhis outside the dominions of the Sultanate of Zanzibar. J.W. Barth argued that it 
did not matter whether the government was asked to remunerate the Kadhi when 
appointed. His concern was that in previous appointments of Shaykh Abud bin Shaykh 
Kale al-Bajun, and Shaykh Ali Hassan, "government policy had already been departed 
from and was not in favor of another lapse in implementing government policy". 322 
During September 1914 a consensus was reached between J.W. Barth and H.R. Tate, and 
Abdi Somad was accordingly appointed as 'Registrar' of Muslim marriages and divorces, 
320 The District Commissioner cited the precedent of Sheikh Ali bin Hassan who was appointed Kadhi and 
Registrar in Nairobi district on 1st July 1913. 
321 Mr. H.R. Tate, District Commissioner, Nairobi to Acting Chief Secretary and Attorney General, ref. No. 
69/24/13/ of 12th September 1914, in KNA/AG/511205. 












a pseudo-Kadhi post with responsibilities including conducting Muslim marriage rites 
and registering them. For the second time the appointment of Abdi Somad elevated the 
heshima of the Swahili at the expense of the Somali. However, the Swahili were not 
satisfied with the position of 'Registrar'. They wanted to assert their ethnic pride by 
having their clansman appointed as a fully-fledged Kadhi with both criminal and civil 
jurisdiction. 
In mid-1915, Muslims in Nairobi revived demands for the appointment of a fully-fledged 
Kadhi. The government was sympathetic about this issue, especially when 
F.C. Hamilton, the District Commissioner in Nairobi, reported favorably that "the need 
for a Kadhi was greater now... that the Mohammedan population has increased.,,323 
Hamilton had earlier supported the appointment of Abdi Somad in Nairobi when lW. 
Barth, the Attorney General had raised objections. In fact, it was Hamilton who had 
argued that the appointment of Abdi Somad was not in any way contravening 
government policy as claimed by J.W. Barth. 
Hamilton's sympathies could not influence a positive response for Muslims. Senior 
officers in the colonial administration e.g. the Attorney General and Provincial 
Commissioner, had the authority to do so, but they were opposed to the appointments, 
and Muslim grievances took a long time to be processed. From May 1915 when Muslims 
demanded a substantive Kadhi's appointment, the matter was revisited in the late 1930's. 
The initiative came from government as it reviewed the organization of native 
323 F.C. Hamilton, District Commissioner, Nairobi to Registrar High Court ref. no. 69/24115 of 15th July 











subordinate courts in January 1939. In the process of the reVIew the District 
Commissioner supported the establishment of a Kadhi's Court in Nairobi, and the 
Provincial Commissioner concurred that "these Courts should exercise authority over 
Mohammedan natives".324 
Towards the end of 1939 the government was ready to discuss the precise changes 
required to establish fully fledged Kadhi Courts in the interior of Kenya. Two modalities 
were considered. First, was an attempt to circumvent the problem by amending the 
Liwali, Cadis and Mudirs Courts' Ordinance 1931 to allow the establishment of Kadhi 
Courts outside the Coast. It was suggested to amend Section 7(1) of the Ordinance by 
adding a phrase to read "a Kadhi Court within the limits of the District in which it is 
situated" It was anticipated that this would give government the necessary authority to 
establish Kadhi Courts and appoint Kadhi in any district of Kenya.325 
The second opinion agreed that Kadhis courts should be established and that Kadhis 
should be appointed, but should not be granted criminal jurisdiction. The proposed 
proviso to be added to the Liwali Cadis, and Mudirs Courts Ordinance 1931, would read 
that, "these courts will be set-up in the Kenya colony provided that no Kadhi Courts 
established outside the Coast districts shall exercise any criminal jurisdiction". 326 This 
proviso would have enabled Nairobi and other areas to have Kadhi Court's established, 
324 Provincial Commissioner, Central Province to Registrar, High Supreme Court of Kenya, ref. No. L&O. 
32/12/11 of9ili January 1939 inKNAlAP/l/892. 
325 See Section 18 of the Courts Ordinance 1931 and Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1930. 











although the appointees would be pseudo Kadhi, exercising less authority compared to 
those appointed to serve at the Coast. 
6.9 Books and Examinations 
Concurrently with the above mentioned contemplations to establish a Kadhi's Court a 
possible appointee was sought, thereby reactivating ethnic competition and intrigue. Abdi 
Somad, the Registrar in Nairobi, viewed it an opportunity to have his status elevated and 
showed interest in the position. He was asked to have his knowledge of Islamic law tested 
by Shaykh AI-Amin b. 'All al-Mazrii.<i, the Chief Kadhi.327 
To test Abdi Somad's competence Shaykh AI-Amin prepared what he termed simple 
questions of frequent occurrence in subjects including aspects of marriage, revocable 
divorce, inheritance and wills. In the time leading up to the test Abdi Somad complained 
of subtle ethnic favoritism, accusing the Chief Kadhi of giving him a difficult test and 
intending to fail him and eventually appoint his relative. On his own request, Abdi Somad 
was granted six days of study before attempting the examination. After six days, though, 
Abdi Somad was not ready and was allowed two more days of preparation. 
327 Note that the title of this position had changed from that of Shaykb ai-Islam to that of Chief Kadhi and 
the holder then was Shaykh aI-Amin bin Ali Mazrui. For the role of Shaykh ai-Am in in Muslim 
consciousness see, F.H. el-Masri, "Sheikh al-Amin bin Ali el-Mazrui and the Islamic Intellectual Tradition 
in East Africa," Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 8 (2) July (1987): 229-237, R.L. Pouwels, 
"Sh. AI-Amin b. Ali Mazrui and Islamic Modernism in East Africa 1875-1947" International Journal of 











Shaykh al-Amin thought Abdi Somad might feel intimidated if he supervised· the 
examination and thus asked the District Commissioner of Mombasa to do so. Still, Abdi 
Somad could not take the examination within the allocated time. Instead, he requested to 
access books while writing the examination. Shaykh al-Amin did not grant this request 
and objected that "as an examiner, he would not be in a position to ascertain the answers 
furnished by him".328 Meanwhile Abdi Somad accused Shaykh AI-Amin of "bias and 
prejudice" arguing that under such circumstances his chances for a favorable 
consideration were extremely remote.329 
Disagreement between Abdi Somad and Shaykh AI-Amin meant that the first 
examination did not materialize. But the government insisted that Abdi Somad should be 
tested, and asked the Chief Kadhi to prepare another examination, a request that Shaykh 
AI-Amin considered impracticable, as he took great exception to Abdi Somad's 
attitude.33o In an uncharacteristically harsh stand, Shaykh AI-Amin recorded his strongest 
objection and withdrew his participation in the process to find a Kadhi for Nairobi?31 
Infuriated by accusations of bias and prejudice against Abdi Somad, Shaykh AI-Amin 
was not entirely blameless in this matter. It was speculated that Shaykh AI-Amin was in 
favor of the appointment of his kinsman, one Sulayman b. Surur, who had submitted his 
328 Sheikh AI-Amin, the ChiefKadhi to District Commissioner, Mombasa on 1st July 1939 explaining why 
he could not give a favorable recommendation for Abdi Somad. 
329 This information is gleaned from communication between Shaykb AI-Amin b. Ali Mazrii<i who was 
Chief Kadhi, Justice Joseph Sheridan, the Chief Justice and D.C. Morgan, the District Commissioner in 
Mombasa. There is no communication emanating from Abdi Somad on this matter. See KNA/AP/l/892. 
330 D.C. Morgan, District Commissioner, Mombasa to District Commissioner, Nairobi ref. L&O 117 of 15th 
July 1939, in KNAlAPI1/892. 
331 Sheikh AI-Amin expressed these sentiments in a letter to Sir Joseph Sheridan, the Chief Justice on 18th 











application to be considered for Kadhiship.332 In fact, the administration in Nairobi 
accepted the suggestion that Shaykh al-Amin was in fact in favor of this candidate and 
that he therefore made matters difficult for Abdi Somad. On its part, the government 
stopped any possible appointment of Sulayman recognizing his experience but arguing 
that he was more suitable to work at the Coast than in Nairobi. 333 
Shaykh AI-Amin's attitude paradoxically ignited a strong resolve from the government in 
favor of Abdi Somad's appointment. It also indicated a conflict of authority between the 
Chief Kadhi and European officers. As head of the Kadhi courts, Shaykh AI-Amin 
wanted to exercise his authority in deciding who qualified for and assumed posts of 
Kadhiship. On the other hand, some European officers wanted to have the final authority 
to decide which Muslim would be included in the government structures and institutions. 
This conflict also implied that the government used the position of Chief Kadhi as a 
functionary post rather than an independent Muslim leadership position. Of course these 
changes and challenges to the post of Chief Kadhi were evident during the first 
appointment of the Shaykh aI-Islam when he was made answerable to the European 
administration. This policy continued until the 1940's as Shaykh AI-Amin was a 
government employee compelled to conform to orders from his superiors or risk 
disciplinary action. As he had no other choice, Shaykh AI-Amin prepared another 
332 Sulayman b. Surur had been Court clerk and was promoted to acting Kadhi for Takaungu between 
1937/38. Takaungu was the home ofShaykh AI-Amin. 
333 Municipal Native Affairs Officer, Nairobi, in a memo of 28 th December 1939 rejecting a possible 











examination and Abdi Somad was allowed to make reference to books during the 
examination. 
In processing the results of the test Shaykh Al-Amin was adamant that Abdi Somad did 
not qualifY to be appointed Kadhi; he awarded him 100% marks, but declined to award 
him a pass necessary for the government to appoint. The administration insisted that Abdi 
Somad should be appointed as Kadhi for Nairobi, based on the consideration that he had 
worked satisfactorily for over twenty years and gained sufficient experience to be well 
versed in the law.334 
Most of latter part of 1939 was characterized by government's attempts to have Abdi 
Somad appointed by circumventing the authority of the Chief Kadhi, including asking the 
Kadhi of Mombasa, Shaykh Mul;1ammad b. Qasim, another MazriiCi kinsman, to mark the 
papers after convincing him that reference to books was allowable in the examination. 
This attempt did not materialize, either as Shaykh Mul).ammad b. Qasim also awarded 
Abdi Somad 100% marks, but declined to grant him a pass because "the candidate had 
used books and his answers were word for word from the books.,,335 By February 1940 
the decision to award Abdi Somad a pass and appoint him was still being delayed, but J. 
P. MacKean, the District Commissioner for Mombasa, advised his counterparts in 
Nairobi to wait a little longer to enable the government to change the statutes before they 
334 Municipal Native Affairs Officer, Nairobi, in a memo of 28th December 1939 rejecting a possible 
appointment ofSuleiman bin Surur in KNAJAP/J/892. 











could support the appointment of Kadhi in Nairobi.336 However, the administration in 
Nairobi was adamant and impressed upon MacKean to convince 
Shaykh Mul:Iammad b. Qasim to declare that Abdi Somad had been successful in his 
examinations. At the same time, attempts were made to change the statutes to enable his 
appointment as a fully-fledged Kadhi, indicating determination amongst government 
officials in favor of Abdi Somad as Kadhi in Nairobi. 
When the Chief Kadhi and Shaykh Mul:Iammad b. Qasim declined to declare Abdi Somad 
competent, the administration went ahead to appoint Abdi Somad him anyway. The 
District Commissioner of Nairobi, E.G. St. C. Tisdall dismissed the objection raised by 
Shaykh AI-Amin and Shaykh Mul:Iammad as untenable. He successfully influenced J. D. 
MacKean and shortly thereafter, the Chief Justice also discarded the objection against 
Abdi Somad and authorized his appointment. 337 
It is clear from the above that ultimately, instead of basing its appointments of Kadhi's on 
the learned opinions of senior Kadhi, colonial authority preferred the opinion of 
European officers. In the case of Abdi Somad it relied on the fact that he was highly 
recommended by his twenty years of service.338 Upon the wishes of the colonial officers 
and at the expense of the recommendation of senior Muslim officials, Abdi Somad was 
336 Sentiments of Registrar of High Court to Chief Justice on 23rd February 1940 in KNAlAP/1/892. 
337 See C. Tisdall to Chief Justice, ref. L&O 1/40 of 5th March 1940, in KNAlAG/511205. 
338 In 1926, Abdi Somad was recommended for the position ofKadhi or Mudir by Mr. Wendy, in 1933 Mr. 
C. H. Adams then DC, Nairobi had recommended him to Mr. Field Jones, PC, Coast who was later to 
recommend him for appointment as Mudir of Lamu. See C. Tisdall to Chief Secretary and PC, Central 











ready to be appointed as the first 'Kadhi' for Nairobi. In the end this did not materialize, 
as the statutes were not changed, thus leaving him content with the post of pseudo-Kadhi. 
6.10 Conclusions 
In Nairobi, the British did not favor establishing Kadhi courts that would include criminal 
jurisdiction. They defined the territorial applicability of Muslim laws, which was defined 
by the agreements entered into between them and the Sultan in the early twentieth 
century. It can be gleaned from this that the British were also wary of establishing other 
institutions to apply laws that would challenge their authority and create parallel 
structures of power and authority. Evidence has also shown that towards late 1930 and 
early 1940, the period characterized as the beginning of decolonization, individual 
colonial officers were in favor of allowing gradual changes, though still under their 
supervision. This accounts for the contradictory discussion on changes to the Liwali 
Cadis and Mudirs Court Ordinance 1931 to incorporate Kadhis Courts in the interior. 
However a colonial bureaucracy created bottlenecks that lasted a long time and did not 
facilitate spontaneous changes. The general conclusions of this chapter is that Kadhis 
were recognizable Muslim representatives in the colonial power structure, and a sign of 
Muslim influence, despite occasional attempts by European officers to dominate the 
process of making decisions. 
Theoretically this chapter qualifies Mamdani's arguments that forms of control and the 











authority. According to Mamdani, ethnically bound institutions of control were 
emphasized, and ethnicity became a form of colonial control. 339 The discussion nuances 
this conclusion, realizing that ethnicity was not entirely a product of colonial policy. 
Colonial policies indeed racialized power but Muslim societies were also non-
homogenous to an extent that even without colonial authorities emphasizing the 
boundaries of differences, Muslims from different ethnic communities recognized 
ethnically based leaders and competed for ritual leadership on foundations of ethnic 
belonging. 
As a racialized post the pseudo-Kadhi of Nairobi enjoyed mixed blessings in his 
relationship with the colonial authorities. While Muslims identified their leaders as Kadhi 
and expected them to implement Islamic rules, the official Kadhi could not quite meet 
this expectation. They instituted Muslim marriages and interpreted legalistic practices, 
and colonial statutes duly recognized them, but the statutory basis of colonial 
administration recognized more limited roles. They were only authorized to enter entered 
records of marriage rituals or divorce hearings. They thus only instituted marriages by 
recording them in the government register and accomplished the tasks of a "Registrars". 
When they demanded the right to hold court and pass sentences, they could not do so, for 
example, when a husband abdicated his duties and did not maintain his wife and children. 
Pseudo-Kadhis had no legal recourse to implement the rule of law. In such matters, the 
Kadhi of the interior were clearly 'pseudo-Kadhi', viz. Registrars of Muslim marriage 
and divorce. The irony of colonial rule was that, even with such seemingly powerless and 











insignificant interlocutors of Islamic rituals, the state still insisted on exercising its 
authority in their appointment, thereby propelling them to realms of religious social 












7.1 The Kadhiship ofSharifcUmar b. Abd Alliih al-Mahdaly in Mumias 
In his work Islamic Law in Africa, J.N.D. Anderson wrote about Islam and Muslims in 
Nyanza Province in the following terms: 
There is an interesting pocket of Muslims in Mumias trading centre in Nyanza Province. 
The inhabitants of the town are almost aU Muslims (Arabs, Somalis, Nubis and local 
converts); while there are a few Muslims also in the surrounding country. And in addition 
to the usual native tribunal a qti4l has been gazetted-the only qaQl in the Province, or 
indeed, in the whole colony.'34o 
This statement was made in 1955 as recollections from a field survey of the nature and 
position of Islamic laws in Africa. However informative the statement, it suppresses two 
important factors, thus creating a degree of ambiguity. First, it identifies all the racial and 
ethnic identities that comprised the Muslim population of Mumias, but fails to be specific 
on the racial identities of the local converts. Second, it obscures the identity of the 
qar;li even though it creates the impression that the author visited Mumias and probably 
held an interview with the qar;li. In this Chapter, I will reveal the identity of the qar;li as 
one Sharif Umar b. Abd AlUlh al- Mahdaly (d. 1978) and the 'converted' local people as 
the Wanga community who inhabited Mumias as their ancestral land. Thereafter, I will 
discuss the relationship between the qtir;li and the Wanga. To begin the discussion I want 
to state that the phrase "indirect rule" and reference to racialized leadership have already 











been made familiar in previous chapters but their manifestations are emphasized in this 
Chapter with examples from the activities towards appointing a pseudo-Kadhi in 
Mumias. The administrative decisions made by colonial officers have also been cast in 
racial terms as have the subsequent social and political reactions from Muslims. While 
previous chapters argued on the process that institutionalized such leadership, we have 
also nuanced this principle by stating that Muslim societies have not always been 
homogenous and that the existence of multiple ethnic identities has emphasized 
competition. In this chapter, the nuanced behavior of the colonial power's appropriation 
of ethnicity is portrayed with regard to the forceful demands by the Wanga, a partial 
African Muslim aristocracy that existed in western Kenya in early twentieth century. The 
discussion is interfaced by the Wanga's opposition to the appointment of an "Arab 
outsider", Sharif <Umar b. Abd Allah al-Mahdaly to the post of Kadhi in Mumias and 
later in Nyanza against the wishes of the majority Wanga people who favored the 
appointment of someone who was mwenyeji (local person) 
This chapter discusses the racially based tension that emerged as a result of conflicting 
aspirations by Wanga Muslims, but the discussion generally emphasizes the role of 
colonial states' negative impact It is far from certain that the colonial administrative 
experience did in fact eradicate 'pre-colonial' political and social traditions rather than 
working through them. By means of a chronology of events which displayed ethnic 
conflicts and British influences, this chapter situates contradictory concerns amongst 












7.2 Mumias: Its Location and a brief History 
Situated in the western part of Kenya, Elureko, the old name of Mumias, was the village 
commanding the ford over the Nzoia River and inhabited by a Bantu community calling 
themselves the Wanga. Mumias, the town on which this discussion is based, is presently 
located in the Western Province of Kenya though its administrative boundaries have 
changed over the years. It was Kavirondo District in the early 1900's and was part of 
Nyanza Province during the late colonial period 1940-1960's. Mumias used to be the seat 
of power of an African aristocracy, the Wanga kingdom which instituted itself around 
1544-1652, but gained prominence under Nabongo Shiundu Wamukoya who ruled 
during 1841-1882.341 Islam began to spread amongst the Wanga as a consequence of 
trading activities by Arab Swahili Muslims who arrived from the Coast of Kenya and 
Tanzania from 1878. By then the most prominent Muslims included Sudi a Nyamwezi 
from Pangani and Abd AlHili b. I.Iamid who is said to have originated from Mombasa.342 
It was during the reign of Nabongo Mumia (1882-1949) that Islam gained ground as he 
invited Muslim traders into the town and allowed them unlimited access to his kingdom. 
Thus, in the period that followed the arrival of the Swahili, Mumias and its inhabitants 
341 G.S. Were, History of the Abaluyia of Western Kenya ca. 1500-1930. (Nairobi, East African Publishing 
House, 1967): 116-1] 7. 
342 A chronology of rulers of the Wanga Kingdom can be found in Simon S. S. Kenyanchui, Nabongo 
Mumia (Heinemann Kenya, 1992) : 17. J. Osogo, A History of the Abaluyia (Nairobi: Oxford University 











experienced many changes, including the spread of Islam.343 From that time onwards it 
has been argued that some rulers titled, Nabongo and their families, practiced Islam. In 
fact Nabongo Mumia is said to have taken the name Mul;1ammad.344 In the 1870's 
Mumias was a resting place for caravans from the Coast heading towards Uganda. From 
1894 onwards it developed as a British administrative town from which the entire Nyanza 
region was administered. Once the British had established the administrative station, the 
changes that the inhabitants experienced were further enhanced. Life in Mumias was 
negotiated between the interests and requirements of British officers, the religious 
concerns of the Arab and Swahili Muslims, and demands for a sense of belonging and 
leadership by the indigenous Wanga people. Revealed in various social interactions and 
concerns, this interplay is discussed in relation to the establishment and demands for 
official Muslim posts ofKadhiship. 
7.3 Early 'Kadhiship' amongst the Wanga 
Tensions associated with Kadhiship in Mumias followed a similar pattern to those in 
Nairobi where local Muslims instituted marriage rituals and were titled 'Kadhi' 
irrespective of the colonial requirements. Likewise the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce 
and Succession Ordinance 1906 was also applicable in Mumias, thence entailing a 
curtailing of titles, stipUlating functions and geographical areas of jurisdiction. More 
343 For a history of the spread ofIslam amongst the Wanga see M.A. Abdalla "Some Aspects of Coastal 
and Islamic Influences in Mumias from the late 19th century to early 20th Century" BA Dissertation, 
(University of Nairobi, 1971). 











importantly, though, it emphasized and institutionalized the power and authority of 
hitherto locally based interlocutors of power. 
As in Nairobi, Mumias required the attention of CulamtP with expert knowledge on how 
to conduct personal matters. When they existed and performed their roles, they were 
acknowledged accordingly and titled Kadhi. But the colonial government's obsession 
with the institutionalization of social life through the application of Ordinances, led to a 
concerted effort to control the social behavior of communities, especially how they 
conducted marriage rituals. Through selective application of the Mohammedan Marriage, 
Divorce and Succession Ordinance 1906 colonial authorities acquired control over how 
Kadhis were appointed, recognized and accorded authority. In the process, they continued 
displayed a policy of racial favoritism and Arabization of appointments. 
7.4 Sharif Omar and the Colonial State in Nyanza 
In 1912 the government attempt to institutionalize the Muslim conduct of marriage affairs 
in Mumias through applying the rule of the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and 
Succession Ordinance of 1906, leading to an official recognition of one Hadrami Arab, 
Sharif <Umar b. Abd Allah al-Mahdaly as Registrar for North Kavirondo District.345 
Though Sharif 'Umar was the first person recognized by the government, it is also said 











elsewhere that his brother Sharif Ha~an b. Abd Allah al-Mahdaly had been Kadhi in 
Mumias earlier. 346 
Oral recollections indicate that Sharif<Vmar's family including his elder brother, 
Sharif Ha~an, traded in hides and skins and later took residence in Mumias?47 When 
appointed Registrar in 1912, Sharif <Vmar was the recognized Kadhi. He had been also 
involved in Islamic da 'wa (proselytization) and teaching amongst the Wanga from early 
1902. From 1912 he served as registrar without any recognizable conflicts in the 
community. But in the early 1930's, a wave of demands by Muslims to have a fully 
fledged Muslim Court changed his fortunes and put him at the centre of arguments over 
power, authority and influence. In a nutshell Muslims demanded from the government a 
fully instituted Kadhi's Court to challenge the rising concerns over the power of the 
Native TribunaL Demand for the appointment of a fully-fledged Kadhi and Kadhi's 
Courts gained momentum as Sharif <Vmar threatened to resign as Registrar. Like the 
Chief Kadhi, Shaykh Mul;tammad b. Vmar Bakore who in early 1923 accused the 
government of ignoring his services during the First World War, Sharif<Vmar was 
equally demoralized when he was excluded from a list of recipients for government 
awards for services rendered during the War. He recalled having served as askari and 
Kadhi, describing his duties as a "... soldier arresting people and taking them to the 
station. ,,348 
346 M.A. Abdulla, "Some Aspects of Coastal and Islamic Influences in Mumias from the late 19th Century 
to early 20th Century" BA Dissertation (University of Nairobi 1971): 36. 











Sharif<Umar's accusations were alarming but true, as he had indeed served in different 
capacities from 1912 when he was appointed Registrar. It was not until 1926 that he was 
gazetted as unsalaried Registrar. 349 Ultimately the government agreed to compensate him 
ex-gratia for his services to them. 350 In 1937, Sharif<Umar was paid a gratuity in 
recognition of his loyal services, having served about five thousand Mohammedans in 
North Kavirondo. But he was still denied a war medal. 35 1 
7.5 From the Wanga's demands to Nyanzo's demands 
Sharif <Umar' s indications that he would resign ignited racial tensions between him, the 
Wanga, some Arab-Swahili communities and officials of the colonial state. Mumias was 
the ancestral home of the Islamicised Wanga community who formed the majority of the 
Muslim population and wanted to dominate its leadership. As an African aristocracy, the 
Wanga recognized paramount chiefs who envied and sometimes resented the position of 
Kadhi held by Sharif 'Umar. When Sharif <Umar indicated his intention to resign from 
Kadhiship, the Wanga demanded the appointment of a member of their group in the post. 
348 Sharif'Umar to District Commissioner North Kavirondo on 4th January 1937 in KNAlPCINZAl3/18129. 
349 Government Notice no. 751 of 19th November 1929. 
350 Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza to District Commissioner, North Kavirondo Ref. no. MDS 2/3/3 of 
12th January 1937 in KNAlPCINZAl3118/29. 












In 1937 the Wanga consolidated their demand to have their kinsman appointed Kadhi by 
forming the Baraza la Waislamu wa North Kavirondo (Muslim Council of North 
Kavirondo). At one such meetings a resolution was passed recognizing one Mzee 
Athuman bin Seif as their choice of Kadhi. They defined his role as ktifundisha dini ya 
Kiislamu, na kuwaoza wake wetu (to teach the religion of Islam and institute our marriage 
rituals).352 Through this pronouncement the Wanga indicated their unwillingness to have 
non-Wanga people hold such an important position. 
Three months later during October 1937 the Wanga further asserted their regionally 
based opposition to Sharif Omar in a stronger resolution that emphasized their choice of 
Mzee Athuman bin Seif as follows: 
" ... huyu Mzee Athuman bin Self ni mwalimu wa dini ya Islamu, wenyeji wa inchi wamekubali 
qfundishe dini ya Islamu katika inchi yetu ya North Kavirondo, yaani Kisumu, Nakuru, Nairobi na 
Kisii, kutembea pasipo watu kumdharau, na mtu atakae mdharau ataweza kupata adhabu mbele 
ya serikali ... ,,353 
Mzee Athuman bin Self is a teacher of the religion of Islam; the residents have accepted him to 
teach the religion of Islam in the whole of North Kavirondo to include Kisumu, Nakuru, Nairobi 
and Kisti. He should visit these places and anyone who shows disdain shall be liable for 
punishment. 
The above meant that, as the Wanga people, they recognized Mzee Athuman b. Seif as a 
teacher of Islam, and that the residents of North Kavirondo were in agreement that he 
conduct marriages amongst them. To emphasize the seriousness of Mzee Athuman b. 
Seif's authority, they further indicated that his power and authority should apply to any 
352 This resolution was passed and signed by nineteen Muslim representatives of the Wanga chiefs of 
Mumias in North Kavirondo on 21 st May 1937. 
353 This further resolution was signed by representatives of various chiefdoms of the Wanga in the 











Wanga resident of North Kavirondo including those residing in Kisumu, Nakuru, 
Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisii. The memorandum further acknowledged Mzee Athuman's 
freedom to conduct daCwa without being scorned, as council warned of dire 
consequences. These regional, ethnic and sectionally based authoritative sentiments were 
strongly supported by Mzee Athuman b. Seif in a personal initiative as well. Demanded 
access to the registers of marriage to enable him to undertake the responsibilities that his 
community wished him to perform. 
The 1937 memorandum of the Wanga did not give access to Mzee Athuman bin Seifto 
the Register, nor recognition from the government. However, in 1941 K.L. Hunter, the 
District Commissioner in North Kavirondo, noted that the Islamic Wanga community 
around Mumias was anxious to have a Kadhi of their tribe appointed?54 Against earlier 
concerns from other colonial officers, Hunter supported the idea and advised that the 
request be granted.355 This did not materialize however, because the idea was opposed by 
most other colonial officers. 
Despite Hunter's support, on the Wanga realized that it was not easy for the government 
to agree to their ethnic and racially based demands. But this did not mean that the 
colonial government did not consider race or ethnicity for posts in the community. 
Instead, it only confirmed that the Wanga were the wrong race and ethnic group to 
demand the appointment. The government officially objected to the demands by the 
354 K. L. Hunter, District Commissioner, North Kavirondo to Provincial Commissioner, Coast. Ref. no. 












Wanga to create the assumption that it did not consider ethno-racial representation in the 
appointments of 'Kadhi'. This perceived assumption enabled Hodge, the Provincial 
Commissioner at the Coast to issue a simple rejection claiming that Sharif cUmar was 
already appointed as Registrar at Mumias and that there was no reason for an additional 
appointment.356 The Wanga were demanding the replacement of Sharif CUmar who was 
an Arab with Mzee Athuman b. Seif who was a Wanga. Certainly the government wanted 
to be silent on the ethnicity that was the basis of the contestation. In fact, when 
responding to Mzee Athuman' s personal claim, the government argued that a decision 
had already been made not to appoint another Registrar of Muslim Marriages.357 
The intensity of racial and ethnic conflicts was enhanced when Sharif 'Umar abandoned 
his initial intentions to resign and became embroiled in the ensuing intrigue which 
elevated ethno-racial factors and considerations as the central factors in the choice of the 
"Kadhi". This process revealed both the governments and the community's emphasis on 
racial favors and concerns, with the government inclined towards favoring the Arab, 
while the Wanga clung to notions that a Wanga Kadhi was ideal for Mumias and Nyanza. 
As a matter of policy, it will become clear, the government supported the Arabs against 
the Wanga. 
In mid-1941, SharifcUmar's role in the ethno-racial conflicts and intrigue included 
organizing non-Wanga Muslim residents of Mumias and adjacent areas to garner support 
356 Hodge, Provincial Commissioner, Coast to K. L Hunter, District Commissioner, North Kavirondo, ref. 












for his candidature. Most importantly he took the opportunity to petition the government, 
demanding the elevation of his status from the Registrar to fully-fledged Kadhi. Before 
the Wanga issue was resolved to the satisfaction of the indigenous people, Sharif 'Umar 
expressed a more formidable concern, that of establishing a fully fledged Kadhis Courts 
in Nyanza. He only included the non-Wanga communities of Nyanza to support his 
candidature and pressurized the government to appoint him Kadhi, further enhancing 
racial concerns and widening the scope of the communities included in the conflicts. 
In June 1941 two petitions by a cross-section of Muslims from Nyanza were sent to the 
government expressing support for Sharif'Umar's demand for elevation to fully-fledged 
Kadhi for Nyanza Province. They stated unequivocally that Nyanza province did not 
have a Kadhi and that they would be grateful if Sharif 'Umar were appointed for all 
Districts of Nyanza and allowed to exercise his power in matters of Islam, with or 
without disputes.358 
The government's response to the demands by the general Muslim public in Nyanza, and 
the Muslim conduct in the process reveals a visible racial conflict. Race was the prism 
through which government policy on the appointment of Muslim officials in the interior 
of Kenya became practical and applicable. R.L. Hunter, the District Commissioner of 
Mombasa certainly was aware that the jurisdiction of such officials was specifically 
confined to districts of the Coast. Unlike D.L. Hunter, the District Commissioner of 
North Kavirondo, who supported the demands for a Wanga "Kadhi", he requested for 
358 Two groups of Muslims petitioned the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza on 23rd June 1941. One was by 
a group comprised of ninety-seven Muslims and another had the names of forty-one Muslim people. 
However all these petition bore the signature of Sharif Omar alone as a representative of the communities 











reasons and justifications for the residents' demands for a Kadhi. In spite of the statutory 
obstacles, disagreements amongst colonial officers persisted. K.L. Hunter was 
sympathetic and viewed the demands by Muslims as an attempt to institute a religious 
leadership. He did not concur with the statutory limitations that others referred to. He 
understood the functions of a Kadhi to include, amongst others, the interpretation of 
Muslim religious laws. Accordingly, a Kadhi would have roles to play in any district 
where Muslims lived. 
However, yet another official, the Acting Provincial Commissioner of Nyanza was not in 
favor of the appointment of a Kadhi in Nyanza. He cited financial concerns, cautioning 
that such an appointment would require added expenditure by the government. But this 
objection seemed another ruse, as Sharif (Dmar was appointed Registrar of Muslim 
marriage without necessarily committing the government financially. K.L. Hunter was 
even making suggestion to change the law because the "Muslim community was 
vigorously growing and Muslims had constructed a permanent mosque and a school 
which justified demands for the appointment of a Kadhi. It was becoming increasingly 
difficult to carry on with a Registrar only.359 
Differences between government officers delayed decision to the demands by Muslims 
but it was also suggested that the Muslim population of Nyanza was influential, law-













government to allow such a community to be held back in its development by obsolete 
laws.361 Despite such positive acclimations, in the period 1906-1945 Nyanza did not have 
a Kadhi on account of the existing statutes. 
7.6 'The Kadhi comes to town' ca. 1945 
From 1910 the Muslim community of Nyanza demanded the appointment of a Kadhi in 
their region, beginning with the demands by the Wanga. Conflicting and contradictory 
sentiments and opinions of colonial officials however delayed responses to and 
implementation of the demands. In early 1945 changes in the attitudes of colonial officers 
were noticed. This period is in fact the beginning of attempts by colonial rulers to include 
a colonized community in the general affairs of the state.362 Largely identified as the 
beginning of a gradual process of decolonization in Africa, changes were visible in the 
attitudes of colonial officers towards Muslim communities of the interior of Kenya. In 
July 1945 F.D. Hislop, the District Commissioner for Kakamega asked for advice from 
the Chief Kadhi in Mombasa on the suitability of appointing a Kadhi for Nyanza and 
inquired as to what changes needed to be initiated in the statutes to accommodate such an 
appointment. 363 
361 Ibid. 
362 John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945. (New York: Palgrave, 2001): 1-12. 
363 F. D. Hislop, District Commissioner, Kakamega to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza. Ref. No. MDS 











F.D. Hislop's queries were responded to by the new Liwali, Mbarak Ali Hinawy, and by 
Shaykh AI-Amin b. Ail, the Chief Kadhi. They were in favor of the appointment and 
suggested that a proviso be incorporated in sections of the Liwali Cadis and Mudirs 
Courts Ordinance 1931, to cover the authority of the Kadhi in a district outside the Coast. 
Mbarak Ali Hinawy emphasized the desirability of establishing a Kadhiship for Nyanza, 
but cautioned that times had changed and that Muslims should not just demand the 
appointment of a Kadhi, but that, more importantly it was necessary that the appointee 
espouse a depth of knowledge of civil and criminal procedure codes.364 Another 
important issue was that the appointees should also be able to adapt to government 
machinery in addition to being knowledgeable on Islamic laws365 Muslim officials gave a 
positive recommendation, but the decision to implement government policy did not 
depend entirely on their sentiments. British colonial officers exercised an overwhelming 
influence on decisions, suggestions and recommendations that could be implemented. In 
view of their concerns about losing authority to the Muslim courts the suggestion to 
establish a Kadhis Court in Nyanza did not augur well with other administrators. 
Principally, colonial officers argued that it was not necessary to establish a specific sub-
ordinate Court in Nyanza to administer the penal code.366 For example the Acting 
364 Mbarak: Ali Hinawy was warning Muslims on the demands and expectation of the colonial government 
on the roles and procedures ofthe Kadhi and their Courts. This warning was made in response to an already 
difficult position that most Kadhi faced in the Coast due to their inability to conform to Court Procedures. 
365 Mbarak: Ali Hinawy, LiwaIi for Coast, to Provincial Commissioner, Coast on 9th August 1945 in 
KNAlCA/20/31. 
366 Acting Provincial Commissioner, Coast to District Commissioner, Mombasa. Ref. ST. 4/3 of 9th August 











Provincial Commissioner at the Coast was not in favor of the establishment of Kadhi 
Court in Nyanza and categorically instructed that; 
Irrespective of the religious affiliation of some communities in Nyanza, they were mainly natives 
of Africa, and as such did not have special claim to be tried other than by ordinary Subordinate 
Courts ofthe colony. 367 
Such opinions were in total disregard of the religious concerns of the Muslim 
communities who demanded the appointment of a Kadhi but more concerned with the 
government's position of having its rules observed. 
Irrespective of the negative sentiments expressed by some officers, the winds of change 
in colonial policy were beginning to blow. The opinions of a few officers could not 
prevent the general changes in colonial practice. Clearly, colonized communities had to 
be incorporated into the hierarchies of power. In this case the demands by Muslims for 
the establishment of a Kadhis Court were appropriate. By August 1945, further 
consultations had been concluded out and a decision to find a suitable candidate to be 
appointed as Kadhi for Nyanza was made.368 
Priority for appointment was given to the serving Registrar, Sharif <Vmar. The Chief 
Kadhi, who knew him personally, attested to Sharif<Vmar's popUlarity as a respected 
leader in Mumias and acknowledged the fact that he was proposed as the most likely 
candidate for the post. However, the Chief Kadhi was not in a position to authenticate 
367 Ibid. 
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Sharif<Vmar's knowledge and competency for the task?69 In August 1945, there was a 
unanimous agreement that a Kadhi would have to be appointed and that the prospective 
candidate, Sharif <Vmar, was eminently suitable because he was well known and had 
considerable prestige in the area.370 With exact information on his qualification not 
available, his service as a Registrar strongly supported the assumption that he was a man 
of standing and considerable heshima (respect) in the community. In fact, the heshima 
was a far greater asset in Kadhiship than merely being a learnedfaqih Gurist).371 Once it 
was agreed that Nyanza did in fact require the services of a Kadhi, the process of 
appointing one depended entirely on the matter being debated in the Legislative Council. 
7.7 Debating the Kadhis Court and the Native Tribunal: 
Muslims and Others in the Legislative Council debates 
One of the most characteristic features of colonial rule as understood by the proponents 
of indirect rule, was the existence of a system of Native Tribunals which formed an 
integral part of the colonial administrative machinery. It is in Native Tribunals that 
elders, Chiefs and traditional rulers practiced an effective authority during the inter-War 
period. To colonial administrators of the inter-War period, with their enthusiasm for 
indigenous institutions as vehicles for indirect administration, Native Tribunals had a 
particular appeal. Here there existed a traditional institution which vitally affected the 
lives of the whole African population, for it was in these Tribunals that the vast bulk of 
369 Ibid. 
370 District Commissioner, Mombasa to Provincial Commissioner, Coast on 9th August 1945 in 
KNNCAI20/31. 
371 V. M Mckeag, Acting Provincial Commissioner, Coast to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza ref. No. 











native litigation was disposed of, mainly under customary laws. Such institutions, felt 
colonial officers, must clearly be preserved, and in this context demands for 
establishment of a Muslim Court in areas where Native Tribunals existed, was an 
arbitrary dualism of instituted structures of authority. While being discussed V.M 
Mckeag and Arch Deacon L.J. Beecher contributed to the debate with these concerns in 
mind. 
In 1945, the demands for the establishment of a Kadhi's Courts were hampered by a 
competing demand to enhance the authority of Native Tribunals at Mumias. At the same 
time was exercised as Muslim Courts at the Coast were experiencing difficulties 
associated with inadequate staff, general laxity in record-keeping and incompetence of its 
officials. These two facts influenced the decision to appoint a fully-fledged Kadhi as well 
as to establish a Court for the appointee. Irrespective of sentimental agreements between 
officials, instituting Kadhi's Courts necessarily had to conform to colonial court 
structures. As its perceived role was the institutionalization of Islamic codes, a racially 
defined court hierarchy confined the jurisdiction of Kadhi's Courts to Arab people. In the 
minds of colonial officers, a Muslim was synonymous to an Arab, hence Muslim law was 
rightfully applicable to Arabs who also had to be appointed at its helm. Confronted by the 
Wanga demands some colonial officers were perplexed as to why a native African 
community would wish to fall under the jurisdiction of a court system meant for Arabs. 
One of these was V.M. McKeag, quoted earlier, who was perplexed about how a 











CourtS.372 Some thought the Wanga Muslims did not hold a justifiable claim, but I 
assume they were mainly concerned about the existence of parallel legal structures within 
the same population of colonized communities. Another reason to demand Kadhi's 
Courts in Mumias, was because Muslims in Nyanza had to travel all the way to the Coast 
to be attended to by properly constituted Kadhi's Courts or alternatively Kadhis from the 
Coast had to travel to Nyanza to arbitrate on matters. To ease this practical difficulty it 
was seen as desirable to appoint a Kadhi. Another important reason was that the 
appointee was expected to inculcate and uphold high moral standards in the 
community. 3 73 
Representing the government in the debate, V.M. McKeag sought a delay in the decision 
to await the final decision on how to improve the functions of Kadhi' s Courts at the 
Coast. Mbarak Ali Hinawy wanted the Courts to be established for Muslims every where 
in Kenya, irrespective of their geographical location, while L. J Beecher, representing 
native interests, was concerned and opposed to such a proposal it would hinder and 
interfere with the functions of an already existing Native Tribunal. Consistent in his 
opposition, Beecher received assurances from the government that, once established the 
Kadhi Courts would not interfere with the operation of the Native Tribunals. In the 
follow-up process these assurances were however an obstacle, as the thought of 
appointing a Kadhi became undesirable and Beecher's concerns came closely to derailing 
the progress made so far towards instituting Kadhiship and Muslim Courts in Nyanza. 
372 See quote and footnote no. 365 above. 












In December 1946, a compromise was sought to allay Beecher's apprehensions and to 
please Muslim sensibilities. Sharif (Umar was financially enticed with a lower 
appointment in lieu of a substantive fully-fledged Kadhiship. If accepted, Sharif(Umar 
would not be allowed to have criminal jurisdiction over Muslims who could however 
seek recourse in the Native Tribunal at Mumias, on which Sharif (Umar would sit as an 
assessor.374 
Ultimately it was accepted that Sharif (Umar was a Registrar and not Kadhi, and would 
sit on the Tribunal as an assessor as opposed to a judge. This action weakened his 
influence on the conduct of matters in the Tribunal. The proposal was not accepted by 
Muslims either. They would have preferred a bench of Muslim jurists under the auspices 
of a Kadhi Court. Because members of the tribunal were tribal elders who did not 
understand Islamic rules, inevitably a general feeling of distrust developed towards the 
abilities and capabilities of the Tribunal to properly arbitrate on Islamic disputes. 
Muslims felt disappointed and accused the elders at the tribunal of being inefficient, un-
procedural and ignorant. 
On the basis that Mumias was predominantly Muslim, its residents wanted the Tribunal 
to be reconstituted to reflect the Muslim character of the town; like having the Tribunal 
deliberate on the basis of Islamic tenets and laws invariably turned the Tribunal to into a 
374 K.L Hunter, Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza to District Commissioner, North Kavirondo ref. No. 











quasi Kadhi Court. The government became wary of this suggestion, considering the 
guarantees previously made to Beecher.375 Nevertheless, the bottom line was that native 
customary law and Islamic codes were in conflict and that neither the Kadhi's Court nor 
the Native Tribunal would countenance. Consequently, to better serve Muslims the 
establishment of a Kadhi's Court was the most obvious and best solution if only 
government's legal officers would concur.376 
During May 1947, H.E. Stacey, the judicial advisor in the Attorney General's Office 
categorically indicated that the government favored separate jurisdiction between the 
Kadhi's Courts and the Native Tribunal. Avoiding action that could be ultra-vires when 
the Tribunal was reconstituted into a Kadhi's Court, Stacey thought the suggestion was 
sinister and explicitly argued against it in that, "attempts to establish a court with powers 
to treat as criminal offences, offences against Mohammedan religion should be regarded 
with gravest suspicion".377 Stacey's jargon aside he clearly espoused the government's 
unwillingness to allow Muslim officials' viz. the pseudo-Kadhi to institute Islamic 
criminal jurisdiction and practice. 
375 District Commissioner, Kavirondo to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, ref. MDS 1/3 of 24th April 
1947 in KNAJPCINZAl3!J 8/29. 
376 Acting Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza to District Commissioner, North Kavirondo. ref. L&O 
11113/1/169 of 1st May 1947 in KNAlPCINZAl3/18/29. 
377 H.E. Stacey, Judicial Advisor, to G.R. A Davies, Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza. Ref. No. LILAl12 











In the final analysis, attempts' to establish Kadhi's Courts with both criminal and civil 
jurisdiction, were indirectly thwarted as Stacey continued to argue in explicitly opposing 
terms that, 
No matter how useful the body of men who acted as assessors in Mohammedan disputes, the 
Tribunal had no powers in cases involving Mohammedan civil laws and neither could it legally 
impose sentence for offences against Mohammedan religion'. 378 
Instead, and as was expected of the government's position, Kadhis appointed in the 
interior would have to be pseudo-Kadhi holding a watered-down authority and 
jurisdiction confined to personal matters of marriage, divorce and succession. When 
appointed, the Kadhi for Nyanza had to conform with these rules, as Beecher was further 
assured of minimized conflict of laws where a Kadhi was appointed. 379 Satisfied, 
Beecher consented and affirmed to the effect that establishing a Kadhi Court in Nyanza 
would not breach any prior undertakings given.38o 
7.8 A final Wanga racial onslaught 
In October 1947, demands to have a Kadhi appointed at Murnias were finally accepted 
and approval to appoint Sharif'Vmar was given. Sentiments espousing the racialization 
and Arabization of Kadhiship continued to manifest as l.W.P. Forster Sutton insisted that 
Sharif'Vmar was only liable for appointment "on the assumption of limited doubt 
37& Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza to District Commissioner, North Kavirondo ref. No 11113111173 of 
21" July 1947 in KNAlPCINZA/3118/29. 
379 District Commissioner, North Kavirondo to Acting Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza ref. MDS 1/3/77 
of 24th July 1947 in KNAlPC/3118/29. 
380 J.W. P. Forster-Sutton, Member for Law and Order, to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, on 91h 











regarding his race as an Arab".381 Invariably the Wanga embarked on another racially 
based opposition to express their dissatisfaction with the government's favoritism 
towards Arabs and their disenfranchisement. Taking their cue from Mzee Athuman b. 
Seif in the 1940's, more specifically in October 1947, Maalim Athuman Wangara 
spearheaded the next campaign to have a Wanga person appointed Kadhi with an explicit 
racial condemnation accusing the government of colluding with Arabs from the Coast to 
"deny the people of Kavirondo their legitimate right to choose who was going to institute 
marriage amongst them. ,,382 In April 1948, Maalim Wangara's efforts were 
complemented by those of Abd Alliih b. 'Dmar who viewed the appointment of 
Sharif 'Dmar as an encroachment of traditional community leadership by a foreigner, an 
aspect that they had objected to during the reign of their paramount Chief Mumia. 
Accusing the government of colluding with outsiders to deny the Wanga their rightful 
leadership post, Abd Alliih b. 'Dmar reminded them of the past when the government 
declined to hand over the registries of marriage and divorce to Mzee Athuman b. Seif. 
Perplexed by this denial, he was also confused about the titles of the post when he 
wondered "how is it that an outsider has been made the Chief Kadhi while the local Mzee 
Seif deserved the appointment because he was quit fit, while Sharif'Dmar was a 
foreigner.,,383 In actual sense there was no ChiefKadhi in Nyanza rather a pseudo-Kadhi 
appointment of Sharif 'Dmar. 
381 Director of Establishment to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza ref. no S/E 19/2/3884/6 of 7th January 
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AbdAllah b. 'Dmar blamed the Wanga who previously allowed Sharif'Dmar to work 
amongst them; he was certain that they accepted him as a teacher but not as a Kadhi. 
Recommending the passing over of religious authority in a similar fashion as traditional 
chieftaincy, he supported Mzee Athuman b. Seif to be made the Kadhi, because he 
thought he was the "right person".384 Abd Allah b. 'Dmar raised pertinent issues of 
religious leadership in a multi-ethnic and multi-racial Muslim community. However, in 
total disregard to the issues raised by Abd Allah b. 'Dmar on behalf of the Wanga, the 
government disagreed with him, arguing that Sharif'Dmar had the support of a great 
majority of Muslims in the district.385 On the basis of the District Commissioner's 
support, the Chief Native Commissioner not only responded to Abd Allah b. <Umar's and 
the Wanga community's concern in the negative, but the District Commissioner also 
indulged in unnecessary deception. Contrary to the common practice he insisted that the 
appointment of Kadhi was the responsibility of the government and that the government 
did not intend to consider the race of a person appointed to such an office, but only on 
their suitability.386 
The Wanga resented Sharif 'Dmar' s dominance of the post of Kadhiship because he was 
an Arab and an 'outsider,' and yet his appointment was a precedent that other Muslim 
384 Ibid. 
385 District Commissioner, Kavirondo, to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanz,a in ref.: no. MDS. 1/3/88 of lOth 
March 1948 in KNAIPC/NZA/3118129. 
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communities around Mumias used to demand sil'Il-ilar appointments. In 1948, Muslims in 
Kisumu thought the Registrar Shaykh Abd Allah was too old to carry on his duties with 
vigor and suggested that a Kadhi be appointed; ironically they recommended another 
Arab, one Shaykh A1:Jmad b. 'Vmar aI-Kindy. Likewise, the residents of Nubian village in 
Kisii petitioned the District Commissioner, demanding the appointment of a Kadhi to 
serve them, as they had doubts about the knowledge and understanding of the QtWan and 
the process of marriage and divorce by Shaykh Sulayman b. Abd Allah, the incumbent 
Registrar.387 Most likely the difference between the Nubi community and the Kadhi 
occurred because the Nubi follow the Malik school of thought while 
Shaykh Sulayman, an Hadrami Arab of the Shafi'i sect. Nevertheless, the government 
concurred with this demand to the effect that the knowledge of the registrar was 
questioned and Shaykh Sulayman b. Abd Allah had failed to retain the confidence of his 
people. It recommended his replacement but was silent on the appointment of a fully-
fledged Kadhi. 388 
7.9 The Kadhi and the Colonial State 
While other Muslim communities within Nyanza used the appointment of Sharif'Vmar 
to demand similar appointments in their own locations, the government was already 
387 Sulayman b. Abd Alliih had been the Registrar since 1935. See Government Notice No. 783 Official 
Gazette 1935 in page 1186 but in 1948 sixteen residents of the Nubian Village in Kisii petitioned the 
District Commissioner, North Kavirondo demanding his removal. See KNA!PCINZN31l8/29. 
388 Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, to District Commissioner, North Kavirondo ref. no. MDS 2/4/2/97 of 











questioning his performance barely a year after his appointment. As a Kadhi, 
Sharif (Vmar was charged with responsibilities equivalent with those of a second-class 
magistrate but sub-ordinate to European Magistrates who had powers to oversee 
operations his operations by way of inspections. In December 1948, a routIne inspection 
by C. Campbell, the District Officer indicated that Sharif'Vmar did not follow the 
procedures laid down by law in his duties, leading Campbell to recommend his 
temporary suspension and thereby ushering conflicts between Sharif (Vmar and other 
administrators. 389 
In February 1949 Sharif (Vmar's post in the judiciary was queried again, this time over 
the inadequate volume of work which allegedly could not justify its existence. On the 
other hand, Muslims thought the queries were excuses by the government to justify 
limiting the operations of Islamic Laws, especially when Sharif(Vmar was ordered to 
stop exercising jurisdiction on offences committed against sharj(ah.390 Like Shaykb 
Abud, his counterpart in Nairobi, Sharif (V mar was also accused of fmandal impropriety 
and eventually C. Campbell concluded that "the Kadhi's court as constituted was a 
failure, and because of the low volume of work performed, the Court should be 
abolished".391 It is recalled that this decision was harsh, its implementation hasty and 
taken without the government considering the prolonged agitations that had led to the 
389 C. Campbell, District Commissioner, North Kavirondo, to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza. Ref. no. 
MDS 113 of 28th December 1948 in KNAIPCINZAJ3118/29. 
390 Provincial Native Courts Officer, Nyanza, to District Commissioner, North Kavirondo, ref. No MDS 
2/4/21103 of 16th February 1949 in KNAIPC/3/18/29. 
391 C. Campbell, District Commissioner, North Nyanza to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza ref. No. MDS 











establishment of the Court?92 Perhaps the Kadhi should have been given an opportunity 
to confonn to strict bureaucratic standards, or another Kadhi, possibly with higher 
qualifications than Sharif <Vmar engaged to manage the Courts, otherwise C. Campbell's 
suggestion to abolish the courts was not viewed with sympathy by Muslims.393 
There were similarities between Nairobi and Nyanza, as the saga of Sharif <Vmar 
involved personality clashes between European colonial officials and their Muslim 
counterparts. For example, P.H. Brown's criticism of the conduct of Sharif <Umar was 
countered by the Provincial Commissioner who thought Sharif <Vmar was competent in 
matters of Muslim personal law. P .H. Brown did not observe the counsel insisting on his 
conviction that Sharif <Vmar did not espouse sufficient knowledge for the onerous duty 
of a Kadhi. Not convinced of the possibility for improvement, P.H. Brown harshly 
recommended pennanent closure of the Kadhi's Court due to unsatisfactory services.394 
Irrespective of P .H. Brown's uncompromising stance, the reasons for Sharif (Vmar' s 
troubles as outlined by the District Commissioner included prevalent ethno-racial 
differences involving the Wanga, some Somali and other vocal Arab-Swahili 
communities who declined to recognize Sharif <Vmar's authority. Occasionally these 
Muslim ethno-racial groups conspicuously failed to work together, and disrupted the 
peaceful management of Muslim affairs, thus affecting the volume of cases brought 
392 Mzee Manyara, Personal interview. Mumias, 12th September, 200 I. 
393 Ibid. 
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before the Kadhi.395 Similar to the inquiry held in Nairobi, the government wished to 
invite capable Muslim Officers from the Coast to visit Nyanza, report on the ability of the 
Kadhi and make other observations with a view to improving the efficiency of the Courts. 
396 
The Kadhi, Sharif 'Umar, had a different opinion of his troubles, espousing the view that 
P. H. Brown's recommendations, orchestration and campaign for closure of the Kadhi's 
Court were a personal vendetta. Resulting from P.H. Brown's visit to Sharif'Umar's 
residence outside nonnal office decorum, the Kadhi lodged a complaint, accusing Brown 
of disrespecting his post and duties. In fact this visit gave rise to an exchange of 
unpleasantness as Sharif'Umar complained of Brown's neglect of his heshima, (respect) 
by going to his house during a time when he [Sharif<Umar] was off duty, where P. H. 
Brown shouted and used unsuitable language to Sharif 'Umar [in the presence] of his 
family. 397 
In early 1950, Muslims were concerned that the government might implement Brown's 
recommendation, but nevertheless countered with a demand that the Kadhi should in fact 
be allowed to cover a wider area ofNyanza Province instead of confining his jurisdiction 
to Mumias alone. Under the auspices of the Nyanza Muslim Social Service League 
395 District Commissioner, North Kavirondo to Provincial Native Courts Officer, Nyanza in Conf. Ref. no. 
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(NMSSL) they elaborated on the qualities and knowledge of the Kadhi preferring a 
"scholarly person", one versed in Muslim law. The NMSSL wanted the Kadhi to be 
appointed from amongst all Muslim communities including Arab, Swahili, African 
Muslim and the Somali instead, of giving preference to Arabs. While the NMSSL made 
these recommendations, they also acknowledged that competent individuals were 
difficult to find and suggested that the appointment be held in abeyance to give Muslims 
the opportunity to request the Chief Kadhi, a reason they referred to as the Muslim 'high 
priest' to recommend a suitable candidate for appointment.398 
In January 1950 efforts by the NMSSL were complemented by the Swahili Muslim 
Association (SMA), who defended SharifcUmar by arguing thatfitina was responsible 
for attempts to dismiss him. Aligning themselves to ethno-racial sentiments, the SMA 
argued against the removal of SharifcUmar, describing such action as being 
kudharauliwa taifa la Kiswahili, (demeaning of the Swahili people).399 Muslims thus 
concurred on the relevance of Kadhiship in Nyanza but disagreed on the actual 
appointment. Government's wishes to abolish Kadhiship were rescinded to avoid a joint 
Muslim backlash against the government.400 Instead Sharif'Umar was transferred from 
Mumias to the District headquarters in Kisumu. 
398 See Secretary, Nyanza Muslim Social Service League to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, in 
KNAlPCINZAJ3!18!29. 
399 Minutes of Swahili Muslim Association of 28th January1950 in KNAlPCINZAJ3!18!29. 











7.10 'Not qualified but capable': Confirming Sharif'Umar 
Before Sharif <Vmar was transferred from Mumias to Kisumu, T.A. Watts instructed the 
Chief Kadhi, Sayyid <Ali b. AQmad Badawy to test his ability to administer Islamic 
laws.401 During the process Sayyid <Ali Badawy indicated that he was not particularly 
impressed with Sharif'Vmar and that the candidate had "not mastered extensive learning 
though he had sufficient knowledge to undertake Kadhi's duties without serious 
mistakes,,.402 
Yet Sayyid <Ali AQmad Badawy recommended Sharif<Vmar's appointment, but was 
concerned that his duties required competency in the workings of a bureaucratic system 
and familiarity with procedures. The Chief Kadhi thought that Sharif <Vmar's handicap 
with bureaucratic procedures was not unique, as some Kadhis at the Coast also had no 
knowledge of the procedures which were based on English Common law. Moreover, 
instructions were written in English and most Kadhis had not mastered the language.403 
The Chief Kadhi's sentiments inspired little confidence in Sharif <Vmar, but also warned 
of a complicated judicial process that brought elements of English common law and 
401 T. A. Watts, Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza to District Commissioner, North Nyanza ref. 2/4/2/130 
of 10th March 1950 in KNAlPCINZAl3118/29. 
402 Sayyid Ali Ahmad Badawy, Chief Kadhi to District Commissioner, Mombasa on 17th June, 1950 in 
KNAlPCINZAl3118/29. 












Muslim law together. Muslims suspected that such attempts hindered the implementation 
of Muslim law in personal matters. Nevertheless, Sharif (Umar was posted to Kisumu and 
his duties included conducting visits to all Districts of Nyanza to arbitrate in dispute 
involving matters of Muslim personal status. 
When Sharif(Umar was relocated to Kisumu, the Wanga immediately re-invigorated 
their campaign for a kinsman Abu Bakr b. Juma's appointment. But Sharif'Umar 
nominated his son Sharif Mul)ammad b. SharifcUmar al-Mahdaly to succeed him. The 
Wanga objected furiously and held meetings to mobilize their community against 
possible appointment. For his part Sharif 'Umar castigated the Wanga for being 
ungrateful for his services in teaching them Islam for so many years. He was concerned 
that the Wanga were holding "baraza(meeting)after baraza" to try to stop his son from 
taking up the post of Registrar at Mumias. He defended his action on the fact that 
"Sharif Mul)ammad understood more about Islamic laws and custom than any other 
person in Mumias.,,404 He warned the Wanga not to consider the position of a registrar to 
be that of a tribal chief as the post was a religious one and ought to be taken seriously. 
In April 1951 the government invited the Nyanza Muslim Social Service League 
(NMSSL) to seek the opinion of the entire Muslim population on the appointment to 
replace Sharif'Umar at Mumias. The Wanga lost again as the NMSSL sought a 
compromise candidate in Shaykh Ishaq b. Mul)ammad from the Somali community, who 












was appointed on the strength of his previous service in the same capacity in the Uasin 
Gishu district ofNyanza Province.405 
7.11 Conclusions 
The contest over Kadhiship between all the Wanga communities against one Arab 
individual epitomized the racially defined struggles for leadership in an Islamic polity, 
but also emphasized the dominance of the preferences by colonial officials on the choice 
ofKadhis. This has been an illustration that the ultimate power that accorded authority to 
the Kadhi during the colonial period was the colonial state and that its preference was 
always to accord coastal communities the power and authority to rule over indigenous 
communities. Indirect rule seemed to employ coastal community members in the interior. 
In the case discussed, SharifUmar b. Abd Allah al-Mahdaly could not have had a chance 
to exercise the authority of a Kadhi were it not for the fact that colonial authorities 
preferred him on the basis of his Arab identity. 
405 Nyanza Muslim Social Service League to T. Watts, District Commissioner, Central Nyanza on 16th 












8.0 General Conclusions 
I have made detailed conclusions at the ends of chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, 
which constitute the major discussions and findings of this study. However, in this 
chapter, I will summarize the findings in a generalized form based on the objectives set 
for this study. 
Kenyan Muslim demography of the period covered by this study comprised a non-
homogenous population of diverse ethnic and racial groups. Contrary to the common 
understanding that puts the geographical 'home' of Islam within the expansive Coastal 
regions of Eastern African, Kenyan Islam belongs to the interior as much as it does to the 
Coast. Islam thus has extended its influences into places like Mumias and Nairobi and 
their surrounded areas to create a distinctive and indigenous interior or Bara-based 
Muslim demography. Thus, the Muslim demography of Kenya comprises the Arabs, 
Mijikenda and their Swahili neighbors at the Coast, but it is incomplete if the Kikuyu, 
Kamba, Luhya and Luo Muslims are not included in defining the ummah. 
The existence of race, ethnic group identities and regional balances brings us to other 
conclusions, based on our analysis of more recent attempts to consolidate a unitary form 











because, Muslims could not and did not entirely agree on the forms of leadership or the 
composition of leading interlocutors in the political and ritual arena. Contrary to the 
notion that there was no priesthood in Islam, distinguishable forms of leadership do 
actually exist in Islamic societies. In Kenya the culama: was such a form that mostly 
exercised leadership in ritual practices. In spite of an almost common reverence for the 
authority of the culamiP, however, most of them failed to gain unquestionable acceptance 
outside their specific racial, ethnic or residential identities. Muslim interest groups always 
negotiated power and authority around race and ethnicity. Every segment of the Muslim 
population of Kenya demanded a role in the emerging leadership institutions, especially 
within the structures of power established by the colonial authorities. In fact communities 
demanded the right to exercise not just any role, but a leadership role in Mumias in 
opposition to the position accorded to an Arab 'outsider'. While demanding the 
opportunity to lead other Muslims, the Wanga were prone to use their Wanga identity and 
regionalism to claim and assert exclusiveness. So too did the Mijikenda when they argued 
with their Swahili neighbors. It is in this sense that we concluded that the emergence of 
political forms of leadership, as forms of civil society in Mombasa, did not occur within 
parameters other than those of race, identity politics and colonial power. 
Even overtly political groups that championed political leadership and interests confined 
to racial identity and exclusivity. The Central Arab Association (CAA) was for Arabs and 
the Afro-Asian Association (AAA) reserved membership to members of mixed descent. 
The Mrican Muslim Society made it clear that Arab members were not welcome. In this 











institutionalizing race as a factor in according the scarce resource of leadership. With its 
ideas of civilization that debunked the political aspiration of "native" communities, 
colonial power, embarked on a process to exercise control. Such control was exercised by 
limiting indigenous institutions of power, and creating new models of authority. 
Colonized African communities had no choice but accept such structures and their 
conditions as a matter of political expediency and means of survival. The Islamic figures 
of authority, the Shaykh aI-Islam and other lower Kadhis were an instance of this broader 
system. Whilst apparently continuing earlier forms of religious control, the colonial 
Kadhis were never delineated from the colonial system. Even institutions of political 
representation, like the Legislative Council that manifested the colonial idea of civilized 
articulation of power and authority, did not escape the racial pre-eminence. The colonial 
rulers' major predicament was how to incorporate the diverse interests of such a wide 
variety of non-homogenous populations. In its responses to this predicament colonial 
power formulated the policy of indirect rule, by deliberately setting apart for favors one 
section of the population to the detriment of other sub-groups. The process of selecting 
leaders exclusively from a particular ethnic and racial group was not only objected to by 
the majority of the population affected by the exclusion, but one of its major effects was 
the consolidation of race as a determining factor in leadership evaluation. Amongst the 
Muslims of Kenya, racially inclined and ethnically defined values of leadership in its 
political and religious forms were grounded during colonial rule. This study concurs with 
Mamdani's notion that places post-colonial forms of leadership in African societies 
within the discourses of the effects of colonial policies. Colonial forms of leadership 
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Abd al-Ral;unan <Umar Cheka 
Ali, Shaykh Darani 
Ali, Shaykh Shee 
Ali, Shaykh Mwinzagu 
Ali, Mzee wa Shaft 
Bashir Mchangamwe 
I:Iammad, Shaykh Qasim al-Mazru<i 
List of Oral lriformants 
The Chairman of the Supreme Council of Kenya 
Muslim (SUPKEM) and Professor of Chemistry at 
the University of Nairobi 
A Mombasa based African Muslim politician. Was 
elected member of parliament for Lamu during the 
early 1980's and was Secretary of the African 
Muslim Society (AMS). 
A Former Kadhi of Nairobi, retired, and presently an 
adviser to the Chief Kadhi, had a lot of insight on the 
histories and chronology of Kadhi; he was 
instrumental in relating, and clarifying family 
relations between various Kadhi 
A scholar of repute, a long time resident of Nairobi 
and former Imam of the Jamia Mosque in Nairobi. A 
participant in Muslim political activities and 
Chairman of the Council of Imams and Preachers of 
Islam (CIPK). 
A Kadhi of Mombasa since 1970's and a member of 
the Thelatha Taifa Swahili 
A member of the Mijikenda and resident of Mombasa 
participated in the early formation of the African 
Muslim Society (AMS). 
A resident of Nairobi and a progenitor of the 
Thelatha Taifa families that opposed the 
Mazru<i dominance of the Kadhiship in Mombasa. 
Interviewed while the Kadhi of Nairobi. He was 












List of Oral Informants (cont'd) 
Haider Ali Matano 
Haji Mwishame 
Juma Bakari Gari 
JumaKeke 
Mohammed Omar. M. Dzimba 
Munir Mazrti<I 
Ramadhani Matano 
Rashid Salim Mwaneke 
Rajab Sumba 
The son of Mombasa political reformer and one of 
the strongests supporters of the political activities of 
the Thelatha Taifa community. His father was a 
founder member of the Afro-Asian Association 
(AAA). 
A Tisa Taifa Swahili patriot and resident of Jomvu 
Kuu. 
A Giryama Muslim and resident of Kisauni in 
Mombasa 
A Digo elder and resident of Mwabungo, Kwale. A 
herbalists of repute and very informative on the 
social histories of the Digo. 
A Digo resident of Nyali Mombasa, municipal 
worker during the 1940's to early 1960. Had useful 
knowledge of the political atmosphere of Mombasa 
during the 1960's. 
A member of the prominent Mazrti<I family in 
Mombasa. 
A Tisa Taifa Swahili, resident of Mtongwe, 
Mombasa and useful for his pictorial memory of 
political events during the 1940's 
A Digo Muslims and resident of Kisauni, Mombasa. 
Useful in locating and placing local historical 
incidents in their social perspectives. 
A former Mayor of Mombasa and a reliable source of 











List of Oral Informants (cont'd) 
Salim wa Katwa 
Salim Gakweli 
Shekue Ali 
Sulayman, Shaykh Munyi 
Swaleh, Ustadh Harith 
<Umar Sulayman Mwajambia 
A Mijikenda Muslim, resident of Mtwapa to the north 
of Mombasa, useful with information on early local 
histories of Mombasa and social interactions 
especially in the early 1920's and 1930's 
A Mijikenda-Digo elder and resident of Mkomani, 
Mombasa, instrumental in narrations of social 
interactions between Swahili families and the 
Mijikenda. 
A Digo from Kwale but a long time resident of 
Mombasa, participated in the formation of various 
nationalistic political organizations in Mombasa 
during the early 1950's, was instrumental in the 
histories of African Muslims participation in politics 
in Mombasa. 
Was the Registrar of Muslim Marriages in the 
Majengo area of Nairobi. His father was amongst the 
first Kikuyu Muslim and his knowledge of the local 
histories ofIslam in Nairobi was useful. 
A prominent Mombasa based <alim who hails from 
Lamu. Well known in Mombasa for his philosophical 
darsa. He was appointed the interim Chairman of the 
proposed Majlis aJ-<Ulamil. I was impressed by his 
collection of books on Islam and other subjects in his 
home library in Mombasa. 
A Muslim elder in Nairobi with considerable respect 
and active in the community. He has been a local 
comedian and recently started to tell stories with 
Islamic moral teachings in an FM Radio station in 
Nairobi. He considers himself a second generation of 
upcountry Muslim being the son of a local Kikuyu 
woman and a Digo Muslim who immigrated from 
Tanga and settled in Nairobi during early twentieth 
century. 
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